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Preamble and Motivation
This book contributes to two facets of the discussion on wage rigidity: downward 
nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) and real wage rigidity of newly hired workers over 
the business cycle. It is divided into three parts.
The first and major part of the book focuses on DNWR. It provides an overview 
on its causes and degree, deals with the macroeconomic consequences of DNWR, 
and analyzes whether or not DNWR affects workers differently, conditional on their 
characteristics, their position in the wage change distribution, and their employers’ 
characteristics.
The second part of the book focuses on real wage rigidity of newly hired workers 
over the business cycle. One way of generating realistically cyclical fluctuations in 
the unemployment rate in the Mortensen-Pissarides model is the introduction of 
rigid wages into the model. This part of the book contributes to the discussion on 
whether or not this assumption can be confirmed empirically.
The third part of the book summarizes the results and offers an outlook for 
future research.
Motivation for Part I: Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
Price stability adds to economic wealth and is hence favored by many economists. 
Advantages of price stability include, e.g., a reduced inflation risk premium in 
interest rates and the reduction of uncertainties about the general development of 
prices – which leads to more transparency of relative prices. Since the early 1990s 
the prior goal of central banks’ monetary policy has therefore been the assertion 
and maintenance of low inflation rates (i.e. inflation rates below but close to 2 %) 
in order to assure price stability.
However, some economists call attention to possible negative effects of low 
inflation rates. The most prominent critique can be traced back to Tobin (1972). 
He advances the view that DNWR in combination with low inflation rates could 
hamper necessary real wage adjustments of firms that have economic difficulties. 
This would lead to a higher level of real wages and to an increase of the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Tobin (1972) argues that “inflation greases the wheels of the 
labor market”: a certain positive inflation rate is necessary in order to enable 
employers to decrease the real wages of employees without being forced to 
decrease nominal wages – which is often not accepted by employees.
Concerns about potentially adverse employment effects of low inflation 
have given rise to a plethora of studies on the extent of DNWR, such as the 
microeconometric multicountry studies of Behr and Pötter (2010), Knoppik and 
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Beissinger (2009), and Dickens et al. (2007a) or the survey evidence provided by 
Bewley (1999). Focusing on the compression of wage cuts, microeconometric studies 
usually find a high degree of DNWR. In Germany, e.g., approximately 28  percent 
of wage cuts desired by employers are avoided because of DNWR (Knoppik and 
Beissinger, 2009). Several studies also show that certain workers frequently 
experience nominal wage freezes, while other workers experience nominal wage 
cuts (see, e.g., Kahn, 1997; Beissinger and Knoppik, 2001; Anspal and Järve, 2011), 
and that firm characteristics play a crucial role as well (see, e.g., Babecký et al., 
2010). Given the microeconometric evidence, the observed macroeconomic effects 
on aggregate real wages and employment seem to be surprisingly weak, leading 
Lebow et al. (1999) to speak of a “micro-macro puzzle”.
Chapter 1
provides an overview on causes, extent, and implications of DNWR with a focus on 
Germany. The chapter is a translated and slightly revised compendium of the book 
article “Ursachen, Ausmaß und Implikationen von Abwärtsnominallohnstarrheit” 
[Causes, extent and implications of downward nominal wage rigidity] (Beissinger 
and Stüber, 2010) and the IAB Brief Report “Geldpolitik und Beschäftigung: Ist 
niedrige Inflation Gift für den Arbeitsmarkt?” [Monetary policy and employment: is 
low inflation the labor market’s poison?] (Stüber and Beissinger, 2011).
Chapter 2
deals with the macroeconomic consequences of DNWR and offers a solution 
to the “micro-macro puzzle”: I show that wage cuts as well as wage increases 
are compressed in the presence of DNWR. Because of the compression of wage 
increases, the macroeconomic effects on aggregate real wages are weak. I find that 
a decrease in inflation of one percentage point only causes an average increase 
of real wage growth between 0.013 and 0.060 percent. The results indicate that 
DNWR does not provide a strong argument against low inflation targets. The 
chapter is based upon the article “Does downward nominal wage rigidity dampen 
wage increases?” (Stüber and Beissinger, 2012) and the corresponding discussion 
paper (Stüber and Beissinger, 2010).
Chapter 3
analyzes whether or not DNWR affects workers differently, conditional on their 
characteristics, their position in the wage change distribution, and their employers’ 
characteristics. The results show that some workers are “discriminated” against by 
DNWR. Previous results are confirmed, e.g., that women resist nominal wage cuts 
less than men (see, e.g., Anspal and Järve, 2011), and new insights are gained, e.g., 
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that blue-collar workers in particular are affected by the compression of wage 
increases. The chapter is based upon the article “Downward nominal wage rigidity 
in a cross section: an analysis of linked employer-employee data for the years 1995 
to 2007” (Stüber, 2012b).
Motivation for Part II: Real Wage Rigidity
The second part of the book deals with real wage rigidity. More precisely, it discusses 
and analyzes the real wage rigidity of job entrants over the business cycle. So far, 
little empirical evidence exists on how real wages of newly hired workers react to 
the business cycle.
The recent interest in real wage rigidity has been driven by the ongoing debate 
on the ability of the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) to generate realistically large cyclical fluctuations 
in unemployment (see, e.g., Shimer, 2005; Hall, 2005; Veracierto, 2008). Shimer 
(2005, p. 45) for example shows “[…] that a search and matching model in which 
wages are determined by Nash bargaining cannot generate substantial movements 
along a downward-sloping Beveridge curve in response to shocks of a plausible 
magnitude.” This fact is usually referred to as the “Shimer-Puzzle”. So far, Shimer’s 
(2004, 2005) suggestion to generate more variability of unemployment within the 
model by introducing wage rigidity has been widely shared (see, e.g., Hall, 2005; 
Hall and Milgrom, 2008; Kennan, 2010). Since the decision of opening a vacancy 
or not is mainly influenced by the real wage of newly hired workers (see, e.g., 
Pissarides, 2009; Haefke et al., 2012), research has recently often focused on the 
real wage cyclicality of job entrants.
Recently the idea of introducing real wage stickiness into the search and 
matching model – in order to amplify realistic volatility of unemployment – has 
also been challenged. Pissarides (2009), e.g., dismisses theories based on cyclically 
rigid wages because empirical research shows that hiring wages are in fact 
procyclical. His dismissal is based on microeconomic studies reporting that the 
real wage cyclicality for job movers is larger than for incumbent workers (e.g., 
Bils, 1985; Shin, 1994; Devereux and Hart, 2006; Shin and Solon, 2007). These 
studies, however, do not control for “cyclical upgrading” in booms and “cyclical 
downgrading” in recessions: workers may move from high- to low-wage jobs 
over the business cycle and vice versa, while the wage of newly hired workers 
within these jobs may be rigid (cf. Gertler and Trigari, 2009). Hence, not controlling 
for the employer/employee match could lead to the conclusion that the wage is 
procyclical over the business cycle when in fact the procyclical movements of the 
wage actually result only from the job changes.
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Whether or not introducing wage rigidity into search and matching models is 
justified should be subject to empirical investigation: how rigid are real wages 
– especially real entry-wages – over the business cycle? So far, to the best of my 
knowledge, only two studies for Portugal exist that control for “cyclical upgrading” 
and “cyclical downgrading” in employee/employer matches: Carneiro et al. (2012) 
and Martins et al. (2012b).
Chapter 4
provides a brief overview on previous research and recent developments concerning 
the real wage rigidity of newly hired workers over the business cycle.
Chapter 5
presents the first empirical evidence for a large economy (Germany) on the 
cyclicality of real entry-wages while controlling for “cyclical upgrading” and 
“cyclical downgrading” in employee/employer matches, by introducing firm-job 
fixed effects in the regressions. The results show that entry-wages in Germany are 
not rigid, but respond considerably to business cycle conditions. An increase in the 
unemployment rate of one percentage point leads to about 0.92 to 1.27  percent 
lower real entry-wages. The results strengthen Pissarides’ (2009) dismissal of 
theories based on cyclically rigid hiring wages. The chapter is based upon the 
discussion paper “Are real entry wages rigid over the business cycle? Empirical 
evidence for Germany from 1977 to 2009” (Stüber, 2012a).
Part I
Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
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1  Causes, Extent, and Implications of Downward Nominal 
Wage Rigidity
Since around two decades, central banks of western industrialized countries have 
been able to stabilize the inflation rate at a low level. Although price stability is a 
central target of economic policy, some economists see a threat in it: downwardly 
rigid nominal wages in combination with low inflation rates could lead to a higher 
unemployment rate.
The interaction between inflation and unemployment has concerned researchers 
and politicians for a long time. For instance, the former German chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt admitted in 1972: “It appears to me, that the German nation – 
poignantly formulated – rather tolerates a 5 percent price increase than 5 percent 
unemployment.”1 But is there really a compulsory trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, and vice versa?
Price stability adds to the economic wealth and is hence favored by many 
economists. Advantages of price stability include, e.g., a reduced inflation risk 
premium in interest rates and the reduction of uncertainties about the general 
development of prices – which leads to more transparency of relative prices.2 
Since the early 1990s the prior goal of monetary policy of central banks of western 
industrialized countries has therefore been the assertion and maintenance of low 
inflation rates in order to assure vast price stability. The Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank, e.g., defined price stability in 1998 “[…] as a year-on-year 
increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of 
below 2 %.” (European Central Bank, 2011, p. 8) In May 2003, the Governing Council 
made clear that, within this definition, it aims at keeping inflation rates below but 
‘[…] “close to 2 % over the medium term”. ’ (European Central Bank, 2011, p. 8)
However, some economists call attention to possible negative effects of low 
inflation rates. The most prominent critique can be traced back to Tobin (1972). He 
advances the view that downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR)3 in combination 
with low inflation rates could hamper necessary real wage adjustments of firms 
that have economic difficulties. This would lead to a higher real wage level and 
to an increase of the equilibrium unemployment rate.4 Tobin (1972) argues that 
“inflation greases the wheels of the labor market”: a certain positive inflation rate 
1 Own translation; original statement: “Mir scheint, daß das deutsche Volk – zugespitzt – 5 Prozent Preisanstieg eher 
vertragen kann, als 5 Prozent Arbeitslosigkeit.” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1972)
2 A detailed overview of the advantages of price stability is provided by the European Central Bank (2011).
3 DNWR describes the fact that firms cannot cut nominal wages, or that they cannot cut the nominal wage in the 
desired extent. Reasons for DNWR are introduced in Section 1.2.
4 The equilibrium unemployment rate is defined as the unemployment rate that would exist if the labor market was 
in equilibrium.
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is necessary in order to enable employers to decrease the real wages of employees 
without being forced to decrease the nominal wage – which is not accepted by 
employees.
Since the 1990s there has been a lively academic debate on the existence and 
the extent of DNWR. This debate has not only been carried out in academic journals 
but also in the media.5
This chapter provides an overview of the debate on DNWR and inflation. First, 
I illustrate the theoretical view on how an inflation that is too low in combination 
with DNWR can increase the equilibrium unemployment rate. In Section 1.2 I address 
possible reasons for DNWR. Section 1.3 introduces strategies for the identification 
of DNWR in microdata. Section 1.4 looks at the existence and the extent of DNWR, 
as well as macroeconomic consequences, and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.1  The Connection between Inflation, Unemployment,  
and Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
Since the 1970s the majority of economists has held the view that a long-term 
relationship between inflation and unemployment does not exist. This opinion 
is based on the work of Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968). Independent from 
each other, they stress that rational economic agents should orient their behavior 
towards real variables and not towards nominal variables. Hence, employees 
should be interested in their real wage and not their nominal wage. In wage 
bargaining usually the nominal wage is fixed for the next period; therefore the 
expected inflation rate is of great importance. If (in the long-run) the expected 
inflation rate is anticipated correctly, nominal wage increases should, ceteris 
paribus, exactly correct for the inflation rate. Hence monetary policy should be 
neutral in the long-run – i.e. it should not affect real variables in the economy. An 
enduring relationship between monetary policy and the real wage can only exist 
if money illusion exists – i.e. if economic agents base their decisions on nominal 
variables (e.g., prices in monetary units) and not on real variables (e.g., relative 
prices). Such a behavior, however, contradicts the usual assumption of rational 
behavior of economic agents.
The hypothesis of the neutrality of monetary policy in the long-run can 
graphically be displayed as a vertical Phillips-curve (see Figure 1.1). The equilibrium 
unemployment rate u* depends – if anticipations are correct – only on structural 
factors like the amount of unemployment benefit. At this equilibrium unemployment 
5 See, e.g., International Monetary Fund (1999), the contributions in European Central Bank (2001, 2003), Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2002), and the articles of the Economist (2000a,b, 2002) and the 
NNZexecutive (2009).
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rate there is neither pressure for rising nor for falling inflation rates from the 
labor market – i.e. u* is consistent with a constant inflation rate. Therefore, the 
acronym NAIRU (Non-Accelerating-Inflation Rate of Unemployment) is used for 
the equilibrium unemployment rate. According to the hypothesis of the neutrality 
of monetary policy in the long-run, central banks can use their monetary policy to 
“choose” an inflation rate that is optimal in their opinion – e.g. point A or point B 
in Figure 1.1a – without affecting the NAIRU.
But some economists criticize the hypothesis of the neutrality of monetary policy 
in the long-run. Tobin (1972), e.g., points out possible threats for the labor market 
that could result from low inflation rates. He hypothesizes that the combination of 
DNWR and low inflation rates could increase the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
Tobin (1972) constitutes that firms, which are hit by an adverse (negative) shock, 
might not be able to implement necessary real wage cuts if the inflation rate is too 
low and DNWR binds. Instead of cutting real wages these firms resort to dismissing 
employees. Therefore Tobin (1972) concludes that a certain positive inflation rate 
is preferable from a macroeconomic perspective.
It took nearly 20 years to include Tobin’s (1972) hypothesis in a general equilibrium 
model. Akerlof et al. (1996) use a modification of the standard NAIRU model to 
prove Tobin’s postulated long-run Phillips-curve trade-off in times of low inflation. 
Their result ignited a lively debate on the existence and the extent of DNWR. Akerlof 
et al. (1996) show that in times of low inflation rates the long-run Phillips-curve 
is not vertical but inclining. Figure 1.1b shows how the equilibrium unemployment 
rate can then depend on the inflation rate. In point A the inflation rate is sufficiently 
Figure 1.1: Phillips-curve by flexible and downward rigid nominal wages 
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high in order to keep the minimal equilibrium unemployment rate u*min – the value 
is equivalent to the value of u*  from Figure  1.1a. With a lower inflation rate, 
e.g. in point B, the corresponding unemployment rate  u*B  is higher than u*min. The 
interaction of low inflation and DNWR leads to an excess-unemployment rate of 
u*B   –  u*min. Akerlof’s et al. (1996) simulations for the USA show that in the case of 
zero inflation the excess-unemployment rate can reach several percentage points. 
However, already a inflation rate of around three percent is sufficient to assure 
u*min. The following paragraph examines the modeled processes of the labor market.
The model of Akerlof et al. (1996) is based on plausible assumptions: goods 
and labor market are characterized by imperfect competition, and firms and labor 
unions are heterogeneous. Because of their market power, firms and labor unions 
possess price and wage setting powers. In combination with the assumption of 
heterogeneity this can lead to different real wages between firms. If a firm is 
confronted with a declining demand for its goods, it will react – under imperfect 
competition – by reducing employment and/or by lowering real wages. In times 
with relatively high inflation, firms can decrease the real wage by increasing 
nominal wages by less than prices rise. The lower the inflation rate, the higher 
is the probability that the desired real wage decrease can only be reached by 
decreasing nominal wages. In an economy with zero inflation, every real wage 
decrease will result in a nominal wage decrease. If DNWR exists, and hence firms 
are not able to decrease nominal wages freely, it is not possible to decrease the real 
wage as desired. Therefore firms, which are affected by an adverse development 
of demand, are forced to reduce employment by a higher degree than they would 
with flexible nominal wages or in times of higher inflation. However, one should 
also keep in mind that an inflexibility of real wages cannot only be absorbed by 
employment adjustments. During Germany’s most recent recession working time 
accounts proved to be of value to preserve employment (Zapf and Brehmer, 2010). 
However, the more rigid real wages are, the higher is the probability that firms are 
forced to reduce employment. In contrast, if a decrease of labor cost is possible, 
then the reduction of employment can be attenuated or it can even be avoided. 
Hence, on the macroeconomic level the combination of low inflation and DNWR 
can lead to an increase of the equilibrium unemployment rate. This explains the 
inclining trend of the Phillips-curve in times of low inflation rates (see Figure 1.1b).
1.2 Causes for Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
In the literature the existence of DNWR is explained either by psychologically 
founded patterns of behavior or by institutional conditions.
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1.2.1 Psychological Causes
In a well-known study Bewley (1999) looks into firms’ wage setting during the 
American recession in the beginning of the 1990s. Because of the tremendous 
decrease in demand and the associated decrease in production the firms had 
strong economic incentives to lower their production costs by real wage decreases. 
Since the inflation rate was relatively low, desired real wage decreases should 
have resulted in nominal wage cuts in many firms. However, nominal wage cuts 
could be observed only in very few firms. Bewley’s (1999) analysis is based on 
over 300  interviews with human resources managers, union leaders, managers of 
temporary employment/help agencies and employment agencies. He discovers that 
firms try to avoid nominal wage cuts because management is afraid that nominal 
wage cuts would damage workers’ morale.
If a firm decides to decrease the nominal wage two effects appear. First, with 
given prices the real wages of the workers decrease. Second, workers feel discredited 
– they are used to yearly nominal wage increases or that their nominal wages at 
least stay stable. A sudden nominal wage cut is interpreted as unfair behavior; the 
workers have the feeling that their work effort is not sufficiently recognized. This 
leads to a decrease of workers’ morale and hence workers eventually provide less 
work effort and engagement which in turn leads to lower productivity of the firm. 
The concept of work morale describes a situation in which employees adopt the 
firm’s aims as their own and are therefore willing to provide a considerable work 
effort to achieve these aims. A good morale within the firm is of great relevance to 
the firm’s management, since usually labor contracts are imperfect contracts – the 
nominal wage is fixed but not the worker’s consideration. Certain aspects of the 
worker’s consideration simply cannot be fixed by a contract – e.g., the level of his or 
her initiative or independent judgment. Given imperfect contracts, it is all the more 
important for employers to create and preserve a cooperative working atmosphere. 
If firms are not able to decrease real wages they are forced to reduce employment 
by a higher degree compared to a situation where real wages are flexible. In 
contrast to nominal wage cuts, dismissals have a weaker effect on worker morale 
and affect the morale only temporarily – since the dismissed persons are not able to 
express their dissatisfaction within the firm. Further, if a firm dismisses employees 
its management has some control over which persons to dismiss. In contrast, if a 
firm cuts wages in particular the more productive employees could decide to leave 
the firm in order to start working for a better-paying firm. Only under exceptional 
circumstances employees seem to be willing to accept nominal wage cuts – e.g., 
if the survival of their employer is threatened by financial problems (see, e.g., 
Stephan, 2006).
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The observation that employees particularly dislike real wage cuts if they are 
achieved by nominal wage cuts points to the existence of money illusion. Money 
illusion is contradictory to the concept of the homo oeconomicus, but the psychology 
literature shows that it is an important and common phenomenon (Sharfir et al., 
1997).6 A further important result from the field of cognitive psychology is that 
alternative representations of one and the same situation (so-called frames) can 
influence individuals’ behavior in these situations in a systematic way (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1986). Economic transactions, e.g., can either be formulated in 
nominal or in real values. The way they are presented affects how individuals 
rate the transaction. Sharfir et al. (1997) attribute money illusion to the use of 
multiple frames – i.e. the simultaneous use of a real and a nominal frame during 
the rating of economic transactions. I would like to illustrate the idea of multiple 
frames using an example where individuals are confronted with two scenarios. 
In scenario A they are offered a two percent nominal wage increase in a time 
with four percent inflation. In scenario B they are offered a two percent nominal 
wage decrease in a time with stable prices (zero inflation). The individuals are 
indifferent between scenario A and B if the scenarios are presented using the real 
frame – in each scenario they would experience a two percent real wage decrease. 
However, the individuals prefer scenario A over scenario B if the scenarios are 
presented using the nominal frame. Confronted with both frames simultaneously, 
the individuals perceive scenario B as more negative as scenario A. Hence the 
phenomena of money illusion can be traced back to the simultaneous use of the 
nominal and the real frame, and the fact that the evaluation of the real frame is 
adulterated by the simultaneous evaluation of the nominal frame. The fallback 
to the nominal frame happens because it is more convenient than the use of the 
real frame – that first demands a translation. Kahneman et al. (1986) demonstrate 
that money illusion also affects fairness considerations. Their research backs the 
statement made above that employees typically consider nominal wage cuts to 
be unfair.
In this context one should also consider that labor relations – like many other 
social interactions – rely on reciprocity. Reciprocal behavior patterns conflict 
with the standard economic model – individuals should base their behavior 
solely on their self-interest. However, a lot of experimental studies show that 
individuals respond to behavior of other individuals that is sensed to be unfair 
with “punishment actions”. Individuals even show reciprocal behavior if this 
behavior only produces costs and not any (material) earnings (Fehr and Gächter, 
6  The existence and importance of money illusion is also documented by experimental studies (cf. Fehr and Tyran, 
2001, 2007).
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2000). Hence, an employer will refrain from actions that employees could perceive 
as unfair – e.g., nominal wage cuts – if he or she expects employers to show 
reciprocal behavior patterns.
A further psychological explanation for DNWR builds on Keynes’ (1936) 
hypothesis that employees’ utility is affected by relative wages. Because wage 
changes are not implemented simultaneously in all firms a coordinating problem 
exists: employers refuse to cut the nominal wage, since this would result in a lower 
relative wage for their employees. However, would the same real wage decrease 
be achieved by an increase in the common price level, the employees’ resistance 
would be much weaker because it would not result in a decrease of their relative 
wages. Bhaskar (1990) develops a detailed micro model based on this hypothesis, 
assuming that the utility loss caused by a decrease of the relative wage is larger 
than the utility gain caused by a wage increase.
1.2.2 Institutional Causes
The institutional approach for the explanation of DNWR builds upon the fact that 
individual or collective labor contracts generally fix a nominal wage for the total 
contract period. Moreover, even after the expiration of the validity of the contract, 
in many countries the fixed nominal wage is paid until a new (collective) agreement 
is negotiated (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Holden, 1994).
To simplify the description, in the following I suppose that the wage bargaining 
takes place between a labor union and an employer organization of a certain 
business sector. As Holden (1994, 2004) shows, in the aftermath of negotiations 
this leads to a strategic disadvantage for the bargaining side that would like to 
change the negotiated wage. With positive inflation the labor union has a strong 
interest to increase wages, since the positive inflation leads to a real wage decrease 
if the nominal wage fixed by the old collective agreement is not changed. If the 
economic situation necessitates that the business sector decreases the real wages, 
the employer organization might try to achieve this through delaying the wage 
bargaining process. With zero or even negative inflation rates, however, a real wage 
decrease can only be implemented by a decrease of the nominal wage. In this case 
the employer organization has a strong interest in a new collective agreement. 
The labor union on the other hand is able to avoid a real wage decrease through 
delaying the wage bargaining process.
Both parties involved in the collective agreement can fall back on collective 
action – strike and lock-out, respectively – to achieve their aims. However, these 
measures have costs that have to be fractured in realistically by the respective 
party. The possible use of collective action does not change the basic argument: 
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the wage pressure is lower in times of high inflation – because of the weaker 
bargaining position of the labor union – and higher in times of low inflation – 
because of the weaker bargaining position of the employer organization.
Labor unions have more options to oppose wage cuts than individual 
employees; therefore the institutional approach for the explanation of DNWR 
should be more distinctive in countries with a high degree of tariff liaisons 
and a high rate of unionization. In the case of non-unionized workers (free 
labor) the degree of DNWR should depend in particular on the magnitude of job 
protection, since job protection enables (single) employees to oppose nominal 
wage cuts (cf. Holden, 2004).
1.2.3 Conclusion
In the end, it remains an open question whether DNWR can be better explained 
by psychology or by institutions. Correlations between institutional settings and 
country-specific degrees of DNWR rarely lead to significant results – moreover, 
these are often inconsistent (Knoppik and Beissinger, 2009). Thus, the effect 
of institutional variables on the degree of DNWR seems to be rather weak. The 
psychological approach – based upon fairness considerations – seems to play a 
more important role for the explanation of different degrees of country-specific 
DNWR. Also, research based on firm interviews largely comes to the conclusion 
that firms consider fairness considerations in their wage setting and hence try to 
avoid nominal wage cuts. This discussion will be picked up again when I look at the 
existence and the extent of DNWR in Section 1.4.
1.3  Identification of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity  
in Microdata
1.3.1 Basic Considerations
To answer the question whether and, if yes, to what extent firms in economic 
difficulties are unable to decrease real wages as desired because of DNWR one 
generally looks at wage changes (see Beissinger and Knoppik, 2005). Of vital 
importance is to keep in mind that firms as well as employees are heterogeneous. 
Hence, at any time – independently from the general economic situation – firms 
exist that do well while other firms do poorly. Even in the unrealistic case of total 
wage flexibility a wage change distribution would exist.
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The distribution present under total wage flexibility is called the counterfactual 
distribution or notional distribution. With a given inflation rate it would typically 
cover wage increases as well as wage cuts (see Figures 1.2a and 1.2b).
If DNWR binds, firms are not or less often able to cut nominal wages. Thus, 
nominal wage cuts are replaced by zero nominal wage changes. This leads to 
a characteristic reshaping of the wage change distribution: a thinning of the 
distribution in the area of nominal wage cuts and a pile-up at zero (see Figures  1.2c 
and 1.2d). This effect can be observed in reality. Figure 1.3 exemplarily shows 
the distribution of observed wage change for Germany from 2006 to 2007. The 
distribution exhibits the characteristically thinning of the wage cuts and the pile-
up at zero.
Figure 1.2:  Distribution of wage changes with and without downward nominal wage rigidity 
according to hitherto existing studies
0        wage cut         wage increase 0 
a)   low inflation b)   high inflation 
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A comparison between Figures 1.2a and 1.2b shows that an increase in the 
inflation rate leads to a rightward shift of the notional distribution. Because of 
the general price increase there is more room for nominal wage increases and the 
number of desired wage cuts decreases. Also, because of the rightward shift of the 
distribution, a smaller fraction of it is affected by DNWR. Hence the pile-up at zero 
decreases (see Figure 1.2d).
To evaluate the degree of DNWR empirical studies concentrate on the reshaping 
of the wage change distribution described above. The problem is, that the notional 
distribution is unknown. It could, e.g., be possible that the notional distribution is 
also characterized by a thinning in the area of wage cuts and a pile-up at zero. 
Hence, one cannot really be certain whether one observes a distribution that is 
unaffected by DNWR, or a distribution that is influenced by the existence of DNWR. 
In order to distinguish the two possibilities one needs identification strategies that 
assure that certain characteristics of the distribution – e.g., the thinning of the 
lower part and the pile-up at zero – can be traced back to the existence of DNWR. 
Those identification strategies are outlined in the next section.
1.3.2 Identification Strategies and Analytical Approaches
The most basic strategy to identify DNWR relies on the assumption of a specific form 
of the notional wage change distribution. Variations from the notional distribution in 
the areas of nominal wage cut and at zero nominal wage change are interpreted as 
evidence in favor of the existence of DNWR. The literature uses several assumptions 
for the notional wage change distribution: Card and Hyslop (1997) assume that the 
distribution is symmetric (symmetry approach). They do not assume an influence of 
DNWR on wage increases; hence they use this part of the distribution to create 
the counterfactual distribution for the area of nominal wage cuts. Dickens et al. 
(2007a) argue that the counterfactual wage change distribution is described by 
a (symmetric) Weibull-distribution while Behr and Pötter (2010) argue that the 
counterfactual distribution is described by an (asymmetric) generalized hyperbolic 
distribution. In the so-called earnings-function approach by Altonji and Devereux 
(2000), the counterfactual wage changes are described by a Mincer-type regression. 
For the error term of this regression typically a normal distribution is assumed. Hence 
the “conditional” counterfactual distribution, i.e. the wage change distribution 
conditional on given characteristics of human capital variables and further regressors, 
is assumed to be normally distributed. The necessity to make assumptions about 
the counterfactual distribution is the weak point of this identification strategy. If 
the respective assumption about the notional distribution is incorrect, then the 
conclusion about the degree of DNWR derived based on it is problematic as well.
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A more sophisticated identification strategy relies on the fact that shifts of the 
wage change distribution along the x-axis can lead to systematic shape changes 
if DNWR exists. Such shifts take place when the average nominal wage growth 
alters. Together with changes in the rate of productivity growth the inflation 
rate is an important cause for changes of the position of the nominal wage 
change distribution. For an illustration I refer to Figure 1.2. As the comparison of 
Figures  1.2a and 1.2b shows, an increase in the inflation rate leads to a rightward 
shift of the notional wage change distribution. Because of the rightward shift of the 
wage distribution a smaller fraction of it is influenced by DNWR. This affects the 
shape of the actual wage change distribution – the pile up at zero decreases (see 
Figures 1.2c and 1.2d). One might conclude that DNWR exists if such a systematic 
shift of the shape of the distribution of actual wage changes can be observed. 
The advantage of this second identification strategy is that no assumption on the 
shape of the counterfactual distribution of wage changes is necessary. However, 
one has to assume that the shape of the counterfactual wage change distribution 
is stable over time. Several studies use this identification strategy. McLaughlin’s 
(1994) so-called skewness-location approach analyzes whether the skewness of 
the wage change distribution varies systematically with changes of the position of 
the wage change distribution. This approach makes it possible to decide about the 
existence of DNWR, but not about the degree of rigidity. A quantification of the 
degree of rigidity is possible with the histogram-location approach (Kahn, 2007) or 
the kernel-location approach (Knoppik, 2007). The first approach uses histograms 
and the second kernel density estimations to econometrically determine whether 
the shape of the wage change distribution varies systematically with changes of 
the position of the wage change distribution.
1.4 Existence and Extent of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
1.4.1 Microdata Studies
The existence of DNWR on the individual (micro) level has empirically been 
demonstrated for many countries. For Germany, e.g., Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) 
estimate a degree of (downward nominal) wage rigidity of 28 percent. The degree 
of downward nominal wage rigidity measures the share of desired wage reductions 
that are prevented by DNWR. Hence, in Germany 28 percent of firms’ desired wage 
cuts are avoided because of DNWR. Other European countries have quite high 
degrees of wage rigidity as well (see Figure 1.4).
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In this summary I will concentrate on five multicountry studies (see Table 1.1) 
where all economies are analyzed using the same approach. Therefore, the results 
are better comparable than results from single-country studies.7
7 The results of some selected single-country studies are presented in Table A.1 of Appendix A.
Figure 1.4: Downward nominal wage rigidity of selected EU countries
1  The estimation for the European Union is based upon 12 of the 15 old member states (without Luxembourg,  
the Netherlands, and Sweden).
2  The estimation for the Euro-zone is based upon 10 of the 12 original member states (without Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands).
3  The degree of (downward nominal) wage rigidity measures the share of desired wage reductions that are 
prevented by downward nominal wage rigidity.
Note: Results are taken from Knoppik and Beissinger (2009, Tab. 1, p. 330).
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Table 1.1: Multicountry studies and their results
Study Countriesa Data  Approach 
Behr and Pötter (2010) 10 EU-countries: B, D, DK, 
E, F, GB, GR, I, IRL, P 
European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP, 
1994–2001) 
hyperbolic-notional 
approach, histogram-
location approach 
Highest degree of rigidity: GR (42 %), P (40 %) and I (36 %)
Lowest degrees of rigidity: E (3 %), IRL (5 %) and GB (9 %)
Knoppik and Beissinger 
(2009) 
12 EU-countries: A, B, 
D, DK, E, F, FIN, GB, GR, 
I, IRL, P 
ECHP (1994–2001) histogram-location 
approach 
Average degree of rigidity over all 12 countries: 36 %
Highest degrees of rigidity: I (66 %), B (47 %) and FIN (46 %)
Lowest degrees of rigidity: E (7 %), GB (14 %) and IRL (18 %)
Holden and Wulfsberg 
(2008) 
19 OECD-countries: A, B, 
CDN, D, DK, E, F, FIN, GB, 
GR, I, IRL, L, N, NL, NZ, P, 
S, USA 
Sector data of OECD 
(1973–99) 
 empirical-notional 
approach 
Degree of rigidity for north-European countries (DK, FIN, N, S): 50 %
Degree of rigidity for south-European countries (E, GR, I, P): 41 %
Degree of rigidity for central-European countries (A, B, D, F, L, NL): 23 %
Degree of rigidity for English speaking countries (CDN, GB, IRL, NZ, USA): 20 %
On the level of individual countries the simulation finds some positive degree of rigidity for all countries except 
for F, GR and E. However, the results for CDN, F, D, GR, E, N, GB and the USA are not significant different from 
zero.
Highest significant degrees of rigidity: I (100 %), P (86 %) and A (71 %)
Lowest significant degrees of rigidity: NZ (21 %), GB (21 %) and B (23 %)
Dickens et al. (2007b) 16 countries: A, B, CH, D, 
DK, F, FIN, GB, GR, I, IRL, 
N, NL, P, S, USA 
ECHP and 19 further 
datasetsb 
Weibull-notional approach
Rigidity degrees between 9 % and 66 %
Dickens et al. (2007a) 16 countries: A, B, CH, D, 
DK, F, FIN, GB, GR, I, IRL, 
N, NL, P, S, USA 
ECHP and 19 further 
datasetsb 
Variant of the symmetry 
approach
Average degree of rigidity over all 16 countries: 28 %
Rigidity degrees between 4 % (IRL) and 58 % (P) with a standard deviation of 13 percentage points
Lowest degrees of rigidity: IRL, DK and F
Highest degrees of rigidity S, USA and P
Notes:  Degree of (downward nominal) wage rigidity measures the share of desired wage reductions that are 
prevented by DNWR. 
a  A = Austria, B = Belgium, CDN = Canada, CH = Switzerland, D = Germany, DK = Denmark, E = Spain, F = France, 
FIN = Finland, GB = Great Britain, GR = Greece, I = Italy, IRL = Ireland, L = Luxembourg, N = Norway, NL = the 
Netherlands, NZ = New Zealand, P = Portugal, S = Sweden, USA = United States of America. 
b  Dickens et al. (2007b,a) use 20 datasets. The time period (beginning of the 1970s to the beginning of the 2000s) 
covered varies from dataset to dataset; on average 12 years are covered. For a data overview see Dickens et al. 
(2007b, Tab. 2, p. 47f.) or Dickens et al. (2007a, Tab. 1, p. 198). 
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Dickens et al. (2007b) use different national and international data and two 
different methods to estimate the degree of DNWR. What they call their “simple 
method” is a quantitative version of the symmetry approach; their second 
approach assumes a (symmetric) Weibull-distribution for the counterfactual 
wage change distribution.
In Dickens et al. (2007a) it is implicitly assumed that the counterfactual 
distribution has no pile-up at zero. The degree of rigidity is determined by the 
number of zero nominal wage changes in relation to the sum of the number of 
nominal wage cuts and the number of zero nominal wage changes.
Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) and Behr and Pötter (2010) use data of the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The advantage of the ECHP is that 
the survey – conducted in the 15 “old” member states of the EU – is based on a 
uniform questionnaire. Hence, the data are comparable across countries. Knoppik 
and Beissinger (2009) use a multicountry version of the histogram-location 
approach, while Behr and Pötter (2010) assume – in their favored approach – that 
the counterfactual distribution can be represented by a generalized hyperbolical 
distribution. To facilitate comparisons with other studies, they also apply the 
histogram-location approach for individual countries.
Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) develop a completely non-parametrical 
approach – they run simulations based on empirically observed distributions. This 
empirical-notional approach is based – as the histogram-location approach – on 
the assumption that a change of the position of the wage change distribution 
leads to a characteristic shape change of the distribution if DNWR binds.
All the above mentioned studies use individual wage changes, apart from 
the study of Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) that uses sector data. All five studies 
find significant DNWR for all observed countries (see Table 1.1). The estimated 
degrees of rigidity are quantitatively pretty similar, too. Behr and Pötter (2010) 
and Knoppik and Beissinger (2009), e.g., find that inside the EU-10 the south 
European countries Greece, Italy and Portugal exhibit the highest degrees of 
rigidity, Ireland, Great Britain, and Spain the lowest. 
Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) use Bravais-Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients to compare their results to results of other studies. The corresponding 
correlation coefficients are displayed in Table  1.2. The coefficients show that the 
results of the different studies are all quite similar.
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Table 1.2:  Correlations between estimates of the degree of rigidity of Knoppik and Beissinger 
(2009) with other studies
 
Pearson correlation coefficients Spearman correlation coefficients
 Pairwisea  Casewiseb  Pairwisea  Casewiseb 
Behr and Pötter (2005): 
HNAc 
 0.80 (10)  0.75 (9)  0.77 (19)  0.80 (9) 
Behr and Pötter (2005): 
HLAc 
 0.77 (10)  0.73 (9)  0.75 (10)  0.73 (9) 
Dickens et al. (2006)d  0.56 (11)  0.66 (9)  0.31 (11)  0.54 (9) 
Holden and Wulfsberg 
(2006)e 
 0.65 (12)  0.56 (9)  0.58 (12)  0.40 (9) 
Notes:  Results are taken from Knoppik and Beissinger (2009, Tab. 2, p. 333). Number of considered countries in 
brackets. 
a Results based only on countries that are observed in both studies. 
b Results based only on countries that are observed in all 5 studies. 
c  Compared results are based on the results of the hyperbolic-notional approach (HNA) and the histogram-
location approach (HLA), respectively. Results of the cited discussion paper (Behr and Pötter, 2005) are identical 
to the published paper (Behr and Pötter, 2010). 
d A revised version is available: Dickens et al. (2007b). 
e  Results of the cited discussion paper (Holden and Wulfsberg, 2006) are identical to the published paper Holden 
and Wulfsberg (2008). 
Other studies also calculated correlation coefficients for the degree of rigidity. 
Dickens et al. (2007b), e.g., calculate for their results and the results from Holden 
and Wulfsberg (2008) a correlation coefficient of r =  0.66 (excl. USA). If they take 
the rigidity degree of the USA into account the correlation coefficient drops to 
r  =  0.43. In the revised paper version (Dickens et al. 2007b) they calculate for their 
results and the results from Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) a correlation coefficient 
of r  =  0.45 (excl. USA) and for their results and the results from Knoppik and 
Beissinger (2005)8 a correlation coefficient of r  =  0.74 (excl. USA). Dickens et al. 
(2007a) calculate for 15 countries, which are also in the sample of Holden and 
Wulfsberg (2006), a correlation coefficient for the estimated degree of rigidity of 
r  =  0.46. For the rigidity degrees of 11 countries of the study from Knoppik and 
Beissinger (2005) they calculate a correlation coefficient of r  =  0.45. Dickens et 
al. (2007a) conclude that these correlation coefficients are a strong indicator that 
their results are correct, since the studies use different analytical approaches as 
well as different datasets for different time periods.9
Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) also compare the different results for individual 
countries – see Table 1.3 – using outputs of the studies by Dickens et al. (2006), 
8 Discussion paper version of Knoppik and Beissinger (2009).
9 Results of the cited discussion papers Holden and Wulfsberg (2006) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) are identical 
to the published papers Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2009), respectively.
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Behr and Pötter (2005)10, and Holden and Wulfsberg (2006)11. The results show 
relatively high rigidity degrees for Italy and Portugal and relatively low rigidity 
degrees for Great Britain and Spain. For the other countries, e.g. Greek, France, and 
Ireland, the rigidity degrees (of the different studies) vary stronger.
Table 1.3: Estimated degree of rigidity and ranks across studies
Countrya Degree of rigidity Rankd
Knoppik and 
Beissinger 
(2009)
Other set of resultsb Knoppik and 
Beissinger 
(2009) 
 Other set of resultsb, e
 min  mean  max  Nc highest 
rank 
 mean lowest 
rank 
 Nc
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
I  0.66  0.29  0.58  1.00  4  1  1  2.25  3  4 
B  0.47  0.17  0.20  0.23  4  2  4  5  6  4 
FIN  0.46  0.20  0.43  0.66  2      
A  0.45  0.37  0.54  0.71  2      
GR  0.43  –0.13  0.27  0.63  4  3  1  4.25  8  4 
P  0.41  0.35  0.57  0.86  4  4  1  1.5  2  4 
DK  0.35  0.27  0.35  0.46  4  5  2  3.5  5  4 
D  0.28  0.06  0.11  0.16  4  6  6  7  9  4 
F  0.23  –0.20  0.09  0.40  4  7  4  7  9  4 
IRL  0.18  0.05  0.14  0.32  4  8  4  7  9  4 
GB  0.14  0.06  0.14  0.22  4  9  6  7.25  9  4 
E  0.07  –0.05  0.00  0.04  3      
Notes:  Results are taken from Knoppik and Beissinger (2009, Tab. 3, p. 334). 
a  Countries: A = Austria, B = Belgium, D = Germany, DK = Denmark, E = Spain, F = France, FIN = Finland,  
GB = Great Britain, GR = Greece, I = Italy, IRL = Ireland, P = Portugal. 
b  Ranges based on the sets of estimated national degrees of downward nominal wage rigidity from Behr and 
Pötter (2005) – the discussion paper version of Behr and Pötter (2010) – (based on the generalized-hyperbolic-
notional approach and the histogram-location approach), Dickens et al. (2006), and Holden and Wulfsberg 
(2006) – the discussion paper version of Holden and Wulfsberg (2008).
c N = Number of studies in that the country is observed. 
d Rank: 1 = highest degree of rigidity, 9 = lowest degree of rigidity. 
e Results based only on countries that are observed in all 4 studies.
So far the question, why different countries exhibit different degrees of wage 
rigidity, has not been discussed. According to Section 1.2, DNWR can be explained 
by different notions of fairness or by institutional conditions. To analyze whether 
institutional conditions can explain different degrees of DNWR between countries 
Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) regress their estimated rigidity degrees on 
10 Discussion paper version of Behr and Pötter (2010).
11 Discussion paper version of Holden and Wulfsberg (2008).
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different institutional variables, e.g. indicators for the strictness of employment 
protection legislation, union density and bargaining coverage. Their results show a 
significantly positive correlation between the degree of DNWR and the degree of 
coordination within an economy. For the remaining institutional variable they do 
not find significant correlations. Dickens et al. (2007b) also apply regressions on 
different institutional variables. They only find a significant negative correlation 
between the rate of unionization and the degree of DNWR. A contradictory result 
is found by Holden and Wulfsberg (2008): a positive correlation between the rate 
of unionization and the degree of DNWR.
The three studies show that the correlation between the degree of DNWR and 
institutional variables is astonishingly weak. It looks as if the variation in the degree 
of DNWR between different countries can hardly be explained by institutional 
variables. Therefore one might argue that psychological approaches – based on 
fairness considerations – maybe are more important in explaining the country-
specific degrees of DNWR.
1.4.2 Survey Studies
A further possibility to obtain an impression on the extent of and the reasons for 
DNWR is the conduction and analysis of firm surveys in regard to wage setting 
policies.
A disadvantage of surveys is that they are relatively expensive if one wants 
to obtain a large sample that is “representative”. Therefore, most surveys do not 
constitute a representative firm sample – often only a few firms or certain sectors 
of the economy are surveyed. A further disadvantage with voluntary surveys is the 
self-selection of firms that are willing to provide answers. It is possible that firms, 
that voluntary provide answers, systematically differ from firms that are not willing 
to take part in such surveys.
Table 1.4 summarizes some studies based on surveys and their results. The 
fourth column shows that – except for one survey – the documented DNWR is 
high in all of the studies. The existence of DNWR can usually be confirmed for most 
firms. However, attention should be paid to the fact that the importance of nominal 
wage cuts depends on an economy’s inflation and the growth rates. If a survey is 
conducted, e.g., in times of high inflation it is not surprising that hardly any firm 
would want to cut nominal wages. But the surveys of Agell and Lundborg (2003) 
and Agell and Bennmarker (2007) for Sweden, e.g., were conducted during a period 
of low inflation. Those studies show that even after a longer time of low inflation 
the degree of DNWR does not decrease.
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Table 1.4: Survey studies and their results
Countrya  Study  Data Degree of 
rigidityb 
Cause 
fairness institutional 
regulations
S Agell and 
Bennmarker 
(2007) 
885 firms (among 300 small 
firms) of the manufacturing 
industry, the services sector, 
and the public sector of the 
year 1999. 
 very high  yes  yes
J Kawaguchi and 
Ohtake (2007) 
90 firms and 1557 male worker 
from the region Chubu of the 
year 2000. 
 n.s.  yes  n.s.
S Agell and 
Lundborg (2003) †
Panel data of 157 
predominantly large firms of 
the manufacturing firms for the 
years 1991 and 1998. 
 very high  yes  yes
D Franz and Pfeiffer 
(2003) † 
801 businesses with more than 
10 workers from 6 economic 
sectors of the manufacturing 
industry and services sector of 
the year 2000. 
 n.s.  yes  yes
USA Bewley (1999) † 335 manager, labor leader, 
placement officers, etc. of the 
years 1992 to 1994. 
 very high  yes  no
USA Campbell III and 
Kamlani (1997) † 
111 large firms and 73 smaller 
firms of the manufacturing 
industry and services sector of 
the years 1993/94. 
 n.s.  yes  no
USA Blinder and Choi 
(1990) † 
13 large firms of the 
manufacturing industry and 6 
large firms of the services sector 
of the year 1988. 
 medium  yes  no
GB Kaufman (1984) † 20 small non-unionized firms 
and 6 large unionized firms of 
the manufacturing industry and 
services sector of the year 1982. 
 very high  yes  no
Notes: Results of studies marked with an † are taken from (Beissinger and Knoppik, 2005, Tab. 1, p. 177). 
a D = Germany, GB = Great Britain, J = Japan, S = Sweden, USA = United States of America. 
b  Degree of rigidity: The denoted degree of (downward nominal) wage rigidity refers to the share of firms that 
in the past did not cut nominal wages. This share depends on the level of the inflation rate and the level of 
productivity growth; hence this quantitative measure for wage rigidity has to be interpreted with caution. 
An advantage of surveys is the fact that one can ask questions concerning the 
reasons for DNWR. Agell and Bennmarker (2007), e.g., come to the conclusion 
that managers think that employees underlie money illusion. Similar results are 
found by Blinder and Choi (1990) and Bewley (1999) for the USA. According to 
those studies, DNWR is caused by fairness considerations – where the employees’ 
concept of “fairness” is centered on nominal variables. The two studies for Sweden 
(Agell and Lundborg, 2003; Agell and Bennmarker, 2007) and the study of Franz 
and Pfeiffer (2003) for Germany on the other hand, come to the conclusion that 
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DNWR is also caused (or reinforced, respectively) by institutional settings. This 
result, however, is only found for countries where labor unions and collective labor 
agreements etc. play an important role.
1.4.3 Macroeconomic Consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
For the assessment of the macroeconomic impact of DNWR it is not sufficient to 
know which fraction of desired nominal wage cuts are avoided because of DNWR. 
Further information is necessary. One needs, e.g., to know how many wage cuts 
were desired by the employers – this however depends on the inflation rate. The 
higher the inflation rate, the easier it is to decrease real wages without falling back 
on nominal wage cuts.
There are considerably fewer studies on the macroeconomic implications 
of DNWR than on the microeconomic existence and extent of DNWR. Knoppik 
and Beissinger (2003) calculate for Germany, based on their estimates, the 
impact of DNWR in a hypothetical situation of zero inflation. They come to 
the conclusion that given constant prices the equilibrium unemployment rate 
would increase because of DNWR by approximately one percentage point. The 
macroeconomic implications for the USA, estimated by Akerlof et al. (1996), 
are a bit higher. According to their simulation, a drop of the inflation rate 
from 3 to 0 percent would increase the unemployment rate by between 1 to 
2.6  percentage points.
In the context of macroeconomic implications of DNWR one criticism –  based 
on the so-called Lucas-critique – is expressed quite regularly (see, e.g., Ball 
and Mankiw, 1994; Gordon, 1996). Gordon (1996, p. 62), e.g., argues: “If the 
macroeconomic environment were different, microeconomic behavior would be 
different. Nominal wage reductions would no longer be seen as unusual if the 
average nominal wage was not growing.” If individuals adapt to an environment 
with low inflation in the long-run, than the phenomenon of DNWR should 
vanish. Hence there should not be any negative effect on the wage level and the 
unemployment rate.
This criticism is attenuated by the fact that some of the microeconomic 
studies are based on data of periods of low inflation. Also the two above 
mentioned survey studies from Sweden (Agell and Bennmarker, 2007; Agell and 
Lundborg, 2003) were conducted in a period of low inflation – and found a high 
degree of DNWR. The psychological approach even suggests that in times of low 
inflation individuals more often use the nominal instead of the real frame. Hence 
the phenomenon of DNWR does not necessarily have to vanish in periods of 
consistently low inflation.
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There also exist discrepancies between microeconomic and macroeconomic 
results. On the level of individual (microeconomic) wage changes nearly all studies 
find strong DNWR. The macroeconomic implications of DNWR on the average 
real wage increase and the unemployment rate seem to be considerably too weak 
based on what one would except because of the microeconomic evidence. Lebow 
et al. (1999) call this contradiction the “micro-macro-puzzle”.
However, recent research seems to be able to explain this puzzle. According 
to Elsby (2009), DNWR not only causes wage cuts to be compressed (i.e. that 
wage cuts are avoided or that wages decline less) but DNWR also compresses 
wage increases (see Figure 1.5). This is explained by forward-looking behavior 
of firms. Firms do not increase nominal wages as much as possible if they 
anticipate that they cannot achieve necessary real wage cuts in the future. The 
compression of wage increases counteracts the increase of the average real wage 
caused by avoided nominal wage cuts. Therefore, evidence for strong DNWR 
on the individual (microeconomic) level can be consistent with weak or even 
non-existing macroeconomic effects. The next chapter will discuss this finding 
in detail and I show that for Germany a decrease in the inflation rate of one 
percentage point only causes an average increase of the average real wage 
growth of between 0.013 and 0.060 percent. Elsby (2009) finds similar results 
for Great Britain and the USA. The results indicate that DNWR does not provide a 
strong argument against low inflation targets of central banks.
 
 
Figure 1.5:  Distribution of wage changes with downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR)  
according to recent studies 
Pile-up of zero  
nominal wage  
changes due to  
thinning of wage 
cuts 
0 0 
Pile-up due to thinning 
of wage increases  
With downward nominal wage rigidity and compression of wage increases 
       wage cut         wage increase        wage cut         wage increase 
a)   low inflation b)   high inflation 
% % 
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1.5 Conclusions
This chapter summarized and evaluated the fundamental results of the literature 
on causes and extent of DNWR.
Microeconomic studies usually detect a significant degree of DNWR. In 
Germany, approximately 28 percent of wage cuts desired by employers are avoided 
because of DNWR (Knoppik and Beissinger, 2009). For other countries the existence 
of DNWR is also documented, and sometimes even higher degrees of DNWR are 
found (see, e.g., Figure 1.4).
Based on the fact that DNWR exists, it is often concluded that low inflation 
leads to wage pressure on the macro level. Hence money policy aiming at low 
inflation is blamed for causing excess unemployment.
However, recent studies – that will be presented in the next chapter – indicate 
that because of DNWR not only wage cuts are dampened but also wage increases. 
Taking the effect of DNWR on wage increases into account, it seems that DNWR 
hardly affects the average wage level. Hence there do not seem to be any negative 
consequences on aggregate employment and DNWR cannot be used to make a case 
for higher inflation targets of central banks. 
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2   Does Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity Dampen Wage 
Increases?
Concerns about potentially adverse employment effects of low inflation have 
given rise to a plethora of studies on the extent of downward nominal wage 
rigidity (DNWR), such as the microeconometric multicountry studies of Behr and 
Pötter (2010), Knoppik and Beissinger (2009), and Dickens et al. (2007a)1 or the 
survey evidence provided by Bewley (1999). These concerns are based on Tobin’s 
(1972) hypothesis that if nominal wages are downwardly rigid, a certain amount 
of positive inflation may be necessary to ease firms’ real wage adjustments in 
response to idiosyncratic shocks (“inflation may grease the wheels of the labor 
market”). Focusing on the compression of wage cuts, microeconometric studies 
usually find a high degree of DNWR. However, the resulting macroeconomic effects 
on aggregate real wages and employment seem to be surprisingly weak, leading 
Lebow et al. (1999) to speak of a “micro-macro puzzle”.
A possible solution to that puzzle has been offered by Elsby (2009), who develops 
an intertemporal model in which downward wage rigidity arises because nominal 
wage cuts are followed by sharp decreases in productivity. Wage increases therefore 
become irreversible to some degree. Firms that increase wages during upswings 
may find it difficult to reverse their decisions later when the economic environment 
will possibly deteriorate. Forward-looking firms take the path dependence of wage 
changes into account when determining the optimal wage policy; they refrain 
from large wage increases to reduce the probability of costly future nominal wage 
cuts. Moreover, because DNWR raises the wage level inherited from the past, firms 
do not have to raise wages as much or as often as in a situation without wage 
rigidity to obtain the profit-maximizing wage level. As a consequence, firms will 
compress wage increases as well as wage cuts in the presence of DNWR. This leads 
to the surprising prediction that average real wage growth, and hence aggregate 
real wages, should not be affected by DNWR and that the aggregate employment 
effects should be weak or nonexistent.
In this chapter I first extend the empirical approach of Elsby (2009) by applying 
unconditional quantile regressions (UQR) to the data in addition to variants of 
Elsby’s (2009) OLS model specification. The application of UQR enables me to take 
into account the variance and the cross variable covariance in the microdata. 
Second, I provide an empirical analysis of the effects of inflation on the shape of the 
real wage change distribution for Germany, a country with stronger labor unions 
1 Dickens et al. (2007a) also deal with the extent of real wage rigidities. Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) have carried 
out a multi-country study on DNWR using industry data. See also Section 1.4 for further examples of studies on 
the extent of DNWR.
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and a higher labor union density than in the United States and the United Kingdom 
– for which Elsby (2009) provides empirical evidence. My analysis provides some 
insights into whether Elsby’s (2009) predictions can be observed in a country that 
may already be affected by wage compression due to its labor market institutions.
In line with the empirical literature on DNWR, the analysis focuses on the wage 
change distribution of “job stayers”, i.e. employees who have a “stable employment 
relationship” with an employer, whereas Elsby’s (2009) analysis also includes “job 
movers”. This inclusion may lead to a systematic relationship between inflation and 
the compression of the real wage change distribution that has nothing to do with 
DNWR. The reason is that during economic upswings, inflation often rises, and at the 
same time, more voluntary job changes occur that go hand in hand with real wage 
increases (see, e.g., Cornelißen et al., 2007). As a robustness check and a further 
innovation relative to Elsby’s (2009) analysis I also analyze whether the results are 
changed if inflation forecasts are used instead of actual inflation, because for the 
distribution of wage changes expected future inflation could be more relevant.
The empirical analysis is undertaken for West Germany for the 1975–2007 
period using the IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File of 
the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment 
Agency. The dataset comprises the total population gainfully employed and covered 
by the social security system. After the data selection, the remaining employment 
spells enable me to analyze over 169 million earnings changes, amounting to more 
than 5.2 million earnings changes per year on average. Among the main advantages 
of this dataset are the sheer wealth of information and the high reliability of the 
earnings data.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section 
summarizes the key findings of Elsby’s (2009) model. Section 2.2 contains the 
data description. Section 2.3 presents the empirical implementation and results 
as well as a comparison with Elsby’s (2009) results. Section 2.4 deals with the 
macroeconomic implications, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 The Model
In this section, I explain the main idea of the underlying model and present the key 
findings needed for the empirical testing.
The main feature of Elsby’s (2009) intertemporal model of worker resistance 
to wage cuts is that wage increases become irreversible to some degree because 
nominal wage cuts lead to a sharp decrease of work effort. This assumption is based 
on Bewley’s (1999) findings that a key reason for the reluctance to cut nominal 
wages is the belief that nominal wage reductions can damage worker morale 
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and that morale is a key determinant of worker productivity. A wage increase will 
raise work effort. However, a wage cut of the same amount will reduce effort by 
a greater amount. This implies that wage increases can be reversed in the future 
only at an extra cost. As a consequence, forward-looking firms will not only reduce 
the incidence of wage cuts, but will also moderate wage increases.2 Formally, this 
is captured by an effort function in the spirit of the fair-wage effort hypothesis of 
Solow (1979) and Akerlof and Yellen (1986), with an additional term reflecting the 
impact of nominal wage cuts on effort.
e  =  ln   + c  ln  I (W  <  W–1),  (2.1)
where W is the nominal wage, W–1 is the lagged nominal wage, c >  0 is a parameter 
varying the productivity costs of a nominal wage cut to the firm, and I ( ) is the 
indicator function for a nominal wage cut. Real unemployment benefits b = B/P 
are assumed to be constant over time, where B denotes nominal unemployment 
benefits, and P is the price level. The price level evolves according to Pt  =  e 
π Pt – 1, 
where π reflects the inflation rate.
Given the effort function (2.1), Elsby (2009) considers a discrete-time, infinite-
horizon model. In the model, price-taking worker-firm pairs maximize the expected 
discounted value of profits by choosing the nominal wage Wt  at each date  t. The 
worker-firms’ productivity function is given by (A/P ) x e, where  A denotes a nominal 
technology shock. The shock is idiosyncratic to the worker-firm pair, is observed 
contemporaneously, and acts as the source of uncertainty in the model. The shocks 
evolve according to a geometric random walk. This has the implication that average 
nominal productivity rises in line with inflation π and productivity growth μ.
The value of a job in recursive form is given by:
J (W–1, A)  =  maxw  {A  ln   + c  ln  I (W  <  W–1)   – W  +  β e –π ∫ J (W, A ′)dF  (A ′| A)}, (2.2)
where β  ∈  [0,1) is the real discount factor of the firm. Lagged values are denoted 
by the subscript –1, and forward values are denoted by a prime. By setting c =  0 the 
model is reduced to a frictionless model. It can be shown that frictionless nominal 
wages are equal to the nominal shock A. Hence, wage changes fully reflect changes 
in productivity.
2 It must be stressed that the argument that DNWR leads to a compression of wage increases does not depend on 
this specific justification for DNWR. It would also apply under other reasons for DNWR, e.g. if it is caused by the fact 
that the wage of the old wage contract still determines pay while the bargaining parties bargain over a new contract 
(so-called holdout). For a detailed theoretical discussion see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1994).
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DNWR changes the shape of the frictionless wage change distribution in two 
characteristic ways. First, there is a range of values for the nominal shock A, for 
which the firm finds it optimal not to change the nominal wage. This leads to 
a spike at zero in the nominal wage change distribution and accordingly to a 
spike at minus the inflation rate in the real wage change distribution. Second, 
if the change in A is strong enough and the firm decides to change the nominal 
wage, the wage change will be compressed relative to the frictionless case. Not 
surprisingly, wage cuts are compressed because they imply a discontinuous fall 
in productivity at the margins. More interestingly, the model predicts that wage 
increases are compressed as well. One reason is that forward-looking firms take 
the path dependence of wage changes into account when determining the optimal 
wage policy; they refrain from large wage increases to reduce the probability of 
costly future nominal wage cuts. Moreover, the firms will generally inherit higher 
wages from the past. Consequently, firms do not have to increase nominal wages 
by as much or as often in order to achieve the desired wage level.
Figure 2.1 presents simulated real wage change distributions for high and low 
inflation based on the predictions of Elsby’s (2009) theoretical model. One can see 
that real wage increases are compressed in the case of low inflation.3
Notice that in the absence of DNWR, a change in the productivity growth rate 
should lead to a one-to-one shift of the real wage change distribution, whereas a 
change in the inflation rate should leave the distribution unaltered. In contrast, if 
3 In the simulation, the rate of productivity growth has been kept constant. Similar effects on the real wage change 
distribution are obtained if the (average) rate of productivity growth is changed instead of a change in the inflation rate.
Figure 2.1: Simulated log real wage change distributions
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DNWR exists, one should observe a systematic relationship between changes in the 
inflation rate and/or productivity growth rate, on the one hand, and changes in the 
shape of the real wage change distribution, on the other hand. In the following, I 
will focus on the impact of the inflation rate on the shape of the real wage change 
distribution because the inflation rate can be controlled by monetary policy.
The compression of nominal wage changes will have effects on the percentiles 
of the real wage change distribution. If DNWR is present, the model generates the 
following predictions about the effect of the inflation rate on the percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution, depending on whether the percentiles 
1. lie below the range of zero nominal wage changes; 
2. lie in the range of zero nominal wage changes; 
3. lie above the range of zero nominal wage changes. 
(1) Nominal wage cuts will be compressed relative to the frictionless case because 
of the implied fall in productivity. The probability that a firm is willing to increase 
nominal wages will increase as the inflation rate and/or productivity growth rise. 
With higher inflation and/or higher productivity growth, a firm is more likely to 
reverse nominal wage cuts in the future. As a result, a firm is less inclined to incur 
the costs of wage cuts. With higher inflation, one should therefore observe fewer 
and less pronounced nominal wage cuts. This implies that low percentiles of the 
real wage change distribution, lying below the range of zero nominal wage change, 
will rise with the inflation rate and productivity growth.
(2) Because of DNWR, a nonnegligible range of the percentiles of the real wage 
change distribution will correspond exactly to zero nominal wage changes and 
therefore be equal to minus the inflation rate. Those percentiles fall one-to-one 
with the inflation rate. With higher inflation, firms affected by DNWR are able to 
achieve reductions in real labor costs without falling back on costly nominal wage 
cuts. It is in this sense that inflation greases the wheels of the labor market in the 
presence of DNWR.
(3) In an uncertain world, a firm affected by DNWR will also compress nominal 
wage increases because raising wages increases the risk of costly future nominal 
wage cuts. If inflation is low, upper percentiles of the wage change distribution 
will therefore be reduced relative to the frictionless case. The probability that a 
firm wishes to reduce nominal wages will decline when the inflation rate and/or 
productivity growth rise. In this case, firms are less likely to cut wages in the future 
and no longer need to restrain increases as much as in times with low inflation. 
On average, this should lead to more than a one-to-one increase of the upper 
percentiles of real wage change distribution with productivity growth as well as to 
an increase with inflation.
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Because of these theoretical predictions, one expects the following coefficients 
in a regression of the percentiles of the log real wage change distribution on the 
inflation rate and the productivity growth rate (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1:  Predicted effects of the rate of inflation and of productivity growth on the  
unconditional percentiles of the log real wage change distribution according  
to Elsby’s (2009) model
τth percentile of the log real 
wage change distribution (P
τ  )
Coefficient on
inflation rate productivity growth 
P
τ < minus inflation rate >  0 >  1
P
τ ≈ minus inflation rate <  0 attenuates towards zero (<  1)
P
τ > minus inflation rate >  0 >  1
2.2 Data
The empirical analysis is undertaken for West Germany for the 1975–2007 period 
using the BeH, the Employee History File of the IAB. The BeH comprises the total 
population gainfully employed and covered by the social security system. Not 
covered are self-employed, family workers assisting in the operation of a family 
business, civil servants (Beamte) and regular students. From 1975 to 2007, the 
BeH contains information about 72,695,902 people as well as 1,171,326,023 
employment spells (IAB, 2009). Important advantages of this dataset are the 
enormous amount of information and the high reliability of the earnings data, 
which is due to plausibility checks performed by the social security institutions and 
the existence of legal sanctions for misreporting. In contrast to studies based on 
compensation data from household surveys, measurement error due to erroneous 
reporting should be less of a problem in my analysis.
The earnings data are right censored at the contribution assessment ceiling 
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). For employees whose earnings are censored, earnings 
changes cannot be computed. For the analysis, I use noncensored earnings spells4 of 
full-time working male employees from West Germany aged 16 to 65. In line with 
the literature, the analysis is confined to job stayers. Usually, job stayers are defined 
as full-time working employees who do not change the employer between two 
consecutive time periods. I apply a narrower and better suited concept and require 
that the employees continually exercise the same job at the same employer for at 
4 After dropping the censored earnings spells the sample shows an underrepresentation of highly qualified (white 
collar) workers (see Tables B.3 and B.4 of Appendix B.1). Hence, the results are somewhat less generalizable.
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least two consecutive years.5 In contrast to my data selection, Elsby (2009) includes 
job movers in his analysis. This inclusion might lead to a systematic relationship 
between inflation and the compression of the wage change distribution that has 
nothing to do with DNWR. The reason is that during economic upswings inflation 
usually rises, and at the same time, more voluntary job changes occur that go hand 
in hand with real wage increases (Cornelißen et al., 2007).
After the selection, more than 169 million earnings changes remain in my 
sample. I am therefore able to analyze an average of more than 5.2 million 
earnings changes per year. The sample size is a large advantage in comparison 
to the data applied in Elsby (2009). His largest dataset, the New Earnings Survey 
(NES) for the UK, allows him to analyze on average less than 74,000 observations 
per year. For the USA, it is less than 24,000 and 1,800 observations using the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
respectively. A further advantage of the German data is the longer time period 
of 32 years compared to 21–24 years in Elsby’s (2009) analysis. A disadvantage 
of the German data is the fact that I am not able to observe hourly wages, only 
daily wages. There is also the problem that shifts from part-time to full-time 
work, and vice versa, that occur during the course of the year do not lead to a 
new report of the employer.6 Because such shifts are much more common for 
female employees (see, e.g., Schäfer and Vogel, 2005), I exclude women from the 
analysis. This is in contrast to Elsby’s (2009) analysis in which male and female 
employees are included.
As the inflation rate, I use the log change in the consumer price index (CPI).7 
Following Elsby (2009), I measure productivity growth using the observed average 
regional real wage change. The reason for not directly using a productivity measure 
is that real wages adjust to changes in productivity with a time lag. I would have 
to model some kind of error-correction mechanism for the discrepancy between 
real wage changes and productivity growth. I can avoid these complications by 
using the average regional real wage change as a proxy variable reflecting the 
impact of (regional) productivity growth on wages. It is a suitable proxy because, 
according to the theoretical predictions, DNWR should have no effect on average 
wage changes.8
5 The breakdown of occupations is very detailed, but still not every job change leads to a change in the occupation 
classification. Therefore, some spells of persons who changed jobs within a firm may not be excluded. The narrower 
“same position” restriction has also been applied by Christofides and Stengos (2001).
6 A new status is conveyed with the annual report at the end of a year. This status applies for the whole year.
7 Stüber and Beissinger (2010) show that using the producer price index (PPI) instead of the CPI does not significantly 
affect the results. The CPI is more relevant for employees, whereas the PPI is more relevant for firms’ wage setting.
8 As one of the referees of Stüber and Beissinger (2012) correctly pointed out, there are other arguments for 
including the average regional wage growth in the regression apart from it being a proxy for regional productivity 
growth – e.g. because it is an important alternative wage for the workers.
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Among the other control variables, the absolute change in the rate of inflation is 
included. This is motivated by the hypothesis of Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) 
that higher inflation volatility yields greater dispersion in relative wages, regardless 
of the existence of DNWR. The current and lagged regional unemployment rates 
are included because DNWR may affect unemployment. The unemployment rates 
are used to control for changes in the wage change distribution due to workers 
“leaving” the distribution. Further control variables for the applied regression 
methods are shown in Table 2.2. For more details concerning the data and the data 
selection, see Appendix B.1.
Table 2.2: Variables for the applied regression methods
Variables Seemingly Unrelated Regression/
OLS Regression 
Unconditional Quantile Regression
Dependent Variable 
Real wage change τth percentile from re-weighted 
regional log real wage change 
distribution 
Recentered influence function (RIF) 
of the individual log real wage 
change 
Explanatory Variables 
Inflation rate Log change in the consumer price index (CPI) for Germany
Productivity growth Average regional real wage change
Microvariables
Age Mean age of employees in region Age and age squared
Education Percentages of employees in region 
within seven educational classes 
Education class of employee
Foreign nationality Percentage of employees in region 
with foreign nationality 
Dummy for employee with foreign 
nationality
Occupation Percentages of employees in region 
within six occupational fields 
Occupation field of the employee
Worker Percentage of white-collar workers 
in the region 
Dummy for white-collar worker
Regional Variables
Absolute change in the rate 
of inflation 
Absolute change in the rate of inflation (CPI)
Unemployment rate Current and lagged regional unemployment rate
Dummy Variables
Year 1984 Before 1984, the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification was voluntary. 
Since 1984, one-time payments to employees have been subject to social 
security taxation and are therefore included in the data. This leads to 
a level effect on the 1983–1984 earning changes. For more details, see 
Appendix B.1.
Regions Dummies for the 10 former West German states (excluding Berlin)
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2.3 Empirical Implementation and Results
Elsby (2009) uses an OLS regression to estimate the effect of the inflation rate 
and the average regional real wage change (as a proxy for productivity growth) on 
the percentiles of the real wage change distribution and finds evidence for wage 
compression for the upper percentiles. A disadvantage of this OLS regression is 
that only aggregate data at the regional level can be used, thereby neglecting the 
variance and the cross-variable covariance in the microdata. First, an identical 
mean does not imply that the distributions are also identical. Second, for example, 
it is possible to observe two regions with the same mean age of employees and 
the same composition of the educational classes. Using OLS regression, these 
two regions are identical in terms of age and education. However, a closer look 
might reveal that in one region mainly young employees are highly educated, 
while in the other region mainly older employees are highly educated. Elsby 
(2009) accounts for changes in sample composition by applying the method of 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), henceforth “DFL”, to the wage data. The DFL 
method enables the estimation of counterfactual (re-weighted) real wage change 
distributions that would prevail if the distribution of worker characteristics did not 
change. However, this method is not able to take the general equilibrium effects 
of changes in sample composition on wages into account, because actual wages 
are used to calculate the counterfactual wage change distribution. Therefore, an 
approach in which the information contained in the microdata can be directly 
used is preferable.
Because of the above-mentioned critique, I apply two regression methods. To 
enable a comparison with Elsby’s (2009) results, I first apply variants of his OLS 
approach to the data and estimate the impact of inflation and other variables on the 
percentiles of the real wage change distribution. Second, I apply a new regression 
method proposed by Firpo et al. (2009): unconditional quantile regression (UQR). 
It allows us to directly use the information contained in the microdata and to 
estimate the impact of explanatory variables, such as inflation, on the unconditional 
percentiles of the real wage change distribution. The advantage of UQR over OLS is 
that it takes the whole distribution of explanatory variables into account.9 Finally, I 
briefly compare my results with the results Elsby (2009) obtained for the USA and 
the UK.
9 I also applied quantile regression to the data to look at the effects of the inflation rate or of productivity growth 
on the real wage change distribution conditional on the attributes of the employee and conditional on the region 
where the employee works. Results are shown in Table B.5 in Appendix B.2.
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2.3.1  Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression
To take the effects of changes in sample composition on the shape of the real wage 
change distribution – albeit imperfectly – into account, I first apply the DFL method. 
The worker characteristics for the re-weighted density are age, age squared, class 
of worker, a dummy for foreign nationality, qualification level and occupational 
field. The DFL method requires no parametric assumptions on the effect of these 
controls on wage changes.10
I use the re-weighted real wage change distributions to calculate the τth 
 
percentile of the distribution for region r at time t (P
τ, rt  ), with τ  = 10, 20, …, 90. 
As a first approach, I estimate the effect of the inflation rate, π, on P
τ, rt  using 
regressions of the following form:
P
τ, rt   =  ατ  +  ητ πt  +  λτ μrt  +  z ′rt  ϕτ  +  ετ, rt   =  ατ  +  x ′rt  βτ  +  ετ, rt (2.3)
In Equation 2.3 I take into account that the location of the real wage change 
distribution for region r at time t depends on productivity growth μrt , measured as 
average regional real wage growth. The vector zrt contains further control variables, 
shown in Table 2.2.
Elsby (2009) uses OLS regressions with region-specific dummies – least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) regressions. However, because I regress the different 
percentiles of one single distribution, the residuals are very likely simultaneously 
correlated across equations. Therefore, I use an LSDV approach within a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) with small-sample adjustment and weighting by region 
size:11
 
(2.4)
with x ′
τ, rt   =  (μrt  πt   z ′rt ).
10 See DiNardo et al. (1996) or Fortin et al. (2011) for a description of the procedure. I apply the DFL method to each 
region, and I choose the final sample year (2007) as the “base year”. The weights are estimated using a probit model 
according to the Stata ado file provided by Fortin: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html.
11 I performed “within” fixed effects and random effects regressions for all percentiles. For each percentile I tested 
whether or not there are significant differences in the coefficients of the two regressions using Hausman-Tests. The 
Hausman-Test was rejected for every percentile. Therefore, I use a fixed effects model.
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The results of the SUR estimates can be found in Table 2.3.12 The results show that 
the upper tail of the wage change distribution is compressed as a result of DNWR, 
as predicted by the model (see Table 2.1). The estimated impact of the inflation 
rate is significantly positive for the 80th–90th percentiles; the coefficients on the 
average regional real wage change (significantly) exceed unity for these percentiles. 
These results are consistent with lower inflation leading to a compression of wage 
increases.
Table 2.3:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution using seemingly unrelated regression
Consumer price index 
Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t | Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t |
p10  –0.063  0.027  0.021  0.912†  0.024  0.000 
p20  –0.114  0.015  0.000  0.858†  0.013  0.000 
p30  –0.082  0.016  0.000  0.927†  0.015  0.000 
p40  –0.101  0.021  0.000  0.959†  0.019  0.000 
p50  –0.088  0.017  0.000  0.958†  0.016  0.000 
p60  –0.043  0.015  0.004  0.987  0.013  0.000 
p70  0.005  0.013  0.723  1.004  0.012  0.000 
p80  0.047  0.016  0.003  1.024  0.014  0.000 
p90  0.091  0.033  0.005  1.057  0.029  0.000 
Notes:  Seemingly unrelated regression with small-sample adjustment weighted by region size. Controls: regions, 
mean age, absolute change in inflation, current and lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 
1984, percentage of the educational classes, percentage of workers with foreign nationality, percentage 
of white-collar worker, percentage of the occupational fields. †: coef. for productivity growth significantly 
different from 1 at the 5 % level.
For reference, Table 2.3 also reports estimates on the effects of inflation and the 
average regional real wage change on lower percentiles. Note that the predictions 
of the model on the coefficients for lower percentiles depend on the position of the 
zero nominal wage change in the distribution of the real wage change distribution 
(see Table 2.1).
The results for percentiles in the range of zero nominal wage changes are 
consistent with the predictions of the model. In my data, the spike at zero nominal 
12 For comparison, the results of an LSDV regression ignoring the contemporaneous correlation of the residuals are 
documented in Table B.6 of Appendix B.3.
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wage change predominantly appears above the 10th and below the 30th percentile.13 
In this percentile range – in Table 2.3 represented by the 20th percentile – the 
coefficient on the inflation rate is significantly negative, and the coefficient on 
the average regional real wage change is significantly below one and attenuates 
towards zero compared to the coefficients of the 10th and the 30th percentiles.
For percentiles that predominantly lie below the range of zero nominal wage 
changes – the 10th percentile – the model predicts a coefficient of the inflation 
rate larger than zero. Here the prediction of the model fails because the coefficient 
on the inflation rate is significantly negative. This may be due to the fact that for 
13 years, the spike at zero nominal changes lies near the 10th percentile (between 
the 6th and the 14th percentile). The coefficient on the average regional real wage 
change is higher than the one of the 20th percentile, but it does not rise above 
unity as predicted by the model.
2.3.2  Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles  
using Unconditional Quantile Regression
In the following, I apply the UQR approach proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) to 
estimate the impact of explanatory variables, such as inflation, on the unconditional 
percentiles of the real wage change distribution, taking into account the variance 
and cross-variable covariance in the microdata.14 A standard quantile regression 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 2005) is only able to observe the effects 
of inflation on the conditional percentiles of the real wage change distribution. 
Wage changes that correspond to a certain conditional percentile can, however, be 
distributed over the entire observed wage change distribution. The UQR allows us 
to estimate the impact of changes in the distribution of explanatory variables, X, 
on the marginal percentiles of the dependent variable, Y. A further advantage of 
applying UQR to the data is that I do not need to apply the DFL method in the first 
step to estimate counterfactual wage change distributions.
To estimate the average marginal effect E [d Pr [Y >  P
τ
| X ] /d X ] Firpo et al. (2009) 
propose, inter alia, a recentered influence function OLS (RIF-OLS) regression.15 This 
regression provides consistent estimates if Pr [Y >  P
τ
| X   =  x ] is linear in x. In case 
13 Zero nominal wage changes appear in the range between the 6th and the 37th percentile. For the early years of 
the dataset with higher inflation the spikes predominantly appear in very low percentiles, while for later years, with 
very low inflation, the spikes predominantly appear in higher percentiles of the range. For later years, the spike is 
often observed over more than one percentile. Generally, I observe the zero nominal wage change seven times for 
percentiles ≤ the 10th percentile, 12 times for the range above the 10th and ≤ the 20th percentile, 24 times in the 
range above the 20th and ≤ the 30th percentile and nine times for percentiles above the 30th percentile.
14 The “unconditional percentiles” are the percentiles of the marginal distribution of the outcome variable.
15 For a brief introduction see also Fortin et al. (2011).
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of quantiles, the conditional expectation of the recentered influence function 
E  [RIF (Y; Pτ , FY  ) | X ] can be viewed as an unconditional quantile regression.
The RIF-OLS consists of regressing the (recentered) influence function RIF of the 
outcome variable Y for the τth percentile P
τ
 on the explanatory variables X by OLS. 
The RIF is computed by estimating the sample percentile P
τ 
and the density of the 
outcome variable f^Y (·) , using kernel (or other) methods: (Y; P^τ ) =  c^1, τ I (Y  >  P^τ )  + c^2,  τ  , 
where I (·) is an indicator function, c^1, τ = 1/ƒY (Pτ ), ƒY (Pτ ) is the density of Y evaluated 
at Pτ ,  and  c^ 2, τ = Pτ – c1, τ (1 – τ ). I follow Firpo et al. (2009) and use a kernel density
estimator 1
Nb
), where KY (·) is a kernel function, and b  >  0
denotes the scalar bandwidth.16 I make use of the RIF-OLS and regress the 
percentile-transformed individual log real wage change on X = (μrt  πt   z ′irt  ). The 
vector z contains the control variables on the individual level wherever possible 
(see Table 2.2). To estimate the density of the individual log real wage change, 
I  use a Gaussian kernel.17 The bandwidth b is set to the “optimal” width.18 For the 
regression, I use a 10 %-stratified sample of the data.19 The results for the UQR can 
be found in Table 2.4.20
The UQR shows a significantly positive coefficient for the inflation rate for 
the 90th percentile. This result is consistent with lower inflation leading to a 
compression of wage increases – the upper tail of the wage change distribution 
is compressed as a result of DNWR. However, only very high wage increases are 
compressed. In contrast, as has been shown above, for the SUR, the coefficients 
for the 80th and the 90th percentile of the inflation rate are significantly positive. 
This points to an overestimation of the compression of wage increases using SUR.
For reference, Table 2.4 also reports estimates on the effects of inflation and 
the average regional real wage change (as a proxy for productivity growth) on 
lower percentiles.
The results for the percentiles in the range of zero nominal wage changes are 
consistent with the predictions of the model summarized in Table 2.1.21 In the 
16 The influence function IF  (Y; ν , FY  ) of a distributional statistic ν (FY  ) represents the influence of an individual 
observation on that distributional statistic. Adding back the statistic ν (FY  ) to the IF  yields what Firpo et al. (2009) 
call the recentered influence function (RIF  ). Therefore, for the τth percentile, the RIF (Y; Pτ , FY  ) = Pτ  + IF (Y; Pτ , FY  )  = 
Pτ  + (τ – I (Y  >  Pτ ))/ƒ (Pτ ).
17 For the RIF-OLS, I used the Stata ado file provided by Fortin: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html.
18 The “optimal” width is the width that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian 
and a Gaussian kernel were used. Thus, it is not optimal in a global sense.
19 The sample has been stratified by region, age, foreign nationality, worker class, occupational field, and year.
20 To identify the impact of the individual-level control variables, I run regressions omitting individual characteristics 
(see Table B.7 of Appendix B.4). This leads to an overestimation of the wage compression for very high percentiles 
of the wage change distribution.
21 In the data, the spike at the zero nominal wage change predominantly appears between the 10th and the 30th 
percentiles. For an overview of the distribution of the position of the zero nominal wage change, see Footnote 13.
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percentile range above the 10th and below the 30th percentiles – in Table  2.4 
represented by the 20th percentile – the coefficient on the inflation rate is 
significantly negative, and the coefficient on the average regional real wage 
change is significantly below one and attenuates towards zero compared to the 
coefficients of the 10th and the 30th percentiles. For percentiles below the range 
of zero nominal wage changes, the model predicts coefficients of the inflation rate 
larger than zero. Here the prediction of the model fails because the coefficient for 
inflation for the 10th percentile is significantly negative but smaller in absolute 
value than for the SUR.
Table 2.4:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution using unconditional quantile regression
Consumer price index 
Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t | Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t |
p10  –0.043  0.004  0.000  0.862†  0.003  0.000 
p20  –0.148  0.002  0.000  0.716†  0.002  0.000 
p30  –0.152  0.002  0.000  0.813†  0.002  0.000 
p40  –0.136  0.002  0.000  0.862†  0.002  0.000 
p50  –0.142  0.001  0.000  0.949†  0.001  0.000 
p60  –0.165  0.002  0.000  0.993†  0.002  0.000 
p70  –0.125  0.002  0.000  0.952†  0.002  0.000 
p80  –0.037  0.003  0.000  0.950†  0.003  0.000 
p90  0.068  0.005  0.000  0.979†  0.005  0.000 
Notes:  Unconditional quantile regression. Controls: region dummies, age, age squared, absolute change in inflation, 
current and lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, educational class, dummy for worker 
with foreign nationality, occupational fields, dummy for white-collar worker. Bootstrapped standard errors, 
50  replications. †: coef. for productivity growth significantly different from 1 at the 5 % level.
As for the average regional real wage change I find coefficients that are very similar 
to those obtained using SUR. The coefficients are highest for very high percentiles, 
and the coefficient for the 10th percentile is higher than for the 20th percentile. 
However, the coefficients for very high percentiles do not rise above unity, which 
may be due to the fact that the average regional wage growth not only reflects 
productivity growth but also acts as an outside wage in the wage-setting process.
As a robustness check I also analyzed whether similar results are obtained if 
inflation forecasts from auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models 
are used instead of actual inflation, because it can be argued that wage compression 
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should depend on expected future inflation, and not current inflation. A detailed 
description of how I constructed the series of expected inflation is contained in 
Appendix B.5. In this Appendix I also report the estimation results using expected 
inflation in the UQR. It turns out that the compression of wage increases becomes 
more pronounced than in the UQR estimates with actual inflation. Hence, the basic 
conclusion that wage increases are compressed in times of low inflation holds for 
both current inflation and expected inflation.
2.3.3 Comparison with Results for the USA and the UK
Elsby (2009) analyzes whether a compression of wage increases can be found for 
the USA and the UK. He uses OLS regressions, but otherwise his approach is similar 
to the Seemingly Unrelated Regression introduced in Section 2.3.1.
For the empirical analysis, Elsby (2009) uses data taken from the NES 
(1975–1999) for the UK and data taken from the PSID (1971–1992) and the CPS 
(1979–2002) for the USA. The results are similar to my results for Germany. Elsby 
(2009) provides evidence that as a result of DNWR, the upper tail of the real 
wage change distribution is compressed. For all three datasets, the estimated 
impact of inflation is positive for the 70th–90th percentiles and often significant. 
The coefficients on the average regional real wage change exceed unity for 
these upper percentiles of the real wage change distribution and are strongly 
significant. For the range of the zero nominal wage change, the coefficients on 
inflation are negative, and the coefficients on the average regional real wage 
change attenuate towards zero for all of these percentiles. For percentiles below 
the range at zero nominal wage changes, the respective coefficients on inflation 
are either significantly negative or they are insignificantly positive. Here, the 
prediction of Elsby’s (2009) model fails as it did for Germany. The coefficients 
on the average regional wage change rise above unity using CPS and NES data.
2.4  Macroeconomic Implications
In this section, I look at the effect of DNWR on average real wage growth and 
compare the estimated effects using the predictions from the SUR and UQR. 
According to the underlying theoretical model, DNWR should have no effect on 
average real wage growth and hence on the average real wage level. Previous 
empirical studies, however, which neglected the compression of wage increases, 
report positive estimates on the effects of DNWR on average real wage growth 
(Card and Hyslop, 1997) or the average real wage level (Knoppik and Beissinger, 
2003).
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In the previous section, I showed that wage increases in Germany are compressed 
when inflation is low. This compression should dampen the so-called “wage sweep-
up” effect of DNWR and may even completely annihilate any effect of DNWR on 
average real wage growth. To quantify the impact of DNWR on real wage growth, I 
estimate the average log real wage change when inflation is low πL and average log 
real wage change when inflation is high πH  and calculate λ^  , the difference of the 
estimates. If DNWR has no effect on average real wage growth,  λ^  should be zero:
λ^  =  Ê (Δ lnw | πL, μ, z) – Ê (Δ lnw | πH , μ, z)  (2.5)
I estimate the expected average log real wage change using the predictions from 
the SUR and UQR from Section 2.3. For the calculations, I use the fact that the 
mean of a random variable may be expressed as a simple average of its percentiles.
As for the SUR, I conduct the regression for 99 percentiles. I then use the results 
to simulate 99 percentiles of the real wage change distribution for a given inflation 
rate π for each region. Finally, I calculate means (weighted by region size) for the 
99 percentiles Pτ |  π .
As for the UQR, I estimate the effect of inflation for the τ = 1, 2, …, 99 
percentiles of the real wage change distribution. I then use the results to simulate 
99 real wage change distributions for a given inflation rate π. Finally, I use the τth 
simulated distribution to calculate the τth percentile Pτ |  π .
I apply these procedures for the SUR and the UQR for low inflation πL as well 
as for high inflation πH, and then calculate λ^  using the predicted percentiles Pτ , for 
τ  = 1, 2, …, 99. Hence, . 
I use a value for πL equal to 1 percent and a value for πH equal to 6 percent.
22 Because 
I estimate  λ^  using a difference in inflation of five percentage points, I can interpret 
λ^  /5 as the average change in average real wage growth caused by a decrease in 
inflation by one percentage point. According to the results shown in Table 2.5, a 
decrease in inflation by one percentage point causes an average increase of real 
wage growth between 0.013 and 0.060 percent. The results show stronger effects 
on average real wage growth than Elsby’s (2009) results: for the USA, a decrease in 
inflation by one percentage point causes an average increase of real wage growth 
in the range of 0.002 to 0.008 percent and for the UK of 0.001 percent. Still, my 
results indicate that the effects of DNWR in combination with low inflation on 
average real wage growth, and hence on aggregate real wages, are quite small.
22 These inflation rates lie in the range of observed inflation rates during the sample period, see Table B.2 of Appendix B.1.
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Table 2.5: Increase of the average real wage growth due to a decrease in inflation
Regression method 
Average log real wage change caused by a decrease  
in inflation by 1 percentage point ( λ^  /5)
SUR 0.013 % 
UQR 0.060 % 
Unfortunately, a comparison with results from previous studies (e.g. Card and 
Hyslop, 1997; Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003) is not possible. Those studies use a 
counterfactual wage change distribution – a distribution that would prevail if 
DNWR would not bind – to calculate the wage sweep-up.23 According to my results, 
the identification of a counterfactual wage change distribution is not possible 
because the whole distribution is affected by DNWR. Hence, I cannot ascertain by 
how much previous studies overestimate the effect of DNWR on average real wage 
change. However, I certainly know that they do overestimate it.
To get an insight into the effects of inflation on the amount of real wage cuts 
and increases, I estimate E (Δ lnw | π) for negative and positive real wage changes 
(see Table 2.6).24 The results confirm that with low inflation a compression of wage 
increases takes place – the expected real wage increases during low inflation are 
smaller than the expected real wage increases during high inflation. With rising 
inflation the expected real wage increases get larger, but less people experience a 
real wage increase. For example, the results for the UQR show that for low inflation 
59 percent of the workers experience a real wage increase, while for high inflation 
only 55 percent experience a real wage increase. However, in the latter case, the 
wage increase is more pronounced. In contrast, for low inflation only 40 percent 
of the workers experience real wage cuts, while for high inflation 44 percent 
experience real wage cuts. It is in this sense that inflation greases the wheels of 
the labor market in the presence of DNWR.
23 Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) using the IABS from the Institute for Employment Research, a 1 percent random 
sample drawn from the German social-security accounts for the years 1975–1995, estimate at zero inflation a 
sweep-up range from 0.3 to 0.4 additional percentage points of individual expected real wage growth due to wage 
rigidity. Cornelißen and Hübler (2008), using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1984–2004, 
estimate that downward wage rigidity increases real wage growth by 3.4 to 4.9 percentage points.
24 Specifically, I estimate 
,
 
 and 
, 
, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Conditional expected real wage change for negative and positive real wage changes
Regression 
method 
 π = πL  π = πH
E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw  <  0) E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw ≥  0) E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw  <  0) E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw ≥  0)
SUR –3.440 % (33) 4.224 % (66) –3.208 % (38) 4.599 % (61)
UQR –5.120 % (40) 8.651 % (59) –5.036 % (44) 9.048 % (55)
Notes: The numbers in brackets show how many percentiles are considered calculating the expected value. 
I also estimate E (Δ lnw | π) for negative and positive nominal wage changes (see 
Table 2.7).25 The results show that, as expected, with high inflation one observes 
less nominal wage cuts. For example, the results for the UQR show that of the 
workers experience a nominal wage cut when inflation is low, while with high 
inflation only experience a nominal wage cut.
Table 2.7: Conditional expected real wage change for negative and positive nominal wage changes
Regression 
method 
 π = πL  π = πH
E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw  <  –π) E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw ≥  –π) E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw  <  –π) E (Δ lnw | Δ lnw ≥  –π)
SUR –4.723 % (23) 3.604 % (76) –9.154 % (6) 2.296 % (93)
UQR –6.111 % (33) 7.686 % (66) –11.105 % (13) 4.889 % (86)
Notes: The numbers in brackets show how many percentiles are considered calculating the expected value. 
2.5  Conclusions
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that in times of low inflation, 
DNWR not only hinders wage cuts but also leads to a compression of wage 
increases. If the latter effect is taken into account, DNWR has a negligible effect 
on average real wage growth and hence on aggregate real wages.
The empirical analysis has been undertaken for West Germany for the 1975–2007 
period using the BeH, the Employee History File of the IAB. In line with the literature, 
my analysis has been confined to “job stayers”, i.e., full-time employees who 
continually exercise the same job at the same employer for at least two consecutive 
years. After the data selection, I was still able to analyze about 169 million earnings 
changes, i.e., an average of more than 5.2 million earnings changes per year. The huge 
25 Specifically, I estimate 
,
 
 and 
, 
, respectively.
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sample size and the reliable earnings data are great advantages for the analysis of the 
impact of DNWR on the shape of the real wage change distribution.
Applying SUR to the percentiles of the log real wage change distribution at 
the regional level, I have shown that in Germany a compression of wage increases 
takes place due to DNWR – wage increases are compressed when inflation is 
low. Because the SUR approach does not consider the variance and cross-variable 
covariance of the microdata, I have also applied UQR. This allows me to estimate 
the impact of changing the distribution of explanatory variables on the marginal 
percentiles of the dependent variable. Using UQR, I estimated the impact of 
inflation on the unconditional percentiles of the real wage change distribution. 
The results confirm a compression of wage increases due to DNWR. However, 
compared to the SUR estimates, less percentiles of the wage change distribution 
are affected. I also checked whether similar results are obtained if inflation 
forecasts from ARIMA models are used instead of actual inflation, because it could 
be argued that wage compression should depend on expected future inflation, 
and not current inflation. Using expected inflation in the UQR it turns out that 
the compression of wage increases becomes more pronounced than in the UQR 
estimates with actual inflation. To summarize, my finding of a compression of 
wage increases in times of low inflation is quite robust to the estimation method 
and the inflation variable used.
As for the macroeconomic implications of DNWR, I find that a decrease in 
inflation of one percentage point only causes an average increase of real wage 
growth between 0.013 and 0.060 percent. These results indicate that DNWR does 
not provide a strong argument against low inflation targets. However, it must be 
stressed that this conclusion is based on evaluating different steady state rates 
of inflation, where the inflation rate is correctly foreseen. It is not argued that 
this analysis should be used e.g. to calculate the possible costs of downward 
nominal wage rigidity in southern European countries with high nominal cost 
level in the current crisis of the Eurozone. These countries have ended up in a 
situation which they did not foresee. It does not seem to be the case that firms 
have anticipated binding downward nominal wage rigidity and that this has had 
a mitigating effect on the nominal wage increases in these countries. Thus it 
cannot be concluded from my analysis that a higher temporary inflation target in 
the European Monetary Union would not be helpful for countries with a relatively 
high cost level in the current situation.
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3  Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in a Cross Section: 
An Analysis of Linked Employer-Employee Data for  
the Years 1995 to 2007
As outlined in the last two chapters, concerns about negative employment 
effects of low inflation have given rise to many studies on the extent of 
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). These concerns are based on Tobin’s 
(1972) hypothesis that if nominal wages are downwardly rigid, then a certain 
amount of positive inflation could be necessary to ease the firms’ real wage 
adjustments in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Looking at microeconometric 
evidence, Tobin’s (1972) concern appears to be justified: the empirical evidence 
overwhelmingly points to a high degree of DNWR (see, e.g., the multicountry 
studies from Dickens et al., 2007a; Knoppik and Beissinger, 2009; Behr and 
Pötter, 2010). However, the resulting macroeconomic effects on aggregate real 
wages and employment appear to be surprisingly weak. This contradiction in 
the empirical evidence leads Lebow et al. (1999) to speak of a “micro-macro 
puzzle.” However, recent studies – presented in the last chapter – show that 
pronounced wage rigidity on the individual level can be consistent with weak 
macroeconomic effects. These studies show that in the presence of DNWR and 
low inflation, not only are wage cuts compressed but – due to the forward-
looking behavior of firms – also wage increases. Because of the compression of 
the wage increases, the average real wage growth is hardly affected by DNWR. 
The results indicate that DNWR does not provide a strong argument against the 
low inflation targets of central banks.
However, even if the macroeconomic effects of DNWR are negligible, one 
should look closely at the workers who are affected by DNWR. If wage changes 
are unevenly distributed across workers, a microeconomic analysis could reveal 
effects of nominal wage rigidity where a macroeconomic analysis cannot. So 
far, several studies show that certain types of workers experience nominal wage 
freezes more often, while other types of workers experience nominal wage cuts 
(see, e.g., Kahn, 1997; Beissinger and Knoppik, 2001; Anspal and Järve, 2011) and 
that the firm characteristics play a crucial role in DNWR (see, e.g., Babecký et 
al., 2010). However, there is no empirical evidence showing whether workers in 
the upper part of the wage change distribution are affected differently by DNWR 
and whether this effect is conditional on the worker’s characteristics, the firm 
characteristics and/or the position of the worker in the wage change distribution. 
It could be, for example, that certain types of workers are “discriminated” against 
due to DNWR – they could not only be more affected by nominal wage cuts, but 
they could also experience stronger compressions of wage increases. If DNWR 
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affects workers differently over the wage change distribution, conditional on their 
individual characteristics and/or on the characteristics of their workplace, this 
result should be considered in any forthcoming theoretical and empirical research 
on the microeconomic consequences of DNWR.
For the empirical analysis, I apply unconditional quantile regressions on a 
linked employer-employee dataset to provide an in-depth empirical analysis on 
how DNWR affects different worker types conditional on their position in the wage 
change distribution. However, analyzing the extent of DNWR or the macroeconomic 
effects of DNWR is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I 
describe the research design and the data. In Section 3.2 I present and discuss the 
results, while Section 3.3 summarizes and concludes the chapter.
3.1  Methodology, Data, and Data Selection
To analyze whether the wage changes over the wage change distribution are affected 
if DNWR binds, I follow the approach of Elsby (2009). He considers the percentiles of 
the real wage change distribution. In the absence of DNWR, a change in the inflation 
rate should leave the real wage change distribution unaltered. In contrast, if DNWR 
exists, a systematic relationship between the changes in the inflation rate and the 
changes in the shape of the real wage change distribution should be observed. For a 
detailed introduction of Elsby’s (2009) model see Section  2.1.
For the empirical testing I apply the unconditional quantile regression (UQR, 
or RIF-OLS) introduced by Firpo et al. (2009). I estimate the effect of inflation and 
of further controls on the percentiles of the recentered influence function of the 
individual log real wage change. Applying this regression, I estimate the impact 
of the inflation rate on the unconditional percentiles of the real wage change 
distribution.1 A standard quantile regression (see, e.g., Koenker and Bassett, 1978; 
Koenker, 2005) would only observe the effects of inflation on the conditional 
percentiles of the real wage change distribution. However, wage changes that 
correspond to a particular conditional percentile can be distributed over the entire 
observed (unconditional) wage change distribution. A brief introduction of the UQR 
is provided in Section 2.3.2.
The empirical analysis is undertaken for Germany over the 1995 to 2007 
period2 using the linked employer-employee dataset (LIAB) from the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB). The LIAB is created by matching the data from the 
1 In the framework of the UQR, the “unconditional percentiles” are the percentiles of the marginal distribution of the 
outcome variable.
2 East Germany is included from 1996/97 onwards.
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IAB Establishment Panel and the data from the Employee History File (BeH), and 
it includes all workers who were employed in one of the firms included in the 
Establishment Panel as of July 1 for the data year. The Establishment Panel is an 
annual survey of establishments in Germany that represents all industries and 
establishment sizes nationwide. The BeH comprises the total population that is 
gainfully employed and covered by the social security system. Those not covered 
are self-employed persons, family workers assisting in the operation of a family 
business, civil servants (Beamte) and regular students.3
Advantages of the LIAB are its huge sample size and its reliable earnings 
data. One disadvantage of the data is that it does not allow fringe benefits to be 
separated from “regular” earnings. In addition, the BeH contains no data on the 
hours worked except for information about part-time or full-time employment. 
Therefore, I calculate gross average daily earnings. To avoid any contamination 
with effects from working time, I only observe full-time blue-collar and white-
collar workers, aged 16 to 65 years (subject to social security without particular 
tokens).4 Unfortunately, the wage data are right-censored at the contribution 
assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). For workers whose wages are 
censored, the wage change cannot be computed. Therefore, I analyze only the non-
censored wage spells.5
Consistent with the literature, the analysis is confined to “job stayers.” I define 
job stayers as workers who continually execute the same job at the same employer 
for at least two consecutive years.6 Including job movers in the analysis could lead 
to a systematic relationship between inflation and the compression of the wage 
change distribution that is unconnected with DNWR. The reason for this relationship 
is that inflation often rises during economic upswings and, simultaneously, more 
voluntary job changes occur that go hand in hand with real wage increases (see, 
e.g., Cornelißen et al., 2007).
After the selection, the dataset contains more than 10.7 million wage changes 
from nearly 3.1 million workers who work in a total of 20,596 firms. The control 
variables that are used in the regressions are displayed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
As an individual control variables, I use, inter alia, the gender and the wage 
level of the worker. Controlling for sex is important for two reasons: first, it has 
3 A general introduction to the IAB Establishment Panel is provided by Kölling (2000); more detailed information is 
provided by Fischer et al. (2009). A general introduction to the LIAB is provided by Alda et al. (2005).
4 The BeH contains eight classes of workers. I drop all classes except “white-collar workers,” “unskilled workers” and 
“skilled workers.” The two latter classes are combined to form the class “blue-collar workers.”
5 This leads to an underrepresentation of highly qualified (white collar) workers, making the results somewhat less 
generalizable. See Appendix C.1 for more information on the contribution assessment ceiling and data selection.
6 The breakdown of occupations is very detailed, but still, not every job change leads to a change in the occupation 
classification. Therefore, some spells for persons who changed their job within a firm may not be excluded. The 
“same position” restriction has also been applied by Christofides and Stengos (2001) and in Chapter 2.
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been shown that the average nominal wage increase for women in Germany is 
higher and that female workers are less frequently affected by nominal wage cuts 
(see, e.g., Pfeiffer, 2003, Table 2, p. 624). Second, controlling for the sex allows me 
to control for the fact that shifts from part-time to full-time employment (and vice 
versa) are more common for female workers (see, e.g., Schäfer and Vogel, 2005).7 
Kahn (1997) shows that minimum wage workers in the USA are more often affected 
by zero nominal wage changes and less often affected by negative nominal pay 
changes than other workers. Therefore, I control for the wage level of the workers 
using ten dummy variables.
 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for worker spells
 Mean  Std. Err.  Min.  Max. 
Individual (micro) data 
Change in log real wage  0.01  0.05  –0.19  0.22 
Change in log nominal wage  0.03  0.05  –0.18  0.24 
Age  41.99  9.65  17  65
Female (yes = 1)  0.32  0.47  0  1
Non-German (yes = 1)  0.08  0.27  0  1
White-collar workers (yes = 1)  0.45  0.50  0  1
Tenure (days worked in firm)  4,275  2,610  730  11,869
Education:
Lower secondary school and intermediate  
(secondary) school without vocational  
qualification
 0.15  0.36  0  1
Lower secondary school and intermediate  
(secondary) school with vocational  
qualification
 0.71  0.46  0  1
Upper secondary school examination without 
vocational qualification
 0.01  0.08  0  1
Upper secondary school examination with 
vocational qualification
 0.04  0.20  0  1
Post-secondary technical college degree  0.03  0.17  0  1
University degree  0.03  0.17  0  1
No formal education and no classification 
applicable 
 0.03  0.18  0  1
7 Shifts from part-time to full-time work and vice versa that occur during the course of the year do not lead to a new 
report for the employer. A new status is conveyed with the annual report at the end of a year – this status applies 
for the whole year. However, because I only observe wage changes for full-time workers, the observed wage change 
can only be overestimated – due to changes from part-time to full-time employment – but the wage change 
cannot be underestimated.
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 Mean  Std. Err.  Min.  Max. 
Establishment data
Work council (yes = 1)  0.95  0.21  0  1
Wages paid above standard rate (yes=1)  0.48  0.50  0  1
Establishment size  4,239  8,321  1  51,155
Union variable:
Collective agreement (agreements at industry 
level) 
 0.85  0.36  0  1
In-house rate (agreements at the firm level)  0.13  0.34  0  1
No collective agreement  0.02  0.15  0  1
Note:  Pooled data from 13 years (1995/1996 to 2006/2007). Number of observations = 10,733,205. The dataset 
also contains dummies for 6 occupation fields and 10 dummies for wage levels.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for regional (macro) variables
 Obs.  Mean  Std. Err.  Min.  Max. 
Inflation (log change in consumer price index)  13  0.015  0.004  0.006  0.022
Absolute change in the rate of inflation  13  0.005  0.003  0.001  0.010
Regional productivity growth (average  
regional real wage growth) 
 197  0.012  0.012  –0.027  0.046
Regional unemployment rate  197 0.133 0.048  0.055  0.221
Regional lagged unemployment rate  197  0.133  0.047  0.055  0.221
Note:  Pooled data from 13 years (1995/1996 to 2006/2007). The dataset also contains dummies for the 16  German 
federal states.
The use of the LIAB also allows me to control for institutional characteristics. 
Because the labor unions and other forms of worker participation still have a large 
influence on wage setting in Germany, they could influence the wage changes 
of workers. Therefore, I control for whether a work council is present in a firm, 
whether the firm pays wages according to an agreement at the industry or the firm 
level, and whether a firm pays wages above the standard rate.8
For the inflation rate, I use the log change in the consumer price index (CPI, 
see Table B.2 in Appendix B.1). Following Elsby (2009), productivity growth is 
measured by the observed average regional real wage change rate. Productivity 
is not directly measured because the real wages adjust to changes in productivity 
with a time lag.9 The absolute change in the rate of inflation is included because 
Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) hypothesized that higher inflation volatility leads 
8 In 1999, the question of the LIAB questionnaire on union agreements was changed slightly. The category “firm-level 
collective agreement” was replaced by “firm-level collective agreement underwritten by a union.” I did ignore this 
modification because Dustmann et al. (2007, p. 45) found that “[…] its impact is almost invisible on time series plots 
of the evolution of union recognition.”
9 Alternatively, one could model some type of error-correction mechanism for the discrepancy between real wage 
change and productivity growth. I avoid these complications by using the average regional real wage change rate 
as a proxy variable reflecting the impact of (regional) productivity growth on wages. It is a suitable proxy because, 
according to the theoretical predictions of Elsby (2009), DNWR should have no effect on the average wage change.
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to greater dispersion in relative wages regardless of the existence of DNWR. The 
current and lagged regional unemployment rates are included because DNWR can 
affect unemployment. The unemployment rates are used to control for changes in 
the wage change distribution due to workers “leaving” the distribution.
3.2 Empirical Implementation, Results, and Discussion
To analyze whether workers’ wage changes are affected by changes in the inflation 
rate, conditional on their position in the wage change distribution and their 
individual and/or firm characteristics, I estimate a UQR that has several variables 
interacted with inflation. I regress the percentile-transformed individual log real 
wage change – the recentered influence function  – of the individual log real 
wage change (Δw) against X = (πt  a ′irt  b ′irt  c ′irt ).
πt  is the inflation rate of year t, and a and b are vectors containing further 
control variables on the individual level i or on the regional level r (see Tables 3.1 
and 3.2). Vector c contains the same six control variables as vector b, but they are 
interacted with the inflation rate. The six variables contained in vectors b and c are 
dummies for white-collar worker, female, work council, wages paid above standard 
rate, and the two union variables (collective agreement and in-house rate).10
Because I want to focus on whether the effect of inflation on the real wage 
change varies for workers and whether the effect depends on the position of 
the worker in the wage change distribution, I only display the coefficients for 
the inflation rate, the coefficients of the variables contained in vector b and the 
corresponding coefficients of the interaction terms contained in vector c (see 
Table  3.3).11
The coefficients for the inflation rate (see Table 3.3) can be interpreted as the 
marginal effect of inflation on the real wage change for the reference worker: a 
male blue-collar worker who is employed by a firm without a work council that is 
not paying according to a collective agreement and that is not paying wages above 
a collective agreement.12
10 Appendix C.2 shows that the LIAB appears to be suitable for the analysis. Furthermore, it shows that a decrease in the 
inflation rate leads to a compression of real wage increases – confirming the findings of Elsby (2009) and Chapter 2.
11 Looking at the coefficients of the variables that are not interacted with the inflation rate – presented in Table  3.3  – 
one can see that not only individual characteristics but also institutional characteristics have an influence on the 
real wage change of workers: nearly all coefficients for the variables are highly significantly different from zero but 
small in magnitude.
12 For this reference worker, the effect of the inflation rate perfectly fits the predictions of Elsby’s (2009) model (see 
Appendix C.2).
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If a coefficient for the inflation rate is positive, a decrease in the inflation rate 
is associated with a decrease of the real wage change; a negative coefficient is 
associated with an increase of the real wage change. Depending on the position in 
the wage change distribution, this association has different effects. The distribution 
can be divided into three segments: the lower part of the distribution where the 
nominal wage cuts are observed (the 10th percentile), the range of the distribution 
where zero nominal wage changes are observed (the 20th and 30th percentile), 
and the upper part of the distribution where nominal wage increases are observed 
(≥  40th percentile).13
For the reference worker in the lower part of the distribution, a decrease in 
the inflation rate leads to more pronounced real wage cuts brought about by 
nominal wage cuts. This leads to a decompression of the distribution on the left 
hand side of the distribution. The compression on the left hand side of the wage 
change distribution occurs in the range where zero nominal wage changes are 
observed because DNWR leads to an increase of zero nominal wage changes. 
For the reference workers in the range of the distribution where zero nominal 
wage changes are observed, a decrease in the inflation rate is associated with 
an increase of the real wage change. It cannot be determined whether they 
experience a more pronounced real wage increase or a less pronounced real wage 
cut. For the reference workers in the upper part of the distribution, a decrease in 
the inflation rate will lead to a less pronounced real wage increase and hence to a 
compression of the distribution on the right hand side. This method of interpreting 
the coefficients for the inflation rate, and hence for the reference worker, also 
holds for the interpretation of the coefficient of the variables that are interacted 
with the inflation rate.
To observe how strongly the inflation rate affects the real wage change of 
workers, and to observe how this effect varies between workers, I calculate the 
marginal effect of inflation on the real wage change. The marginal effect is the sum 
of the coefficient of the inflation rate (η) and the 6 coefficients (λi ) of the variables 
interacted with the inflation rate multiplied with the corresponding variable (bi ):
η  + Σi  λi bi  .
Because two of the dummy variables interacted with the inflation rate are 
exclusive (in the sense that workers cannot get paid according to a collective 
agreement and an in-house agreement simultaneously), I can calculate the 
marginal effect of the inflation rate on real wage change for 48 worker types. To 
get a sense for how significantly the effects over the wage change distribution vary 
between worker types, I show summary statistics in Table 3.4.
13 See Appendix C.2.
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Table 3.4:  Summary statistics for the marginal effects of the inflation rate on the percentiles of 
the real wage change for 48 different settings of individual and firm characteristics
Percentiles  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
Min. –1.551 –0.869 –0.753 –1.249 –1.259 –1.364 –0.913 –0.083  0.281
Max.  1.548  0.533  0.290  0.874  1.165  1.432  1.376  1.421  2.395
Mean  0.209 –0.100 –0.228 –0.183 –0.010 0.042  0.238  0.668  1.298
Range  3.098  1.402  1.044  2.123  2.424  2.796  2.289  1.504  2.114
Notes:  The marginal effect of the inflation rate on the real wage change calculated for all 48 possible worker 
types. Gray colored columns indicate the range of percentiles where zero nominal wage changes are 
observed in the data. Unweighted mean.
The summary statistics show (see Table 3.4) that the real wage changes of workers 
are not equally affected by inflation. The marginal effect varies within and between 
the different percentiles of the real wage change distribution. Over the entire real 
wage change distribution, there are some workers whose real wage decreases 
with a decrease in the inflation rate, and vice versa. Other workers experience an 
increase of the real wage change with a decrease in the inflation rate, and vice 
versa. The range shows that the marginal effect of inflation on the wage change 
between the workers differs significantly for the 10th percentile of the real wage 
change distribution in particular – where the nominal wage cuts are observed. The 
ranges for the 20th and 30th percentiles – where zero nominal wage changes are 
observed – are small when compared to the ranges of the other percentiles.14
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for the coefficient of the variables interacted with inflation 
 Min.  Max.  Mean
Individual characteristics
White-collar worker  –0.913  0.522  –0.342
Female  –0.293  0.126  –0.075
Firm characteristics
Work council  –0.785  –0.228  –0.547
Wages above std. rates  –0.441  0.793  0.461
Union variable (reference category: no collective agreement)
Collective agreement (at the industry level)  –0.274  0.244  –0.069
In-house rate (collective agreement at the firm level)  –1.337  0.147  –0.203
Notes: Calculations based on the calculated coefficients for the 10th, 20th, …, 90th percentile. Unweighted mean. 
14 While interpreting the summary statistics, one should keep in mind that the presented mean values are un-
weighted – every worker type has the same weight regardless of how many workers it actually represents. Table 3.1, 
however, shows that, e.g., nearly 85 percent of the workers are employed by firms that pay according to a collective 
agreement.
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To observe which characteristics really influence the real wage change of workers 
when the inflation rate changes, I focus on the coefficients of the variables of 
vector  c, which are interacted with the inflation rate. A look at Table 3.3 shows 
that the coefficients for these variables vary within and between the different 
percentiles of the real wage change distribution. To provide an overview, Table  3.5 
shows some summary statistics for the coefficients of the variables. While 
interpreting the coefficients, one should always keep the general effect of the 
inflation rate on the real wage change – the marginal effect of inflation on the 
real wage change for the reference worker – in mind (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1). 
Because the marginal effects are linear, they add up. Hence, the marginal effect 
of inflation on the real wage change for a worker who is identical to the reference 
worker except that he is a white-collar worker is the sum of the marginal effect 
of the inflation rate and the marginal effect of the white-collar dummy interacted 
with inflation.
 
 
First, I take a closer look at the coefficients of the individual characteristics 
interacted with the inflation rate. The effect of a change in the inflation rate 
on the real wage change conditional on the class of the worker – in terms of 
white-collar worker or blue-collar worker – is especially strong for the very low 
and the very high percentiles of the wage change distribution (see Table 3.3 and 
Figure   3.2). For the 10th percentile – where workers experience nominal wage 
cuts – the coefficient is strongly positive: if the inflation rate decreases, the white-
collar workers experience higher real wage cuts than the blue-collar workers. For 
Figure 3.1:  The marginal effects of inflation on the real wage change for the reference worker
2,5
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0
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Note :  Reference worker: a male blue-collar worker who is employed by a firm without a work council that is not 
paying according to a collective agreement and that is not paying wages above a collective agreement. 
The dotted lines represent the 95 % confidence interval.
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the 20th and 30th percentiles – the range where the zero nominal wage changes 
are observed – the effect of a change in inflation barely differs between the white-
collar worker and the blue-collar worker. Above the 30th percentile of the real 
wage change distribution, the coefficients are negative: a decrease in the inflation 
rate is associated with higher wage increases for white-collar workers.
The effects of a change in the inflation rate on the real wage change conditional 
on the sex is tiny when compared to the effects of a change in the inflation rate on 
the real wage change conditional on the class of the worker. For the 10th, 20th and 
90th percentiles, the coefficients for the interaction term are positive: a decrease 
in the inflation rate is associated with lower real wage changes. For the women in 
the 10th percentile and in the 20th percentile of the real wage change distribution, 
this real wage cut goes hand in hand with a nominal wage cut. Hence, women 
experience higher wage cuts. This finding is consistent with Anspal and Järve’s 
(2011) findings for Estonia: using Kahn’s (1997) histogram-location approach, they 
find that women resist pay cuts less than men. For the 40th to the 80th percentile, 
the coefficients are negative: a decrease in the inflation rate is associated with 
higher real wage changes.
Institutional characteristics also have an influence on the real wage change of 
workers when the inflation rate changes (see Table 3.3 and Figures 3.3 and 3.4). This 
influence is particularly strong for the existence a work council and whether a firm 
pays wages above standard rates. For the workers of firms that pay wages above 
Figure 3.2:  The marginal effect of inflation on the real wage change for white-collar workers  
and female workers
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the standard rates, all of the coefficients of the interaction term are positive except 
for the 90th percentile. However, for the workers of firms with a work council, all 
of the coefficients of the interaction term are negative. Therefore, a decrease in the 
inflation rate is associated with a lower wage change for the workers who are paid 
above the standard rate, while the workers at firms with a work council experience 
an inverse effect: a decrease in the inflation rate is associated with higher wage 
changes.
Surprisingly, labor unions do not appear to have a strong influence on how a 
change in the inflation rate influences the real wage change – the base category 
for both variables is “no collective agreement.” For workers who are paid according 
to a collective agreement at the industry level, the coefficients for the 30th to the 
70th percentile of the interaction term are significantly negative, while only the 
coefficient for the 90th percentile is significantly positive. For the workers who 
are paid according to an in-house rate (collective agreement at the firm level), 
the coefficients of the interaction term are significantly negative for the 10th to 
the 40th percentile and significantly positive for the 60th to the 70th percentile. 
Aside from the fact that the coefficients for the labor unions are not statistically 
significant for quite a few of the percentiles, the coefficients that are significantly 
different from zero are fairly small when compared to the coefficients of the other 
institutional characteristics. The only exception is the coefficient for the 10th 
percentile for workers of firms that pay according to an in-house rate.
Figure 3.3:  The marginal effect of inflation on the real wage change for workers at firms with  
a work council and workers at firms that pay wages above the standard rates
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3.3 Conclusions
Applying UQR, I estimated the impact of inflation on the unconditional percentiles 
of the real wage change distribution. The empirical analysis has been undertaken 
for Germany over the 1995 to 2007 period using the LIAB of the IAB. The analysis 
has been confined to “job stayers,” i.e., full-time workers who continually exercise 
the same job at the same employer for at least two consecutive years. After data 
selection, nearly 11 million earnings changes are analyzed.
Using interacting dummies for the individual and the firm characteristics 
with the inflation rate, I show that the effect of the inflation rate on the workers’ 
real wage changes differs not only between but also within the percentiles of 
the wage change distribution. The effect is conditional on the workers’ position 
in the wage change distribution, and it is conditional on the workers’ individual 
characteristics and on the firm characteristics; the conditional effects also differ 
over the wage change distribution. In particular, the class of the workers (in terms 
of white- and blue-collar workers), whether an employee pays wages above the 
standard rates, and/or whether a work council exists in the firm, have a strong 
influence on how a change in the inflation rate affects the real wage change of 
the worker.
The results show that some workers are “discriminated” against by DNWR: 
previous results are confirmed, e.g., that women resist pay cuts less than men (see, 
Figure 3.4:  The marginal effect of inflation on the real wage change for workers of firms that 
pay according to a collective agreement (at the industry level) or that pay according 
to an in-house rate (collective agreement at the firm level)
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e.g., Anspal and Järve, 2011), and new insights are gained, e.g., that blue-collar 
workers in particular are affected by the compression of wage increases.
Given the results of this section, future research on the microeconomic 
consequences of DNWR should consider that DNWR affects not only the lower 
tail of the wage change distribution but also the upper part of the wage change 
distribution. Furthermore, research should consider that the effect of inflation 
on the workers’ real wage change is conditional on the individual characteristics 
and the firm characteristics and that these effects differ over the wage change 
distribution. Considering these insights in further research will provide a better 
picture of the microeconomic effects of DNWR.
Part II
Real Wage Rigidity
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4   Real Wage Rigidity over the Business Cycle – Previous 
Research and Recent Developments
While the first part of the book deals with downward nominal wage rigidity, the 
second part concentrates on real wage rigidity. More precisely, it deals with real 
wage rigidity of newly hired workers over the business cycle. This chapter provides 
a brief overview on previous research on this topic, while the next chapter analyzes 
the cyclical behavior of real wages of newly hired workers in Germany.
4.1 Introduction
The recent interest in real wage rigidity has been driven by the ongoing debate 
on the ability of the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) to generate realistically large cyclical fluctuations 
in unemployment (see, e.g., Shimer, 2005; Hall, 2005; Veracierto, 2008).
Shimer (2005, p. 45) shows “[…] that a search and matching model in which 
wages are determined by Nash bargaining cannot generate substantial movements 
along a downward-sloping Beveridge curve in response to shocks of a plausible 
magnitude.”1 This puzzle is usually referred to as the “Shimer-Puzzle”. That this 
puzzle also exists for Germany is shown, e.g., by Gartner et al. (2012). They reveal 
that average labor market flows in Germany are much smaller than in the USA and 
show that the “[…] standard deviations of unemployment, vacancies, the job-finding 
rate and the separation rate are larger in Germany than in the United States, both in 
absolute terms and relative to productivity.” (Gartner et al., 2012, p. 106)
One way of solving the “Shimer-Puzzle” is suggested by Shimer (2005, p. 45): “An 
alternative wage determination mechanism that generates more rigid wages in new 
jobs, measured in present value terms, will amplify the effect of productivity shocks 
on the [… vacancy-unemployment] ratio, helping to reconcile the evidence and 
theory.” So far, Shimer’s (2004, 2005) suggestion that real wage rigidity is one way to 
generate more variability of unemployment within the search and matching model 
has been widely shared (see, e.g., Hall, 2005; Hall and Milgrom, 2008; Kennan, 2010).
4.2 Early Research on Real Wage Rigidity
To estimate whether real wages are rigid over the business cycle a common 
practice has been to regresses real wages on a business cycle variable, e.g. the 
1 The Beveridge curve is a graphical representation of the relationship between unemployment and the job vacancy 
rate.
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unemployment rate. The first approaches used aggregated wage data – the results 
suggested that wages move procyclically (see, e.g., Dunlop, 1938; Tarshis, 1939).2 
However, this early literature did not reach a definite conclusion on whether wages 
move procyclical or countercyclical.3 One reason for the inconclusive results could 
be the use of aggregated data. Solon et al. (1994) show that using aggregated 
time series data instead of longitudinal microdata leads to an underestimation 
of wage cyclicality due to a composition bias in aggregated statistics. Bils (1985, 
p. 667) argues in more general terms that an aggregation “[…] involves a loss of 
information and therefore of estimating efficiency.” This criticism led to the use of 
microdata in the analysis of real wage cyclicality.
First microdata studies often analyzed the real wage cyclicality for job movers 
and job stayers (e.g., Shin, 1994; Devereux and Hart, 2006; Shin and Solon, 2007) 
and showed that using microdata in the analysis has pitfalls as well (see, e.g., Bils, 
1985; Mitchell et al., 1985). Keane et al. (1988) show, e.g., that failure to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity leads to a countercyclical bias. Three possible kinds 
of heterogeneities should be taken into account analyzing real wage cyclicality: 
worker, firm, and job heterogeneity.
Worker heterogeneity
Skilled workers tend to retain their jobs during recessions. Therefore low-skilled 
workers account for a smaller share of employment in recessions than in booms 
(see, e.g., Bils, 1985; Mitchell et al., 1985; Keane et al., 1988; Solon et al., 1994). 
This causes a composition bias if aggregated wage are used in the analysis: “[…] 
the aggregated statistics are constructed in a way that gives more weight to low-
skilled workers during expansions than during recessions.” (Solon et al., 1994, p. 1)
Firm heterogeneity
Industry compositions change over the business cycle due to the exit and entry of 
firms.
Job heterogeneity
Job compositions within firms might change over the business cycle due to firing, 
hiring, and the promotion of incumbent workers. For example, a firm might lower 
its hiring standards in a boom to increase employment, while holding entry-
wages rigid. “Such cyclicality in job assignments could cause the real wages of 
2 An early exception is Mehra (1982), who examined the dynamic relationship of real wages and employment at the 
industry level.
3 Evidence of countercyclical real wages is, e.g., provided by: Canzoneri (1978); Chirinko (1980). Evidence of 
procyclical real wages is, e.g., provided by: Kuh (1966); Bodkin (1969).
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the firm’s worker to be procyclical even if wages by job are sticky.” (Solon et al., 
1997, p. 403).
Papers analyzing the wage cyclicality of job movers and job stayers show that 
wages of job movers are more procyclical than wages of job stayers (e.g., Bils, 1985; 
Shin, 1994; Devereux and Hart, 2006; Shin and Solon, 2007). An explanation for 
this finding is given by Hagedorn and Manowskii (forthcoming, p. 5): “[…] workers 
can sample from a larger pool of job offers in a boom than in a recession, and 
workers with lower quality of the current match benefit more from the expansion 
of the pool of offers in a boom.”4
4.3 Recent Developments
Pissarides (2009) shows that the decision of opening a vacancy or not is mainly 
influenced by the real wage of newly hired workers (entrants). Pissarides (2009, 
p. 1340  f.) argues that “[…] wages in continuing jobs may be completely fixed, 
and yet, if wages in new matches satisfy the Nash wage equation, the volatility of 
job creation will be unaffected by their wage stickiness. The wage stickiness that 
matters in [… the search and matching] model is therefore wage stickiness in new 
matches […].” This point of view is also shared by Haefke et al. (2012). They show 
that wages of entrants out of non-employment in the USA respond one-to-one to 
changes in labor productivity. The wages of incumbents however react very little 
to changes in productivity. These new insights caused the recent focus on the real 
wage rigidity of newly hired workers.
Recent literature also challenges the idea of introducing real wage rigidity 
into search and matching models in order to generate a realistic volatility of 
unemployment. Pissarides (2009, p. 1341), e.g., dismisses theories based on cyclically 
rigid wages because, empirically, hiring wages are procyclical: “I conclude that a 
good explanation of the unemployment volatility puzzle needs to be consistent 
with the observed proportionality […] between wages in new matches and labor 
productivity. Models that imply nontrivial departures from unit elasticity between 
wages in new matches and productivity go against a large body of evidence.” 
He bases his dismissal on microeconomic studies reporting that the real wage 
cyclicality for job movers is larger than for incumbent workers (e.g., Bils, 1985; 
Shin, 1994; Devereux and Hart, 2006; Shin and Solon, 2007).
4 Hagedorn and Manowskii (forthcoming, p. 52) include the match quality in regressions (using labor market 
tightness – measured as the ratio of aggregate stock of vacancies to the unemployment rate – as a proxy) to 
control for unobserved idiosyncratic productivity. Due to the control for the match quality, “[…] the differences in 
the volatility of wages between job switchers and job stayers disappears.”
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However, there is an explanation why the empirical evidence, to which Pissarides 
(2009) refers to, does not preclude acyclical wage setting by firms. Gertler and 
Trigari (2009) argue that workers may switch between high- and low-wage jobs 
over the business cycle, while wages of newly hired workers may be rigid or tied 
to the wages of incumbent workers within the same firm. Therefore, one has to 
control for so-called “cyclical upgrading” in booms and “cyclical downgrading” in 
recessions:5 “Suppose, for example, that a highly skilled machinist takes a job as a 
low-paid cabdriver in a recession [“cyclical downgrading”] and then is reemployed 
as a high-paid machinist in a boom [“cyclical upgrading”].” (Gertler and Trigari, 
2009, p. 73) Not controlling for the employer/employee match could lead to the 
conclusion that the wage is procyclical over the business cycle when in fact the 
procyclical movements of the wage actually result only from the job changes.
Whether or not introducing wage rigidity into the canonical search and 
matching model is justified should be subject to an empirical investigation: how 
rigid are real wages – especially the real wages of newly hired workers – over the 
business cycle? Even if wages of incumbent workers are rigid, the wages of newly 
hired employees could be highly procyclical, and, with sufficiently procyclical 
entry-wages, the “Shimer-Puzzle” would remain (cf. Pissarides, 2009). Hence, the 
empirical assessment of recent theories of the rigidity of entry-wages requires 
an approach that identifies cyclical variation in hiring wages within employer/
employee matches.
So far, to the best of my knowledge, only two studies for Portugal exist that 
control for “cyclical up- and downgrading” in employer/employee matches: 
Carneiro et al. (2012) and Martins et al. (2012b). Carneiro et al.’s (2012) endogenous 
variable is the individual real wage. In their regressions they control for worker 
characteristics, and simultaneously for linearly separable worker, firm, and job-
specific fixed effects. Martins et al.’s (2012b) endogenous variable is a slightly 
aggregated wage: they use the “typical” real wage of entry jobs, e.g. the modal 
wage of a certain job within a certain firm. They define jobs within firms and use 
firm-job fixed effects instead of controlling separably for firm and job fixed effects.
Against the backdrop of these recent developments the next chapter provides 
empirical evidence on the real wage cyclicality of newly hired workers in Germany. 
I analyze how changes in the unemployment rate affect the “typical” real wage 
of entry jobs and the individual real wages of newly hired workers, respectively. 
In my regressions I control for “cyclical up- and downgrading” in employer/
employee matches through the use of firm-job fixed effects. Furthermore, I argue 
5 “Cyclical up- and downgrading” has long been discussed and documented – the literature goes back at least to 
Reynolds (1951, chapter 5). Recent analyses include e.g. Devereux (2004); Bjelland et al. (2011), and Hart and 
Roberts (2011).
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that the methodologies to estimate the real wage cyclicality of real entry-wages, 
as applied by Carneiro et al. (2012) and Martins et al. (2012b), probably produce 
biased estimates. I apply both methodologies to obtain an upper and a lower bound 
estimate for the wage cyclicality of newly hired workers. I argue that the true 
parameter should lie within these limits. 
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5  Real Wage Cyclicality of Newly Hired Workers  
in Germany
Based on recent microeconometric evidence on wage cyclicality some authors 
argue that the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) is not able to explain the cyclical volatility of 
unemployment (see, e.g., Shimer, 2005; Hall, 2005; Veracierto, 2008). However, 
by introducing rigid wages into the model, it is better in fitting fluctuations in 
unemployment (see, e.g., Shimer, 2005). Especially the real wage rigidity of newly 
hired workers (entrants) seems to play a crucial role in generating realistically 
cyclical fluctuations in the unemployment rate, since the decision of opening a 
vacancy or not is mainly influenced by the real wage of newly hired workers (cf. 
Pissarides, 2009).
However, there is little empirical evidence on how real wages of newly hired 
workers react to business cycle conditions. Also, previous research has mostly 
ignored “cyclical upgrading” of workers to better employment opportunities in 
booms (i.e. from low-wage jobs to high-wage jobs) and “cyclical downgrading” 
to worse employment opportunities in recessions (cf. Gertler and Trigari, 2009).
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the wage cyclicality of newly 
hired workers in Germany. I use two stage regressions to estimate how changes 
in the unemployment rate affect the wages of newly hired workers. In the 
regressions I control for “cyclical up- and downgrading” in employer/employee 
matches through the use of firm-job fixed effects. For the empirical analysis I 
apply three statistical models – focusing on two different endogenous variables  – 
to a huge administrative longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset for 
Germany over the 1977 to 2009 period. I focus on the “typical” real wage of newly 
hired workers – e.g. the modal real wage paid to entrants into a particular job – 
following Martins et al.’s (2012b) methodology and I focus on the job entrants’ 
individual real wages following Carneiro et al.’s (2012) methodology. 
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is threefold. First, I present the 
first empirical evidence for a large economy, namely Germany, on the cyclicality 
of real entry-wages while controlling for firm-job fixed effects.1 In light of the 
magnitude of the entry-wage cyclicality that I find for Germany, it seems that 
the idea of introducing wage rigidity into the Mortensen-Pissarides model –  in 
order to amplify realistic volatility of unemployment – is not supported by the 
empirical evidence. Second, I argue that estimates obtained using “typical” real 
1 So far comparable empirical evidence exists, to the best of my knowledge, only for Portugal (see Martins et al., 
2012b; Carneiro et al., 2012).
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wages and individuals’ real wages, respectively, as the endogenous variable 
might be biased in different directions. By running separate regressions for both 
endogenous variables I obtain a range of point estimates that should include the 
true parameter. Third, I show that the procyclicality of the employment/population 
ratio in Germany is (nearly) identical to the procyclicality of the real wages of job 
entrants.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section gives 
a brief literature review on methods of measuring entry-wage cyclicality and 
on existing empirical evidence. The data description and the data selection are 
presented in Section 5.2, while Section 5.3 presents the statistical models and the 
empirical results. In Section 5.4 I discuss the results and their implications, while 
Section 5.5 concludes.
5.1  Previous Empirical Evidence and Methods of Measuring
To the best of my knowledge, so far only two papers exist which identify cyclical 
variation in hiring wages while controlling for “cyclical up- and downgrading” in 
employer/employee matches: Martins et al. (2012b) and Carneiro et al. (2012). 
Both papers use the same matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, but 
different time periods and different unemployment rates. Martins et al. (2012b) use 
the 1982 to 2008 period, while Carneiro et al. (2012) use the shorter 1986 to 2007 
period. Also, they use different methodologies to identify the cyclical variation in 
wages.
Martins et al. (2012b) identify entry jobs within firms, track the real wage 
paid to newly hired workers in those jobs, and measure how the entry-wages vary 
over the business cycle. For their analysis they use a two stage regression. In the 
first stage they estimate a period fixed effect common to all entry jobs, where 
the endogenous variable is the log of the “typical” real wage of a job – e.g. the 
modal wage. In the second stage they estimate the cyclicality of entry-wages by 
regressions of the time series of the period fixed effect common to all entry jobs 
– from the first stage – on the unemployment rate and secular time trends as 
controls. Martins et al. (2012b) find that an increase in the unemployment rate by 
one percentage point leads to 1.8 percent lower real wages for newly hired workers 
within given firm-jobs.
Carneiro et al. (2012) estimate the real wage cyclicality of newly hired workers 
and incumbent workers in a one stage regression. They regress the individual log real 
wages on the unemployment rate, a new-hire dummy variable, the unemployment 
rate interacted with the new-hire dummy variable, time-varying individual 
characteristics, and secular time trends as controls. They further control for worker, 
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job title, and firm fixed effects. Carneiro et al. (2012) find that an increase in the 
unemployment rate by one percentage point leads to 2.67 percent lower real wages 
for newly hired workers.2
5.2 Data Description and Data Selection
The empirical analysis is undertaken for Germany for the 1977 to 2009 period using 
the IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File of the Institute 
for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. The 
BeH comprises the total population gainfully employed and covered by the social 
security system. Not covered are the self-employed, family workers assisting in the 
operation of a family business, civil servants (Beamte) and regular students. The 
BeH covers roughly 80 percent of the German workforce. From 1975 to 2009, the 
BeH contains data of 75 million workers in 9.11 million firms (IAB, 2011).3 Workers 
from East Germany are included from 1992 onwards. Important advantages of 
the BeH are the enormous amount of information and the high reliability of the 
earnings data, which is due to plausibility checks performed by the social security 
institutions and the existence of legal sanctions for misreporting. In contrast to 
household surveys, measurement errors due to erroneous reporting should be much 
weaker. Also, the BeH allows a matching of workers with firms, which is crucial to 
control for “cyclical up- and downgrading” in employer/employee matches, i.e. by 
controlling for firm-job fixed effects, as outlined in Chapter 4.
5.2.1 Data Selection and Identification Strategies
To create the dataset for the empirical analysis I first identify all firms which 
employed at least seven workers4 in at least one year in the 1975 to 2009 period. 
In those firms I identify all full-time workers. For each identified worker I draw 
all existing employment spells for the 1975 to 2009 period – including part-time 
employment, apprenticeships etc. The obtained dataset contains data of 59.711.757 
workers in 1.635.679 firms.5 It is used to identify newly hired workers.
2 For incumbent workers Carneiro et al. (2012) find that an increase in the unemployment rate of one percentage 
point decreases real wages by around 2.2 percent.
3 Because of certain selection criteria described in Sections 5.2.1 and a number of data inconsistencies in the first 
years of the BeH (see Appendix D.1) the analysis can only be run for the 1977 to 2009 period. Data from earlier years 
is used for identifying newly hired workers.
4 A worker must be subject to social security contributions without any specific tokens. The number of workers is 
evaluated at June 30 of each year.
5 I checked the data for inconsistencies and dropped a small number of spells. The procedure and the inconsistencies 
found are provided in the Appendix D.1.
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Definition of Jobs and Identification of Job Entrants
I define jobs within firms in terms of three-digit occupation codes6 (such as 
bookkeeper, barber and pharmacist) and further require that all workers in a job 
are at the same “job level” (cf. Martins et al., 2012b). As “job level” I use a four-
category variable coded as blue-collar worker/no craftsman, craftsman/skilled 
laboror7, master craftsman8, and white-collar worker/salaried employee. Hence, I 
create unique job identifiers that consist of the firm identification number, the 
occupation, and the job level.
To identify newly hired workers I use the individuals’ employment spells. An 
individual is a newly hired worker (job entrant) if he/she has worked in a different 
firm before (firm change) – and therefore in a different job – or if the individual has 
not worked (s.t. social security) in the same firm in the last 365 days. The second 
condition makes sure that workers adjourning their employment for a short period 
of time – for whatever reason – are not counted as job entrants when they return 
to the firm. Workers that change jobs within a firm are not identified as newly hired 
workers either.
Data Selection
After the identification of job entrants I select my estimation sample which is 
mostly defined by features of the BeH. 
1. I use data for West Germany from 1977 onwards and for East Germany from 
1993 onwards.9 
2. The BeH does not contain hourly wages. To minimize contamination with wor-
king-time effects, only full-time workers are considered in the analysis.10
6 The BeH covers 86 occupation groups containing 328 occupations. Spells without information about the occupation 
are dropped.
7 This class also contains some master craftsmen and foremen, see Bender et al. (1996).
8 Persons in this class can be employed either as blue-collar or as white-collar workers.
9 For the years 1975 for West Germany and 1992 for East Germany, respectively, I cannot apply the identification 
strategy for job entrants described above. Therefore I cannot use the data for the empirical analysis. Also, I drop 
observations for Berlin for all years before 1993 for the following reasons. First, West Berlin always had a special 
status before the reunification of Germany – West Berlin was highly subsidized and the labor market was not 
comparable to the labor market of the rest of West Germany. Second, in 1992 observations for Berlin cannot not 
be distinguished between East Berlin and West Berlin. Also, due to some data inconsistencies concerning the firm 
assignment in 1976 the data for the year 1976 are not used for the empirical analysis, but for identifying job 
entrants.
10 The BeH contains eight classes of workers. In the regressions I do not consider trainees, home workers, people 
with less than 18 weekly hours of work, and people with 18 or more weekly hours of work but not fully employed. 
Furthermore, the BeH contains 32 classifications for employment relationships, such as trainees, insured artist 
and publicists and employees in partial retirement. I only keep employees subject to social security contributions 
without particular tokens.
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3. Since earnings data are right censored at the contribution assessment ceiling11 
(“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”), only non-censored wage spells are considered 
in the analysis. I apply consistent top-coding instead of just dropping the cen-
sored wage spells.12 Applying consistent top-coding has the advantage that 
over the whole sample period the same fraction of the wage distribution is 
considered in the analysis. I calculate the percentage of individuals subject to 
top-coded (censored) wages in every year. I identify the threshold for the top-
coding separately for West Germany and East Germany. For West Germany the 
highest percentage of spells (8.33 %) are censored in the year 1992, for East 
Germany this is the case in 2002 (6.99 %). Therefore, in each year I drop the 
8.34 %/7 % highest wage spells for West/East Germany.13 
4. I restrict the dataset to workers aged 16 to 65. 
Furthermore, I only keep jobs in the dataset that could be observed in at least three 
years of the 1977 to 2009 period. This selection criterion is necessary to assure that 
wages are observed in multiple years – which is essential for the empirical analysis.
As a robustness check I also apply the much stricter sample selection criteria 
according to Martins et al. (2012b). However, applying these further selection criteria 
(FSC) hardly affects the regression results. The FSC are outlined in Appendix  D.2 
and regression results using this dataset are displayed in Appendix  D.4.
5.2.2  Description of Variables and Descriptive Overview of the Final Data 
Samples
In the empirical analysis I analyze how changes in the unemployment rate affect 
real wages of newly hired workers. As the endogenous variable I use “typical” real 
wages of entry jobs (following Martins et al. 2012b) and alternatively individual 
real entry-wages (following Carneiro et al., 2012).
Employers have to report to the social security system on a yearly base. 
Therefore, the BeH data does not contain monthly wages or hourly wages, but the 
11 The contribution assessment ceiling is annually adjusted to the changes in earnings (see Table D.5 in Appendix  D.3). 
Some employees – miners, mine-employees, sailors and railroad employees – are insured in the so called 
“knappschaftliche” pension insurance. The contribution assessment ceiling of this pension insurance is always 
higher than for the compulsory pension insurance scheme. Since 1999, the BeH does not indicate anymore in 
which pension insurance a person is insured. For this reason, I use only the contribution assessment ceiling of the 
compulsory pension insurance scheme.
12 See Burkhauser et al. (2004) for a introduction of consistent top-coding, and Feng et al. (2006) for a discussion of 
this method for the application to labor earnings.
13 Dropping top-coded spells leads to an underrepresentation of highly qualified (white collar) workers, making the 
results somewhat less generalizable. For a quantitative evaluation of the effect of dropping censored spells see, e.g., 
Tables B.3 and B.4 of Appendix B.1.
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wages14 paid during the duration of an employment spell. Hence, I cannot observe 
the wage of the first month of employment. But since the exact duration of each 
employment spell is known, I can calculate the average daily wage for each spell. 
The first employment spell of a newly hired worker lasts for at most one year – 
January 1 to December 31. When using individuals’ wages I also control for the 
different lengths of employment spells. To calculate the average daily real wage (in 
2005 prices) I use the Consumer Price Index (CPI).15
As the “typical” real entry-wage wjt I use either the modal or the mean average 
daily real wage paid to workers newly hired into job j  in period t. Using the modal 
wage some information is lost due to multiple modes. Summary statistics are 
provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1:  Number of entry jobs per year using the “typical” daily real entry-wage as endogenous 
variable 
Number of entry jobs per year using 
Real mean wage Real modal wage
Mean  1,122,075  631,226 
Min  749,063  448,963 
Max  1,377,595  775,498 
Sum  37,029,491  20,830,454 
Alternatively, I use the individual average daily real wage wijt paid in period t to 
worker newly hired into job j. Summary statistics are provided in Table 5.2. For the 
regressions I draw for each year a random 1 percent sample of the jobs (stratified 
by the number of entrants per job). For each drawn job, I keep all employment 
spells of the 1977 to 2009 period. Concerning the number of job entrants this leads 
roughly to a bisection of the original dataset: of the 122,180,828 job entrants 
59,863,251 are dropped, reducing the dataset to 62,317,577 employment spells of 
newly hired workers. Table D.3 (see Appendix D.3) shows the sample sizes by year 
for this sub-sample.
14 Before 1984, the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification was voluntary. Since 1984, one-time payments to 
employees have been subject to social security taxation and are therefore included in the data.
15 Before I calculate the log real daily wage, I round the daily nominal wage to the second decimal place.
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Table 5.2:  Number of job entrants per year using the individual daily real wage as endogenous 
variable
Number of job entrants per year
Mean  3,702,449 
Min  2,400,124 
Max  4,745,060 
Sum  122,180,828
The exogenous variables are presented in Table 5.3. In Appendix D.3 I provide some 
further information on the data. Table D.4 provides statistics for the different years, 
information on the number of job entrants using the “typical” real entry-wage, 
and the number of entry jobs using individual daily real wage as the endogenous 
variable, respectively. Table D.5 provides the unemployment and inflation rates. 
Table 5.3: Exogenous variables used in regressions using individuals’ wages
Qualification level of the 
employee (education) 
This variable includes eight categories: no formal education, lower 
secondary school and intermediate (secondary) school without 
vocational qualification, lower secondary school and intermediate 
(secondary) school with vocational qualification, upper secondary school 
examination without vocational qualification, upper secondary school 
examination with vocational qualification, post-secondary technical 
college degree, university degree, and no classification applicable. Base 
category: lower secondary school and intermediate (secondary) school 
with vocational qualification.
14.8 % (11.9 %) of the spells of the dataset (with FSC, see Appendix D.2) 
have missing information on the qualification level of the employee. 
Therefore, I do not use the genuine variable but an imputed variable.  
I apply a slightly altered version of the imputation algorithm introduced 
by Fitzenberger et al. (2005) for the IAB employment sub-sample 
(IABS). Using the imputed variable only 0.9 % of the spells have missing 
information on the qualification level of the employee.
Sex Dummy for female workers. Base category: male worker.
Age, Age2 Age a person is turning in the particular year.
Nationality Dummy for worker with foreign nationality. Base category: German.
Length of the 
employment spell 
Length of the first employment spell of a worker in a new job: 
1  month  ≤ length of employment spell ≤ 12 month.
5.3 Empirical Analysis
5.3.1 Models
To estimate the cyclicality of real entry-wages over the business cycle I identify 
particular jobs within firms. I track the wages paid to newly hired workers in firm-
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jobs and measure how the entry-wages vary over the business cycle. By defining 
particular jobs within particular firms, each job is actually a firm-job combination 
(see Section 5.2.1). I follow Martins et al.’s (2012b) methodology and apply two 
stage regressions.16 However, concerning the endogenous variable I follow both, 
Martins et al. (2012b) and Carneiro et al. (2012), using both the “typical” real wages 
of entry jobs and the job entrants individual real wages.
I apply three models to estimate the cyclicality of entry-wages. Table 5.4 
provides an overview of these models. They only differ with respect to the first 
stage regressions, while the second stage regressions are identical.
 
Table 5.4: Overview of the regression models
Model Endogenous variable 
Job fixed  
effects 
Worker fixed  
effects 
Individual  
controls
1 “typical” real wages of entry jobs yes no no
2 job entrants’ real wages yes no yes
3 job entrants’ real wages yes yes yes
Model 1
In model 1 I analyze how “typical” real wages are related to changes in the 
unemployment rate. I follow Martins et al. (2012b) and estimate the cyclicality of 
entry-wages with a two stage regression. In the first stage of the analysis I estimate 
period fixed effects common to all entry jobs, βt , and in the second stage I relate 
them to business cycle conditions. The period fixed effects βt  are estimated by: 
ln(wjt ) = αj   + βt   + εjt ,  (5.1)
where wjt  denotes the “typical” real wage paid in period t to workers newly hired 
into job j, e.g. the modal real wage. αj  is a job fixed effect and εjt  is the error term 
with mean zero representing temporary job-specific departures from the general 
period effect. To quantify the cyclicality of entry-wages I regress in the second 
stage the estimated time series of βt  (β^ t ) on the unemployment rate ut , controls 
for secular time trends, and a dummy that is one for 1984 and every following year 
(D≥ 1984 ): 
β^ t  = δut   + λ0t  + λ1t 2  + D≥ 1984  + εt  (5.2)
16 The unemployment rate – the regressor of interest – varies only between years. When it comes to the estimation 
of the standard errors I prefer a two stage regression over a single stage regression – even if one controls for year 
clusters in the one stage regression. A discussion of clustering and serial correlation in panels can be found, e.g., in 
Angrist and Pischke (2009, chapter 8.2).
93chapter 5
Real Wage Cyclicality of Newly Hired Workers in Germany
The dummy D≥ 1984 is introduced because the BeH does not allow separating fringe 
benefits from regular earnings. Before 1984, the inclusion of fringe benefits to 
notification was voluntary. Since 1984, one-time payments to employees have 
been subject to social security taxation and are therefore included in the data.17
Models 2 and 3
In models 2 and 3 I analyze how real wages of newly hired workers are affected 
by changes in the unemployment rate (following Carneiro et al., 2012). Using 
the individual wages as the endogenous variable allows to control for individual 
worker characteristics and for characteristics of the employment relationship, e.g. 
the length of the employment spell. As described in Section 5.2.2, the BeH does 
not provide monthly wages but wages for employment spells. The daily wage is 
calculated using the worker’s first employment spell. The length of the worker’s 
first employment spell can differ between one day and one year – depending on 
the beginning of the employment. Since the wage may include fringe benefits this 
could cause some noise in the wage data. For example the Christmas bonus is often 
only paid to workers that are employed at the end of the year and/or for at least a 
certain time of the year. Model 2 (see Equation 5.3) allows, inter alia, to control for 
this data issue by controlling for the length of the employment spell:
ln(wijt ) = αj   + βt  + γ ′xit   + εijt ,  (5.3)
where wijt  denotes the real wage paid in period t to worker i newly hired into job 
j and xit is a vector with individual characteristics of the worker i for period t (see 
Table 5.3). To quantify the cyclicality of entry-wages I regress, as in model 1, the 
β^ t time series on ut , controls for secular time trends, and D≥ 1984 (see Equation 5.2).
Several studies (e.g., Keane et al., 1988) show that the failure to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to countercyclical biases. Hence the estimates 
of model 2 are probably biased countercyclically. Therefore, in model 3 (see 
Equation  5.4) I additionally introduce worker fixed effects. As I am only analyzing 
the wages of newly hired workers, I do not observe all workers frequently enough to 
introduce person fixed effects using the original sample (described in Section  5.2.2). 
This is especially true for earlier birth cohorts where individuals often worked for 
only one employer in their working life. Therefore, I draw a sub-sample for the 
analysis that only includes workers which start at least 5 jobs during the observed 
17 However, observations before 1984 should be valid as well. If some employers reported fringe benefits before 1984 
and others did not, it is very likely that employers were usually consistent in their reporting behavior. The obligation 
of fringe benefits to notification leads to a level effect on wages from 1984 onwards for which I control with the 
D≥ 1984  dummy.
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time period. Furthermore, I require that these jobs are observed for at least 5  years.18 
The estimates of model 2 are used to show that the results of model 3 are not 
driven by the selection criteria used to obtain this sub-sample.
For model 3 I estimate linear two-way fixed-effects, as in Abowd and Kramarz 
(1999):19
ln(wijt ) = αi   + αj   + βt  + γ ′xit   + εijt  ,  (5.4)
where αi is a newly introduced worker fixed effect. To quantify the cyclicality of 
entry-wages I regress, as in the first two models, the estimates of the β^ t time series 
on ut , controls for secular time trends, and D≥ 1984 (see Equation 5.2).
5.3.2 Results
The results for model 1 show, that the estimated coefficients of the unemployment 
rate differ only slightly depending on the “typical” real entry-wage used in the 
analysis and the choice of the regression model (see Table 5.5).20 An increase in 
the unemployment rate of one percentage point decreases the real wage of job 
entrants within given firm-jobs by between 0.92 to 1.03 percent.21 The differences 
are not statistically significant at the five percent level. In regression (1.0) I 
estimate unweighted OLS regression models in both stages. In regression (1.1) I use 
weights according to Martins et al. (2012b): while the 1st stage uses unweighted 
OLS, in the 2nd stage OLS is used weighted by the number of observed entry jobs 
per year. Martins et al. (2012b) use these weights “[…] in an effort to correct for 
the heteroskedasticity resulting from the wide variation in the per-year sample 
size […].” However, the per-year sample in the German BeH data hardly varies (see 
Table  D.5 of Appendix D.3).22 Hence a weighting in the second stage regressions 
18 Further details on the sub-sample are provided in Section 5.3.2.
19 I use the Stata ado file “a2reg” by Ouazad (2007).
20 Martins et al. (2012b, Figure 3, p. 44) show a sample distribution of differences between individual workers’ log 
wage and modal log wages per job/year. For the Portuguese data – with hourly wages – the modal wage seems 
to be a good measure. For Germany the “typical” log wages differ more from the individual workers’ log wages 
than in Portugal. This is probably due to the fact that the BeH provides daily and not hourly wages. Distributions 
of differences between individual workers’ log wage and “typical” log wages are displayed in Figure D.1 in 
Appendix  D.5. The differences between “typical” wages and individual workers’ wages seems to be stronger for 
the dataset with FSC (right panel of Figure D.1). This first visual impression is also supported by simple summary 
statistics (see Table D.11 in Appendix D.5). The difference between individual workers’ log wages and the modal log 
wages for the dataset with FSC has a variance that is roughly twice as high as for the other measures.
21 Also, whether FSC are used or not only slightly affects the estimated coefficients of the unemployment variable 
(see Appendix D.4). Hence, the selection criteria from Martins et al. (2012b) do not seem to influence the outcome 
of the regressions.
22 In Martins et al. (2012b) the minimum number of entry jobs (newly hired workers) per year is 5.9 (11.1) times lower 
than the maximum one. The differences in Germany are much smaller – the minimum number of entry jobs (newly 
hired workers) per year is 1.8 (2.0) times lower than the maximum one.
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seems not to be necessary. A comparison of the estimates of model (1.0) and (1.1) 
shows that indeed, the weighting hardly affects the results.
Table 5.5:  Model 1 – estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate (δ^  ) using “typical” real 
entry-wages 
 Modal wage  Mean wage
(1.0) 1st and 2nd stage unweighted OLS –1.03***
(0.35)
–0.94***
(0.34)
(1.1) 1st stage unweighted OLS,  
2nd stage OLS weighted  
by number of entry jobs per year 
–1.00***
(0.34)
–0.92***
(0.33)
Note: *** Significant at 1 % level; ** 5 % level.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Jobs are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period. Further 
controls used: secular time trend controls (t  and t 
2) and a dummy for years ≥ 1984.
The results of model 2 (see Table 5.6) – using individual real wages instead of 
“typical” real entry-wages – are quite similar those of model 1. An increase in the 
unemployment rate by one percentage point decreases the real entry-wages of job 
entrants within given firm-jobs by between 0.83 and 0.90 percent.23
Table 5.6:  Model 2 – estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate (δ^  ) using individual  
real wages
(2.0) 1st stage unweighted OLS,  
2nd stage OLS unweighted 
–0.83***
(0.27)
(2.1) 1st stage unweighted OLS,  
2nd stage OLS weighted  
by number job entrants per year 
–0.90***
(0.28)
Note: *** Significant at 1 % level.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Jobs are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period. Further 
controls used: secular time trend controls (t  and t 
2) and a dummy for years ≥ 1984. Individual controls used  
in the 1st stage regression: education, sex, nationality, age, age2, and length of the employment spell. 
Since several papers show (e.g. Keane et al., 1988) that failure to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity produces a countercyclical bias, I introduce worker fixed 
effects in model 3. The introduction of the worker fixed effects allows to better 
control for worker heterogeneity. As mentioned above, the dataset used for models  1 
and 2 is not optimally suited for this kind of regression. Thus, I draw a sub-sample 
of employment spells of workers which enter at least 5 jobs during the observed 
time period. Furthermore, these jobs must be observed in at least 5 years in the 
1977 to 2009 period. Due to this sampling the dataset is reduced from 62,317,577 
23 Some robustness checks for the regressions of Tables 5.5 and 5.6 are provided in Tables D.8, D.9, and D.10, 
respectively, of Appendix D.4.
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to 10,335,054 employment spells of job entrants.24 To test whether the sampling 
affects the results, I re-run the regression shown in Table 5.6 (model 2) using the 
sub-sample as a robustness check (see Table 5.7). The estimated coefficients of 
the control regressions (3.0 and 3.1) have about the same magnitudes as in the 
original sample (see Table 5.6). Hence, it seems that using the sub-sample for the 
regressions hardly affects the results.
Controlling for worker fixed effects, an increase in the unemployment rate by 
one percentage point decreases the real entry-wages of job entrants within given 
firm-jobs by about 1.27 percent. Comparing the results of the control regressions 
(3.0 and 3.1) with the results of the linear two-way fixed-effects regressions (3.2 
and 3.3) shows, that not controlling for worker fixed effects leads – as expected – 
to an underestimation of entry-wage cyclicality.
Table 5.7:  Model 3 – estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate (δ^  ) using individual real 
wages
Control reg.  
w/o worker fixed 
effects (WFE) 
(3.0) like (2.0): 1st stage unweighted OLS, 
controlling for job fixed effects (JFE),  
2nd stage unweighted OLS 
Ind. controls in  
1st stage reg.:  
(a) and (b)
–0.82 ***
(0.24)
(3.1) like (2.1): 1st stage unweighted OLS,  
controlling for JFE, 2nd stage OLS 
weighted by number job entrants per year 
–0.84***
(0.22)
a2reg-reg.  
with WFE 
(3.2) 1st stage unweighted linear two-way 
fixed-effects reg., controlling WFE and 
JFE, 2nd stage unweighted OLS 
Ind. controls in  
1st stage reg.: (b) 
–1.26***
(0.25)
(3.3) 1st stage unweighted linear two-way 
fixed-effects reg., controlling for WFE and 
JFE, 2nd stage OLS weighted by number 
job entrants per year 
–1.27***
(0.23)
Note: *** Significant at 1 % level. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Further controls used: secular time trend controls (t  and t 
2) and a dummy 
for years ≥ 1984. Individual controls used in the 1st stage regression: (a) education, sex, nationality, and (b) age, 
age2, and length of the employment spell. 
I only use wage spells of job entrants which I observe at least 5 times and the jobs must be observed in at least 
5 years in the 1977 to 2009 period. Due to the sampling the dataset is reduced from 62,317,577 to 10,335,054 
employment spells of job entrants. 
In the next Section I discuss the regression results just presented and I comment 
on the question whether or not introducing wage rigidity in the Mortensen-
Pissarides search and matching model – in order to amplify realistic volatility of 
unemployment – is a sound strategy in light of the empirical evidence.
24 The dataset consists of 10,335,054 employment spells of 1,541,300 workers working in 230,722 different jobs.
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5.4 Discussion of the Results
The estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate displayed in Tables 5.5 
and 5.6 are in the general vicinity of –0.94 and the estimated coefficients are 
not significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level. Additionally 
controlling for worker fixed effects results in a higher estimate for the wage 
cyclicality of about –1.27 (see Table 5.7). 
5.4.1 Evaluation of the Regression Models
Using “typical” real wages has a disadvantages: it does not allow to control for 
individual and employment characteristics. However, given the German wage 
data, controlling for the length of the wage spell could be important since the 
dataset provides average daily wages. The Christmas bonus, e.g., is often only 
paid to workers that are employed during at least a certain time of the year. Not 
controlling for the length of the wage spell could lead to biased results. Therefore 
it seems that, given the German data, in general the individual worker’s log wage 
is better suited for the regressions.
However, using the individual wages has disadvantages too. It implies that one 
weights by the amount of hiring, which might be endogenous. If the wages of some 
jobs are more rigid than the wages of other jobs, then it could be that during a 
recession firms hire less workers into the jobs with more rigid wages. This probably 
would produce a procyclically bias in the wage analysis.25
Since the estimates of model 3 – using individual wages – are probably 
procyclical biased, one could argue that model 1 should be preferred over model  3.26 
However, the estimates of model 1 are probably biased as well.
As, e.g., Solon et al. (1994) point out, using aggregate time series data instead 
of longitudinal microdata leads to an underestimation of wage cyclicality due 
to the compositional bias in aggregated statistics. The general problem of using 
aggregated data is also mentioned by Bils (e.g., 1985, p. 667): “Aggregation also 
involves a loss of information and therefore of estimating efficiency.” “Typical” 
wages are aggregated individual wages and information is lost. Using aggregated 
data instead of microdata should lead to an underestimation of the wage 
cyclicality.
Moreover, using “typical” wages does not allow to control for changes in the 
workforce and/or employment shares. However, as Mitchell et al. (1985, p. 1162) 
25 I would like to thank Gary Solon for pointing out this issue.
26 I do not discuss the quality of the results using model 2, since the results are mainly used for robustness checks.
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point out, the “[…] composition of the labor force may change considerably over the 
course of the business cycle.”27 Solon et al. (1997) further state, that firms might 
lower hiring standards in a boom to increase employment, while holding entry-
wages stable. Using the “typical” wage does not allow to control for cyclicality in job 
assignments either. However, Mitchell et al. (1985), e.g., find for the USA that the 
work force becomes younger over time. Mitchell et al.’s (1985, p. 1167) “[…] results 
indicate that employment shares are not constant over time, but are influenced by 
the state of the economy, relative population growth, and time.” Lastly, using the 
“typical” wage assumes that the number of hires in all jobs is identical and stable 
over time – it does not control for changes in the share of hires caused by, e.g., 
technological advance. For example the share of less trained workers within firms 
could decrease over time due to the introduction of new machines, while the share 
of engineers increases over time because more manpower is needed to maintain 
the machines.
Also, “cyclical upgrading” may still cause an underestimation of the true 
procyclicality of entry-wages – especially in model 1. An underestimation of the 
true procyclicality of entry-wages could occur if in a recession employers would 
be able to recruit better qualified workers at any given wage. This would lead to 
a lower effective wage per efficiency unit of labor. Büttner et al. (2010) show for 
West Germany that occupational upgrading and downgrading – occupations as 
units defining homogenous skill requirements – exist in Germany. According to 
their results, the skill level of new hires within occupations rises significantly in 
recessions and decreases in upturns – however the effect amounts only to about 70 
percent of the corresponding USA result.28 Given the results of Büttner et al. (2010), 
the procyclicality of entry-wages estimated in this paper should be underestimated 
only slightly. This should especially be true for model 3, where I control for the 
qualification level (education) of the employee.
To sum up, looking at “typical” wages as well as looking at individual wages 
seems to produce biased estimates. Using individual wages probably produces a 
procyclical bias, while using “typical” wages probably produces a countercyclical 
bias. Therefore, I do not prefer any methodology over the other, but suggest to 
use both methodologies to obtain a range of estimates for the cyclicality of real 
entry-wages.
The point estimate of model 1 – regression (1.1) – provides a lower bound 
estimate and the point estimates of model 3 – regression (3.3) – provides an upper 
bound estimate. Thus an increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage 
27 Also, human capital theory predicts (see, e.g., Becker, 1964) that the employment shares of different demographic 
groups will vary over the business cycle.
28 For a analysis of the heterogeneity in the cyclical sensitivity of job-to-job flows in Germany see, e.g., Schaffner (2011).
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point leads to a decrease of real wages by between 0.92 and 1.27 percent. The 
true parameter should lie within this range. Also, all estimates are not statistically 
different from each other at the 5 % level.
5.4.2 Implications of the Results
The estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate – using individual wages, 
controlling for job and worker fixed effects – are in the general vicinity of –1.27 
(see Table 5.7). Being aware that if labor-force participation is procyclical, “[…] 
the negative of the change in the unemployment rate is an attenuated version of 
proportional changes in employment, […]” (Martins et al., 2012b, p. 48) implies that 
the cyclical elasticity of entry-wages should have the same magnitude as the cyclical 
elasticity of employment. In order to see whether this can be confirmed empirically, 
I follow Martins et al. (2012b) and estimate Okun’s Law-style relationships for 
the 1977 to 2009 period. In order to control for the reunification of Germany I 
introduce a dummy, D≥ 1991, that is equal to one for years from 1991 onwards.
Δu = α1 + β1log(ΔGDPreal ) + t  + D≥ 1991  (5.5)
Δlog ( employmentpopulation ) = α2 + β2(GDPreal ) + t  + D≥ 1991 (5.6)
I find that a one-point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 
1.27 percent reduction (β2 /β1) = –1.27 in the employment/population ratio. This 
procyclicality of employment is (nearly) identical to the procyclicality I have 
estimated for real entry-wages using model 3 (see Table 5.7). However, compared 
to the results of model 1, employment is slightly more procyclical than the 
procyclicality I have estimated for real entry-wages (see Tables 5.5).
Finally, I address the question of whether the Mortensen-Pissarides model 
can account for the cyclical variability of unemployment in light of the 
magnitude of the entry-wage cyclicality found for Germany. As a reference 
point for the real wage rigidity that is required in search and matching models 
to generate realistically large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, I draw 
on results of Kennan’s (2010) model (cf. Martins et al., 2012b). When Kennan 
(2010) calibrates his modification of the Mortensen-Pissarides model (the 
informational rent model), most of his calibrations match the empirical variation 
in the unemployment rate if he assumes that the real hiring wage declines by 
less than 0.68 percent when the unemployment rate rises by one percentage 
point (see Table 5.8).
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Table 5.8: Wage volatility in Kennan’s (2010) informational rent model
Wage change in percent – from life match begins in a bad 
state (w1) to life match begins in a good state (w2) – given a 
one percentage drop of the (long run) unemployment rates, 
assuming  …
… symmetric Cobb-
Douglas matching 
function (ν = 0.5)
… labor share and matching elasticity 
parameter used by Shimer  
(α = ν = 0.72)
Wages: flat ratesa  0.43  0.19 
Wages: non-decreasing ratesb  1.52  0.68 
Notes:  Source: Results are taken from Kennan (2010, Tab. 2, p. 650). Values converted to an unemployment 
change of one percentage point. 
a  The flat rate wage is given by ws = RWs . Where Ws is the present value of wages, and s represents the state: 
life match begins in a bad state (s = 1) or good state (s = 2). R = r  + δ   , where r  is the interest rate and δ    is the 
(constant) job destruction hazard rate. 
b  The non-decreasing rate wage “[…] is constant for the life of the match if the match begins in the good 
aggregate state, with a lower wage initially for matches that begin in a bad state [s = 1], followed by a wage 
increase when there is a transition to the good state [s = 2].” (Kennan, 2010, p. 648) The flow wages are given 
by w1 = w2 – (R  + λ1 ) (W2  – W1 ) = R W1 – λ1 (W2  – W1 ) and w2 = RW2. Where w1  (w2) represents the wage if a life 
match begins in a bad (good) state. 
Since my estimates (using model 3) show a decline of real hiring wages of 1.27 
percent when the unemployment rate rises by one percentage point it seems that 
the Mortensen-Pissarides model cannot account for the cyclical variability of 
unemployment in light of the magnitude of the entry-wage cyclicality found for 
Germany. This result is also backed up by the lower bound estimates of model 1: I still 
find a decline of real hiring wages of about 0.92 percent when the unemployment 
rate rises by 1 percentage point.
5.5 Conclusions
Using longitudinal matched employer-employee data from the IAB, I have tracked 
the cyclical behavior of the real wage paid to newly hired employees in over one 
million jobs. My results show that entry-wages in Germany are not rigid, but 
considerably respond to business cycle conditions. Furthermore, I show that the 
procyclicality of the employment/population ratio in Germany is (nearly) identical 
to the procyclicality of real entry-wages.
Using the “typical” real wage of entry jobs, I obtain a lower bound estimate for 
the cyclicality of real entry-wages: an increase in the unemployment rate of one 
percentage point leads to about 0.92 percent lower real entry-wages. The regression 
results obtained using individual wages as the unit of observation and controlling 
for job and worker fixed effects, suggest that an increase in the unemployment rate 
of one percentage point leads to about 1.27 percent lower real entry-wages (upper 
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bound). The true parameter should lie between the upper and the lower bound. This 
assumption seems to be justified since all estimates are not statistically different 
from each other at the 5 percent level.
The results of this chapter strengthen Pissarides’ (2009) dismissal of theories 
based on cyclically rigid hiring wages. In light of the magnitude of the entry-wage 
cyclicality in Germany it seems that introducing wage rigidity in the Mortensen-
Pissarides model in order to generate realistic volatility of unemployment is not 
supported by the data. This challenges researchers to develop search and matching 
models that are able to generate realistic volatility of, e.g., unemployment when 
considering the empirically documented real wage cyclicality.
However, it seems that real wages in Germany are less cyclical than in 
other countries. The two studies for Portugal that control for “cyclical up- and 
downgrading” in employer/employee matches find that a one percentage point 
rise in the unemployment rate decreases real wages of job entrants by 1.8 percent 
(Martins et al., 2012b) and 2.67 percent (Carneiro et al., 2012), respectively. Studies 
for the USA – that do not control for “cyclical up- and downgrading” in employer/
employee matches – find more procyclicality as well. Shin (1994), e.g., finds that a 
one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate decreases real wages of white 
(black) job changers by 2.67 (3.80) percent.

Part III
Conclusion
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6 Concluding Remarks and Outlook
The book contributes to the current discussion on wage rigidity: downward nominal 
wage rigidity (DNWR) and real wage rigidity of job entrants over the business cycle.
6.1 Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
In Part I of the book I show that microeconomic studies usually detect a significant 
degree of DNWR. In Germany, approximately 28 percent of wage cuts desired by 
employers are avoided because of DNWR (Knoppik and Beissinger, 2009). Based 
on the fact that DNWR exists, it is often concluded that low inflation leads to 
wage pressure on the macro level. Hence monetary policy aiming at low inflation 
is sometimes blamed for causing excess unemployment. However, the observed 
macroeconomic effects on aggregate real wages and employment seem to be 
surprisingly weak, leading Lebow et al. (1999) to speak of a “micro-macro puzzle”.
Recent studies indicate that because of DNWR not only wage cuts are conducted 
to a lower degree as is economically advisable, but also wage increases (see, e.g., 
Elsby, 2009). If wage increases are compressed, this could explain the “micro-macro 
puzzle”. Therefore, I analyze for Germany whether a compression of wage increases 
occurs when DNWR is binding by applying Unconditional Quantile Regressions 
(UQR) and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions to a dataset comprising more than 
169 million wage changes of “job stayers,” i.e., full-time workers who continually 
exercise the same job at the same employer for at least two consecutive years. I 
find evidence of a compression of wage increases and only very small effects of 
DNWR on average real wage growth. The compression of wage increase in times 
of low inflation is robust to the estimation method and the inflation variable used 
(actual inflation or expected inflation). Hence there do not seem to be negative 
consequences on aggregate employment, and DNWR cannot be used to justify 
higher inflation targets of central banks.1
Even if the macroeconomic effects of DNWR are negligible, one should, however, 
take a close look at workers affected by DNWR. If wage changes are unevenly 
distributed across workers, a microeconomic analysis can reveal effects of nominal 
wage rigidity that a macroeconomic analysis overlooks. Applying UQR to nearly 
11  million earnings changes of job stayers from a linked employer-employee dataset, 
1 It must be stressed that this conclusion is based on evaluating different steady state rates of inflation, where the 
inflation rate is correctly foreseen. It is not argued that this analysis should be used e.g. to calculate the possible 
costs of downward nominal wage rigidity in southern European countries with high nominal cost levels in the 
current crisis of the Eurozone. It cannot be concluded from my analysis that a higher temporary inflation target 
in the European Monetary Union would not be helpful for countries with a relatively high cost level in the current 
situation.
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I show that the effect of the inflation rate on workers’ real wage changes differs 
not only between but also within the percentiles of the wage change distribution. 
The effect of the inflation rate on workers’ real wage changes is conditional on 
the workers’ position in the wage change distribution, the workers’ individual 
characteristics, and on firm characteristics. In particular, the class of the worker (in 
terms of white- and blue-collar workers), whether an employer pays wages above 
the standard rates, and/or whether a work council exists in a firm have a strong 
influence on how a change in the inflation rate affects a worker’s real wage change. 
The results show that some workers are “discriminated” against by DNWR. Previous 
results are confirmed, e.g., that women more often experience nominal wage cuts 
(see, e.g., Anspal and Järve, 2011), and new insights are gained, e.g., that blue-collar 
workers in particular are affected by the compression of wage increases.
Given these results, future research on the (microeconomic) consequences of 
DNWR should consider that DNWR affects not only the lower tail of the wage 
change distribution but also its upper part. Furthermore, future research should 
consider that the effect of inflation on workers’ real wage change is conditional 
on individual and firm characteristics, and that these effects differ over the wage 
change distribution. Considering these insights in future research will provide a 
better picture of the microeconomic effects of DNWR.
The results can also be used to evaluate different approaches to analyze 
DNWR in microdata. My empirical results show that low inflation in combination 
with DNWR also affects the upper tail of the wage change distribution. As a 
consequence, empirical results based on the normality approach by Borghijs (2001) 
and the symmetry approach by Card and Hyslop (1997), which assume a symmetric 
counterfactual wage change distribution and infer the shape of the lower tail of the 
counterfactual using the upper part of the wage change distribution, must be re-
interpreted. Other approaches are also challenged, such as the earnings-function 
approach by Altonji and Devereux (2000), the histogram-location approach by 
Kahn (1997) or the approach based on the generalized hyperbolic distribution by 
Behr and Pötter (2010). They do not assume symmetry of the counterfactual wage 
change distribution but that DNWR does not affect higher percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution – an assumption that is challenged by my results.
6.2  Real Wage Rigidity
In Part II of the book I focus on real wage rigidity of newly hired workers over 
the business cycle. So far, little empirical evidence exists on how real wages of 
newly hired workers react to the business cycle. I fill this gap for Germany by 
analyzing the cyclical behavior of real wages of newly hired workers while 
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controlling for “cyclical upgrading” and “cyclical downgrading” in employee/
employer matches. The analysis is undertaken for the 1977 to 2009 period using 
German administrative longitudinal matched employer-employee wage data. I 
find that an increase in the unemployment rate of one percentage point decreases 
the real wages of job entrants within given firm-jobs by between 0.92 and 1.27 
percent. In light of the magnitude of the entry-wage cyclicality it seems that the 
idea of introducing wage rigidity in the Mortensen-Pissarides model – in order to 
generate realistic volatility of unemployment – is not supported by the empirical 
evidence. Researchers are now challenged to develop search and matching models 
that are able to generate realistic amounts of volatility of, e.g., unemployment 
when considering the empirically documented wage cyclicality. Furthermore I show 
that the procyclicality of the employment/population ratio is (nearly) identical to 
the procyclicality of real entry-wages.
As outlined in Section 5.3.2, controlling for worker fixed effects is problematic 
when analyzing job entrants only. Therefore, future research on real wage 
cyclicality (in Germany) should analyze the real wage cyclicality of job entrants and 
incumbent workers simultaneously (cf. Carneiro et al., 2012). However, this is not 
without drawbacks. For example, Carneiro et al.’s (2012) model specification forces 
the wages of job entrants and the wages of incumbents to have an identical time 
trend and, as outlined in Section 5.4.1, the estimate is probably procyclically biased.
Future research should also consider the following two ideas:
1) The effect of a change in the unemployment rate on real wages might not 
be symmetric. Hence results of regressions not allowing for asymmetric reactions 
might be biased. First evidence for Germany from work in progress (Snell and 
Stüber, 2012) shows that in general a change of the unemployment rate of one 
percentage point leads to about 0.9 percent lower/higher real wages.2 Allowing 
for asymmetric reactions, an increase in the unemployment rate of one percentage 
point leads to about 0.7 percent lower wages. A decrease in the unemployment rate 
of one percentage point, however, leads to about 1.3 percent higher real wages. As 
expected due to the strong evidence in favor of downward (nominal) wage rigidity 
(see Chapter 1) wages seem to be more rigid in downswings than in upswings. 
Asymmetric effects of unemployment on real wages are also found for the USA. 
Shin and Shin (2008, p. 13), show that for male job stayers “[…] wage growth in 
expansions […] is much greater than wage reduction in recessions […].”
2) Martins et al. (2011, p. 1) “[…] show that panel estimates of tenure 
specific sensitivity to the business cycle of wages is subject to serious pitfalls.” 
2 We analyze the wage cyclicality for job entrants and incumbent workers. In the regressions we control, inter alia, 
for worker fixed effects and firm fixed effects; however we do not control for firm-job fixed effects.
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Conclusion
Three  canonical variates are used in the literature: (1) the minimum unemployment 
rate during a worker’s time at the firm, (2) the unemployment rate at the start of 
his/her tenure, and (3) the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire 
dummy. The paper shows that all three variates can be significant and “correctly” 
signed even when each worker in the firm receives the same wage, regardless 
of tenure (equal treatment). In matched data this problem can be resolved by 
including firm-year interaction fixed effects into the regression to annihilate the 
common wage components within each firm. In the revised version of the paper 
(Martins et al., 2012a) we show in an empirical exercise – using an administrative 
German dataset – that large changes in the coefficient estimates occur when 
applying the proposed method.
Hence, future research on the cyclicality of real wages could combine the ideas 
of Carneiro et al. (2012), Martins et al. (2012b, 2011, 2012a), Snell and Stüber 
(2012): analyzing the real wage cyclicality of newly hired workers and incumbents 
workers (cf. Carneiro et al., 2012), controlling for job-firm fixed effects (cf. Carneiro 
et al., 2012), controlling for job-firm fixed effects (cf. Martins et al., 2012b) and 
firm-year fixed effects (cf. Martins et al., 2011, 2012a), while allowing asymmetric 
reactions (cf. Snell and Stüber, 2012). This would consider all recent suggestions 
regarding the reduction of estimation biases in the analysis of real wage cyclicality 
and should hence provide a better picture of the real wage cyclicality.
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A Appendix of Chapter 1
The constraint on studies that use the earnings-function approach (EFA) or the 
histogram-location approach (HLA) is due to the introduced analytical methods in 
Section 1.3.2. Extensive overviews of studies are given by Kuroda and Yamamoto 
(2007, p. 52–57) and Bläs (2008, p. 63–70).
Table A.1: Selected microdata-studies and their results
Study Countrya Datab Approachc Degree of rigidityd
Devicienti et al. (2007) I WHIP (1985–99) EFA low
Fehr and Goette (2005) CH SLFS (1991–98), 
SSIF (1990–97) 
EFA very high
Kuroda and Yamamoto (2005) J BSWS (1985–2001) HLA medium (till 
1997), very low 
(since 1998)
Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) D IABS (1975–95) EFA high/very highe
Lebow et al. (2003) USA ECI (1981–99) HLA medium
Beissinger and Knoppik (2001) D IABS (1975–95) HLA low/lowe
Castellanos et al. (2004) MEX IMSS (1986–2001) HLA high
Altonji and Devereux (2000) USA PSID (1971–92) EFA very high
Kahn (1997) USA PSID (1970–88) HLA Medium/lowe
a  CH = Switzerland, D = Germany, I = Italy, J = Japan, MEX = Mexico, USA = United States of America. 
b  BSWS = Basic Survey on Wage Structure, ECI = Employment Cost Index, IABS = IAB Beschäftigten-Stichprobe, 
IMSS = Administrative records of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, PSID = Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, SLFS = Swiss Labor Force Survey, SSIF = Sample of the Social Insurance Files, WHIP = Worker History 
Italian Panel. 
c  EFA = earnings-function approach, HLA = histogram-location approach. 
d  Degree of rigidity: degree of (downward nominal) wage rigidity measures the share of desired wage reductions 
that are prevented by DNWR. Classification of the degree of rigidity: 0 % ≥ very low < 20 %,  
20 % ≥ low < 40 %, 40 % ≥ medium < 60 %, 60 % ≥ high < 80 %, 80 % ≥ very high. 
e Blue-collar worker/white-collar worker. 

121IAB-Bibliothek 340
B Appendix of Chapter 2
B.1 Data Selection and Description
For the analysis, I only use the earnings spells of male employees from West 
Germany1 aged 16 to 65. I distinguish between white-collar workers and blue-
collar workers. The workers must be subject to social security taxes and must be 
gainfully employed in the same occupation by the same employer throughout the 
year for at least two consecutive years.2 The earnings are right-censored at the 
contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). For employees whose 
earnings are censored, the earnings changes cannot be computed correctly. Because 
the monthly income is censored as well, it is possible that yearly earnings are below 
the contribution assessment ceiling, even if several monthly earnings are censored. 
This causes some noise for earnings slightly below the contribution assessment 
ceiling. Therefore, earnings spells above 0.96 times the contribution assessment 
ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme are dropped. The lower limit 
of earnings is given by the earnings limit for “marginal” part-time workers/fringe 
workers (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze; see Table B.2). Workers with earnings below the 
lower earnings limit are not included in the BeH.
I also control for further employment spells. If a person has more than one 
employment spell liable to social security taxes, regardless of full- or part-time, 
I drop the employment spell(s) of that person for that particular year. Still, there 
are some implausibly high growth rates of (annual) earnings – up to 260 percent. 
Until 1999, these are concentrated mainly in the group of employees younger than 
25 years. This is because not every change in an employment relationship leads 
to a new spell. For example, until 1999, the BeH-item “class of worker” contains 
only the last status of the particular year. If a person ends an apprenticeship in the 
middle of a year and then is gainfully employed by the same employer for the rest 
of the year as well as the next year, I will observe the person as being gainfully 
employed two years in a row. Given that after the apprenticeship the respective 
person is typically earning more than double the previous income, an implausibly 
high growth rate of annual earnings is observed. To make sure that this and other 
effects are not at work in the data, I only analyze (annual) wage changes that are 
higher than the one percent percentile and lower than the 99 percent percentile.
After the selection, the remaining spells comprise 50,575,416 salary changes of 
white-collar workers as well as 118,593,371 wage changes of blue-collar workers 
(see Table B.1).
1 Except (West) Berlin.
2 The BeH contains 32 classifications for employment relationships. I only consider employees in regular employment. 
Therefore, I drop, e.g., trainees, insured artists and publicists, and employees in partial retirement.
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For each employee I have the following information.
Gross annual earnings: 
 • salary: gross annual salary of a full-time, white-collar worker 
 • wage: gross annual wage of a full-time worker 
The BeH does not allow separating fringe benefits from “regular” earnings. This 
is important because before 1984, the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification 
was voluntary. Since 1984, one-time payments to employees have been subject to 
social security taxation and are therefore included in the data. This leads to a level 
effect on the 1983 1984 (log) earnings changes. However, observations before and 
after 1984 should be valid. If some employers reported fringe benefits before 1984 
and others did not, it is very likely that employers were usually consistent in their 
reporting behavior.
Gross average daily earnings: 
 • gross average daily salary of a full-time, white-collar worker 
 • gross average daily wage of a full-time, blue-collar worker 
The BeH contains no data on hours worked except for information about part-time 
or full-time employment. Therefore, it is not possible to compute hourly earnings. 
Because I cannot observe changes in the working time – as long as the threshold 
for part-time employment is not crossed – I sometimes observe implausibly high 
growth rates of (annual) earnings. Using gross annual earnings and the duration 
of the employment spell, I calculate gross average daily earnings. Because white-
collar workers are being paid the same salary every month, irrespective of the 
number of working days, I calculate the gross average daily salary for a 365-day 
year. For workers, I use the exact duration of the employment spell to calculate the 
gross average daily wages. To avoid any contamination with working-time effects, 
only full-time employment spells are included.
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Table B.2:  Contribution assessment ceiling for Western Germany, lower earnings limit,  
and inflation
Year Contribution assessment ceiling for Western 
Germany (€ per year)a 
Lower earnings limit  
(§  8, Social Code IV) 
Change of the German 
consumer price indexb 
to the previous year 
in %
Compulsory pension 
insurance scheme 
’Knappschaftliche’ 
pension insurance 
1975  17,179.41  20,860.71  2,147.40  6.03 
1976  19,020.06  23,314.91  2,377.56  4.22 
1977  20,860.71  25,769.11  2,607.60c  3.70 
1978  22,701.36  28,223.31  2,392.80  2.72 
1979  24,542.01  29,450.41  2,392.80  4.13 
1980  25,769.11  31,291.06  2,392.80  5.40 
1981  26,996.21  33,131.71  2,392.80  6.33 
1982  28,836.86  35,585.91  2,392.80  5.24 
1983  30,677.51  37,426.57  2,392.80  3.23 
1984  31,904.61  39,267.22  2,392.80  2.48 
1985  33,131.71  41,107.87  2,454.24  2.04 
1986  34,358.81  42,334.97  2,515.56  –0.12 
1987  34,972.36  43,562.07  2,638.32  0.25 
1988  36,813.02  44,789.17  2,699.64  1.25 
1989  37,426.57  46,016.27  2,760.96  2.83 
1990  38,653.67  47,856.92  2,883.72  2.63 
1991  39,880.77  49,084.02  2,945.04  3.73 
1992  41,721.42  51,538.22  3,067.80  3.93 
1993  44,175.62  54,605.97  3,251.76  3.57 
1994  46,629.82  57,673.72  3,435.84  2.71 
1995  47,856.92  58,900.82  3,558.60  1.63 
1996  49,084.02  60,127.93  3,619.92  1.38 
1997  50,311.12  61,968.58  3,742.68  1.93 
1998  51,538.22  63,195.68  3,804.00  1.00 
1999  52,151.77  63,809.23  3,865.32  0.55 
2000  52,765.32  65,036.33  3,865.32  1.42 
2001  53,378.87  65,649.88  3,865.32  1.94 
2002  54,000.00  66,600.00  3,900.00  1.48 
2003  61,200.00  75,000.00  3,900.00  1.04 
2004  61,800.00  76,200.00  4,800.00  1.65 
2005  62,400.00  76,800.00  4,800.00  1.52 
2006  63,000.00  77,400.00  4,800.00  1.60 
2007  63,000.00  77,400.00  4,800.00  2.26 
a  Values from 1975 until 2001 converted from DM into Euro. Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung Knappschaft-
Bahn-See; Hauptverwaltung Bochum. 
b  Consumer price index for Germany (1995–2007) interlinked with the cost-of-living index of all private 
households for West Germany (1974–1994). Source: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
c After July 1st, 1977: €  2,270.16.
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Duration of employment:
The duration of employment is not consistent with the actual days worked but 
represents the duration of the employment contract. To make sure that a person 
is employed all year, I drop all spells with durations of employment of less than 
365 days.
Class of worker:
The BeH contains eight classes of workers: (1) trainees, (2) workers, (3) skilled 
workers3, (4) master craftsmen and foremen4, (5) white-collar workers, (6) home 
workers, (7) people with less than 18 weekly hours of work, and (8) people with 18 
and more weekly hours of work but not fully employed. I drop all classes except 
“white-collar workers”, “workers”, and “skilled workers”. The two latter classes are 
combined to the class “blue-collar workers”.
Occupational classification:
This variable describes the field of an employee’s occupational specialization. The 
BeH covers 86 occupation groups containing 328 occupations. These groups are 
used to control for job stayers. They are subsumed to six occupational fields, which 
are used in the regressions.
Qualification level of an employee:
This variable includes eight categories: (1) no formal education, (2) lower 
secondary school and intermediate (secondary) school without vocational 
qualification, (3) lower secondary school and intermediate (secondary) school 
with vocational qualification, (4) upper secondary school examination without 
vocational qualification, (5) upper secondary school examination with vocational 
qualification, (6) postsecondary technical college degree, (7) university degree, and 
(8) no classification applicable. The qualification level ’no classification applicable’ 
is subsumed to ’no formal education’.
Age of a person:
The age a person is turning in the particular year-only spells from persons aged 16 
to 65 are kept.
3 The class also contains master craftsmen and foremen (Bender et al., 1996).
4 Persons in this class are employed as blue-collar or white-collar workers.
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Further, I have the following information:
Inflation:
Change of the consumer price index (CPI) for Germany from the previous year (see 
Table B.3). I interlinked the CPI (available for 1995–2007) with the cost-of-living 
index of all private households for West Germany (available for 1962–1999).
Contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze):
The earnings covered by the BeH are right censored at the contribution assessment 
ceiling. The contribution assessment ceiling is annually adjusted to the changes 
of earnings. Some employees-miners, mine employees, sailors and railroad 
employees-are insured in a special pension insurance, called “knappschaftliche” 
pension insurance. The contribution assessment ceiling of this pension insurance is 
always higher than for the compulsory pension insurance scheme (see Table B.3). 
Since 1999, the BeH no longer indicates the pension insurance through which a 
person is insured. For this reason, I only use the contribution assessment ceiling 
of the compulsory pension insurance scheme. As shown in Tables B.4 and B.5, the 
elimination of the censored earnings spells leads to an underrepresentation of 
highly qualified (white collar) workers.
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Table B.3:  Mean age and percentage of white collar workers before and after dropping top-coded 
earnings spells
Year Mean age Share of white collar worker in %
with w/o with w/o 
top-coded spells 
1975  40.31  39.83  34  23 
1976  39.66  39.19  35  25 
1977  39.76  39.29  35  26 
1978  39.90  39.43  36  28 
1979  40.15  39.68  36  28 
1980  40.22  39.71  36  28 
1981  40.27  39.71  37  28 
1982  40.27  39.68  38  29 
1983  40.32  39.71  38  30 
1984  40.36  39.62  39  29 
1985  40.37  39.58  38  28 
1986  40.36  39.52  39  28 
1987  40.32  39.42  39  28 
1988  40.35  39.45  40  29 
1989  40.52  39.60  40  29 
1990  40.60  39.60  40  29 
1991  40.54  39.48  40  27 
1992  40.52  39.43  41  28 
1993  40.48  39.42  41  29 
1994  40.51  39.52  42  31 
1995  40.61  39.62  42  31 
1996  40.63  39.69  42  32 
1997  40.83  39.93  43  33 
1998  40.99  40.13  43  33 
1999  41.12  40.26  44  33 
2000  41.28  40.44  44  33 
2001  41.39  40.59  45  33 
2002  41.60  40.81  46  33 
2003  41.76  41.10  46  36 
2004  41.88  41.27  47  37 
2005  42.09  41.47  48  38 
2006  42.46  41.85  48  38 
2007  42.48  41.86  48  37 
Mean  40.75  40.00  41  31 
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Table B.4:  Qualification level of the employees – before and after dropping top-coded  
earnings spells
Year No formal  
education/no 
classification 
applicable
Lower secondary school  
and intermediate  
(secondary) school 
Upper secondary school 
examination 
Post- 
secondary 
technical  
college  
degree
University 
degree 
without with without with 
vocational qualification vocational qualification 
Share
with w/o with w/o with w/o with w/o with w/o with w/o with w/o
top-coded spells in %
1975  7.85  8.52  22.85  26.87  63.03  63.30  0.38  0.21  0.94  0.34  2.69  0.57  2.25  0.19 
1976  5.61  5.85  23.52  27.09  64.50  65.42  0.39  0.23  0.95  0.39  2.68  0.73  2.35  0.29 
1977  5.23  5.44  22.72  25.89  65.47  66.70  0.40  0.25  0.97  0.45  2.77  0.89  2.45  0.39 
1978  5.06  5.23  22.42  25.35  65.52  66.98  0.41  0.28  1.02  0.52  2.94  1.11  2.62  0.53 
1979  5.01  5.19  22.07  24.79  65.78  67.30  0.42  0.29  1.04  0.57  2.99  1.22  2.70  0.63 
1980  4.94  5.13  21.84  24.70  65.78  67.29  0.43  0.31  1.09  0.61  3.12  1.27  2.80  0.68 
1981  4.87  5.08  21.52  24.43  65.76  67.41  0.44  0.32  1.10  0.63  3.29  1.36  3.01  0.76 
1982  4.79  5.01  21.24  23.97  65.74  67.54  0.44  0.33  1.17  0.72  3.43  1.54  3.18  0.89 
1983  4.71  4.94  20.41  23.08  66.36  68.27  0.44  0.34  1.24  0.80  3.50  1.62  3.34  0.96 
1984  4.54  4.85  19.50  22.64  67.14  69.07  0.45  0.33  1.31  0.82  3.58  1.43  3.49  0.87 
1985  4.47  4.80  19.41  22.65  67.07  69.05  0.45  0.33  1.36  0.87  3.62  1.40  3.61  0.90 
1986  4.37  4.69  18.83  22.08  67.33  69.44  0.47  0.35  1.47  0.98  3.73  1.48  3.80  0.99 
1987  4.31  4.66  18.23  21.51  67.50  69.78  0.49  0.36  1.59  1.09  3.88  1.54  4.01  1.07 
1988  4.31  4.65  17.63  20.73  67.70  70.16  0.50  0.37  1.70  1.22  3.99  1.68  4.18  1.19 
1989  4.35  4.70  17.24  20.39  67.80  70.35  0.50  0.38  1.81  1.31  4.03  1.67  4.27  1.20 
1990  4.48  4.86  16.75  20.11  67.71  70.39  0.52  0.39  1.94  1.40  4.15  1.64  4.44  1.20 
1991  4.59  5.00  16.41  19.93  67.59  70.47  0.53  0.40  2.06  1.48  4.21  1.52  4.60  1.20 
1992  4.82  5.27  16.08  19.59  67.25  70.26  0.55  0.41  2.19  1.58  4.31  1.57  4.79  1.32 
1993  5.03  5.47  15.59  18.76  67.00  70.26  0.56  0.43  2.37  1.76  4.42  1.80  5.03  1.52 
1994  5.21  5.63  14.95  17.78  67.04  70.46  0.57  0.45  2.54  1.95  4.48  2.00  5.21  1.72 
1995  5.43  5.86  14.52  17.28  66.97  70.47  0.58  0.46  2.70  2.10  4.55  2.03  5.25  1.79 
1996  5.70  6.12  14.24  16.80  67.18  70.37  0.59  0.48  2.88  2.27  4.57  2.11  4.84  1.86 
1997  5.86  6.26  13.84  16.28  66.96  70.32  0.60  0.49  3.03  2.42  4.65  2.24  5.06  2.00 
1998  6.12  6.53  13.53  15.93  66.36  70.12  0.60  0.50  3.15  2.52  4.62  2.28  5.60  2.13 
1999  6.48  6.94  12.90  15.33  65.89  70.02  0.61  0.51  3.33  2.64  4.67  2.33  6.11  2.24 
2000  6.91  7.46  12.69  15.27  64.92  69.49  0.65  0.53  3.55  2.76  4.83  2.28  6.45  2.22 
2001  7.56  8.16  12.43  15.07  64.00  68.86  0.68  0.56  3.71  2.86  4.92  2.27  6.70  2.23 
2002  7.98  8.64  12.30  15.00  63.03  68.13  0.70  0.58  3.88  2.96  5.10  2.33  7.01  2.36 
2003  8.39  8.93  11.84  14.00  62.23  67.20  0.78  0.64  4.01  3.26  5.29  2.91  7.45  3.07 
2004  8.85  9.37  11.44  13.39  61.78  66.71  0.81  0.68  4.20  3.48  5.30  3.08  7.60  3.30 
2005  9.54  10.15  10.86  12.78  61.01  66.17  0.82  0.70  4.45  3.71  5.48  3.13  7.83  3.36 
2006  10.1  10.8  10.23  12.11  60.75  66.04  0.81  0.69  4.58  3.80  4.58  3.13  8.01  3.42 
2007  9.98  10.76  10.27  12.36  60.86  66.49  0.78  0.66  4.54  3.67  5.59  2.92  7.97  3.14 
Mean  5.98  6.39  16.68  19.51  65.49  68.49  0.56  0.43  2.36  1.76  4.12  1.85  4.79  1.56 
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B.2  Impact of Inflation on the Conditional Percentiles using 
Quantile Regression
To observe the effect of inflation on the conditional percentiles of the real wage 
change distribution, I regress the real wage change Δw on the inflation rate π, the 
average regional real wage growth rate μ (as a proxy for productivity growth), and 
further control variables.
I make use of the quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 
2005) and model conditional percentiles of the real wage change distribution as 
functions of predictors:
Q Δw i =  (τ | xirt ) x ′rt  β (τ)  (B.1)
with x ′irt   =  (μrt  πt   z ′irt ).
The vector z contains, as for the UQR, the control variables (see Table 2.2). For 
the quantile regressions, I use a 1-percent stratified sample of my data.5
The results (see Table B.5) show that at some degree not only the highest wage 
increases are compressed if inflation is low (see the results in Section 2.3), but 
also the highest wage increases conditional on the attributes of the employee and 
conditional on the region where the employee works are compressed, if inflation is 
low and DNWR binds.
Table B.5:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the conditional percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution using quantile regression
Consumer price index 
Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t | Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t |
p10  –0.075  0.012  0.000  0.904†  0.007  0.000 
p20  –0.138  0.007  0.000  0.847†  0.005  0.000 
p30  –0.148  0.005  0.000  0.854†  0.004  0.000 
p40  –0.152  0.004  0.000  0.865†  0.003  0.000 
p50  –0.142  0.004  0.000  0.871†  0.003  0.000 
p60  –0.114  0.005  0.000  0.876†  0.004  0.000 
p70  –0.072  0.006  0.000  0.893†  0.005  0.000 
p80  –0.019  0.009  0.036  0.906†  0.006  0.000 
p90  0.002  0.017  0.909  0.919†  0.012  0.000 
Notes:  Quantile regression. Controls: region dummies, age, age squared, absolute change in inflation, current and 
lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, educational class, dummy for worker with foreign 
nationality, occupational fields, dummy for white-collar worker. Bootstrapped standard errors,  
50 replications. †: coef. for productivity growth significantly different from 1 at the 5 % level.
5 The sample has been stratified by region, age, foreign nationality, worker class, occupational field, and year.
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B.3  Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using 
Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression
I estimate regressions with region-specific dummies of the following form by OLS: 
Pτ rt =  ατ  + ητ πτ   + βt μrt + z ′rt  ρτ  + ετ rt , where Pτ rt is the τth percentile of the DFL re-
weighted real wage growth distribution in region r at time t, μrt is the frictionless 
average real wage growth (measured using the observed regional average real 
wage growth rate), and πτ is the inflation rate. The vector zrt contains further 
control variables, shown in Table B.5.
Table B.6:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles of the real 
wage change distribution using least squares dummy variable regression
Consumer price index 
Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t | Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t |
p10  –0.063  0.062  0.317  0.912  0.052  0.000 
p20  –0.114  0.025  0.000  0.858†  0.026  0.000 
p30  –0.082  0.031  0.013  0.927  0.036  0.000 
p40  –0.101  0.048  0.041  0.959  0.048  0.000 
p50  –0.088  0.040  0.035  0.958  0.039  0.000 
p60  –0.043  0.035  0.233  0.987  0.032  0.000 
p70  0.005  0.030  0.878  1.004  0.025  0.000 
p80  0.047  0.032  0.144  1.024  0.030  0.000 
p90  0.091  0.059  0.129  1.057  0.058  0.000 
Notes:  Least squares dummy variable regression. I estimate the regressions weighed by region size and relax 
the assumption of independence within years. Controls: regions, mean age, absolute change in inflation, 
current and lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, percentage of the educational classes, 
percentage of workers with foreign nationality, percentage of white-collar worker, percentage of the 
occupational fields. †: coef. for productivity growth significantly different from 1 at the 5 % level. 
The estimated coefficients of this least square dummy variable (LSDV) regression 
are identical to those of the SUR described in Section 2.3.1. However, the residuals 
differ because the LSDV regression ignores the contemporaneous correlation of the 
residuals.
A comparison with the results of the SUR shows that all estimated coefficients 
of the SUR are at least as significant as the results of the LSDV regression, and 
most coefficients of the SUR, especially those for inflation, are even more highly 
significant as the coefficients of the LSDV regression.
132 IAB-Bibliothek 340
Appendix
B.4  Impact of Inflation on the Unconditional Percentiles using 
Unconditional Quantile Regression without Controlling  
for Individual Characteristics
Table B.7:  Effects of inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional percentiles  
of the real wage change distribution using unconditional quantile regression  
without individual control variables
Consumer price index 
Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t | Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t |
p10  –0.050  0.004  0.000  0.843†  0.003  0.000 
p20  –0.150  0.002  0.000  0.708†  0.002  0.000 
p30  –0.150  0.002  0.000  0.815†  0.002  0.000 
p40  –0.130  0.001  0.000  0.870†  0.001  0.000 
p50  –0.132  0.002  0.000  0.964†  0.002  0.000 
p60  –0.148  0.002  0.000  1.017†  0.002  0.000 
p70  –0.100  0.002  0.000  0.990†  0.002  0.000 
p80  –0.002  0.003  0.427  1.009†  0.003  0.000 
p90  0.140  0.005  0.000  1.084†  0.005  0.000 
Notes:  Unconditional quantile regression. Controls: region dummies, absolute change in inflation, current and 
lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984. Bootstrapped standard errors, 50 replications.  
†: coef. for productivity growth significantly different from 1 at the 5 % level. 
B.5  Impact of Expected Inflation on the Unconditional  
Percentiles using Unconditional Quantile Regression
Expected future inflation is based on inflation forecasts using ARIMA modeling 
for quarterly inflation data. The seasonally adjusted monthly CPI series USFB99 of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank has first been converted to quarterly data. Up to 1994 
the series USFB99 refers to West Germany and after 1995 to Unified Germany. 
It is already linked over January 1995. The quarterly inflation series has been 
computed as log difference to the previous year. For the estimations described 
below the maximum sample starts in 1968.q4, hence the unit root tests refer to 
the sample 1968.q4–2007.q4. Applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the 
Phillips-Peron test, I find that inflation is generated by an I(1) process. After the 
inspection of the correlogram of the first difference of inflation, I start with the 
estimation of an ARIMA(8,1,4) model for inflation for the sample 1968.q4–2007.
q4. The size of the model is then reduced using information criteria. The highest 
values of the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz information criterion 
are obtained for an ARIMA(0,1,2) model. Such a model has also been used by 
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Deutsche Bundesbank (2001) to estimate expected inflation when constructing 
a real interest rate series for Germany. However, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test on 
autocorrelation points to autocorrelation in this and all other model versions in 
which only MA terms are included. As an alternative to the ARIMA(0,1,2) model 
I therefore also consider the ARIMA(1,1,1) model for which the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected. Using the White heteroskedasticity test, in both 
ARIMA models no heteroskedasticity is found. Based on the Jarque-Bera test the 
hypothesis of normally distributed errors cannot be rejected for both models.
Table B.8:  Effects of forecasted inflation and productivity growth on the unconditional  
percentiles of the real wage change distribution using unconditional quantile  
regression
Consumer price index ARIMA(1,1,1) 
Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t | Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t |
p10  –0.040  0.003  0.000  0.903†  0.003  0.000 
p20  –0.115  0.002  0.000  0.771†  0.001  0.000 
p30  –0.084  0.001  0.000  0.864†  0.002  0.000 
p40  –0.068  0.001  0.000  0.895†  0.002  0.000 
p50  –0.050  0.001  0.000  0.972†  0.001  0.000 
p60  –0.024  0.002  0.000  1.013†  0.002  0.000 
p70  0.025  0.002  0.000  0.977†  0.002  0.000 
p80  0.044  0.002  0.000  0.948†  0.003  0.000 
p90  0.053  0.003  0.000  0.935†  0.004  0.000 
Consumer price index ARIMA(0,1,2) 
Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t | Coef. Std.Err. P >  |t |
p10  –0.042  0.003  0.000  0.896†  0.003  0.000 
p20  –0.113  0.002  0.000  0.765†  0.002  0.000 
p30  –0.085  0.001  0.000  0.866†  0.001  0.000 
p40  –0.067  0.001  0.000  0.896†  0.001  0.000 
p50  –0.042  0.001  0.000  0.967†  0.001  0.000 
p60  –0.008  0.001  0.000  1.005†  0.002  0.000 
p70  0.036  0.002  0.000  0.974†  0.002  0.000 
p80  0.045  0.002  0.000  0.952†  0.002  0.000 
p90  0.049  0.004  0.000  0.946†  0.003  0.000 
Notes:  Unconditional quantile regression. Controls: region dummies, age, age squared, forecasted absolute 
change in inflation (forecasted inflation rate of year t minus actual inflation rate of year t–1), current 
and lagged unemployment rate, dummy for the year 1984, educational class, dummy for worker with 
foreign nationality, occupational fields, dummy for white-collar worker. Bootstrapped standard errors, 
50  replications. †: coef. for productivity growth significantly different from 1 at the 5 % level. 
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As a next step I estimate ARIMA(1,1,1) models and ARIMA(0,1,2) models using 
rolling samples with a five year moving window and then forecast inflation for the 
subsequent year. For example, the first estimation is done using the sample from 
1969.q1 to 1973.q4 and the inflation forecasts then relate to 1974.q1 to 1974.q4. 
Averaging over these four values leads to the value for expected inflation for the 
year 1974. The second estimation is then done using the sample from 1970.q1 
to 1974.q4, while the forecasts relate to 1975.q1 to 1975.q4, yielding expected 
inflation for 1975 and so on. As Junttila (2001) points out, these rolling regressions 
take parameter instability in the inflation process into account, which is important 
when dealing with inflation expectations.6
My series of expected inflation, based on the ARIMA(1,1,1) model and the 
ARIMA(0,1,2) model, are used instead of actual inflation in the UQR. The results are 
reported in Table B.8.
6 Deutsche Bundesbank (2001, p. 36) also uses a five-year rolling window approach to estimate expected inflation.
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C Appendix of Chapter 3
C.1 Data Description and Data Selection
The contribution assessment ceiling is annually adjusted to the changes in earnings. 
Some employees – miners, mine employees, sailors and railroad employees – are 
insured in the ’knappschaftliche’ pension insurance. The contribution assessment 
ceiling of this pension insurance is always higher than that for the compulsory 
pension insurance scheme. Since 1999, the BeH no longer indicates through which 
pension insurance a person is insured. For this reason, I use only the contribution 
assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme (see Table B.2).
Because the monthly wage is also censored, it is possible that the yearly 
wages are below the contribution assessment ceiling even if the wages for several 
months are censored. This causes some noise for the wages that are just below the 
contribution assessment ceiling. Therefore, the wage spells that are above 0.96 
times the contribution assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance 
scheme are dropped. The lower limit of earnings is given by the earnings limit for 
the “marginal” part-time workers/fringe workers (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze; see Table 
B.2). These workers are not included in the BeH.
C.2 Model Predictions and the Suitability of the Dataset
The LIAB covers a much shorter time period than the BeH dataset used in Chapter  2 
and the inflation rate in this shorter time period is less volatile.
To ensure that the LIAB is suitable for the analysis, I run a UQR that is 
comparable to the UQR of Chapter 2: I run the UQR from Section 3.2 without the 
variables interacted with the inflation rate.
If the wage cuts and the wage increases are compressed due to DNWR, one 
should observe – according to Elsby’s (2009) model – positive coefficients for 
the inflation rate for the percentiles of the real wage change distribution below 
and above minus the inflation rate. For the percentiles of the real wage change 
distribution that correspond to minus the inflation rate, one should observe 
negative coefficients for the inflation rate (see Table 2.1).
In the LIAB, the zero nominal wage changes (Pτ  ≈ minus inflation rate) appear in 
the range equal to and above the 13th percentile and equal to and below the 31th 
percentile of the wage change distribution. The mean of these observed percentiles is 
the 24th percentile. With this information, I am able to check whether the coefficients 
for the inflation rate and the productivity growth that were obtained applying the 
UQR (see Table C.1) fit the predictions of Elsby’s (2009) model (see Table 2.1).
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Table C.1:  The marginal effects of the inflation rate and productivity growth on the percentiles of 
the real wage change distribution without interaction terms
Consumer price index Average regional real wage growth  
(as a proxy for productivity growth) 
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
p10  0.159***  (0.009)  1.158***†  (0.005) 
p20  –0.160***  (0.006)  0.799***†  (0.003) 
p30  –0.473***  (0.004)  0.623***†  (0.002) 
p40  –0.511***  (0.004)  0.654***†  (0.002) 
p50  –0.402***  (0.004)  0.831***†  (0.002) 
p60  –0.386***  (0.005)  0.823***†  (0.002) 
p70  –0.119***  (0.005)  0.881***†  (0.002) 
p80  0.480***  (0.008)  1.082***†  (0.004) 
p90  1.259***  (0.012)  1.425***†  (0.007) 
Notes:  Unconditional quantile regression. Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications). Further controls 
are used as follows: 16 regions, age, age2, absolute change in inflation, current and lagged regional 
unemployment rate, 8 educational classes, workers with foreign nationality, 6 occupational fields, 
establishment size, (establishment size)2, (establishment size)3, (establishment size)4, West Germany, 
tenure, tenure2, 10 wage levels, white-collar worker, female, work council, collective agreement, in-
house rate, wages paid above standard rate. *** p < 0.001. †: the coefficient for productivity growth is 
significantly different from unity at the 5 % level. The gray colored rows indicate the range of percentiles 
where zero nominal wage changes are observed in the data. 
As predicted for the percentiles below minus the inflation rate – the 10th  percentile  – 
I find a coefficient for the inflation rate that is positive and a coefficient for 
productivity growth that is larger than one. For the percentiles equal to minus the 
inflation rate – the 20th and 30th percentiles – I find coefficients for the inflation 
rate that are below zero and coefficients for productivity growth that are below 
one. Similar to the results of Chapter 2, I find further positive coefficients only for 
the very high percentiles – the 80th and 90th – of the real wage change distribution. 
As predicted for those percentiles, the coefficients for the productivity growth are 
larger than unity. The results clearly show that in the presence of DNWR, wage 
increases are compressed-confirming the finding of Chapter 2 that in Germany, a 
decrease in the inflation rate leads to a compression of wage increases. Because I 
find that the inflation rate has similar effects on the real wage change using the 
LIAB, as I did in Chapter 2 for Germany using the BeH data for the years 1975 to 
2007, I am confident that the LIAB is suitable for the analysis despite the shorter 
time period covered by the dataset.
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D.1 Data Preparation
Altogether, I rarely identified inconsistencies in the dataset and most inconsistencies 
were identified in spells of part-time workers or workers who were not employed 
subject to social security contributions without specific token. These spells are only 
used to identify job entrants and are not used in the regressions.
The most common inconsistency I observed were spells that were identical 
except for the end date of the spell and/or the wage. These inconsistencies can 
occur if an employment contract of a worker is supposed to end in the middle 
of a year. If the employment contract is extended, it can happen that the human 
resources department has already sent out the information about the end of the 
original employment contract to the social security administration. However, at the 
end of the year the human resources department will again sent out information 
to the social security administration, this time for the full period the worker was 
employed at the firm in that year. This can lead to two spells for a certain worker 
that are identical except for the end date of the employment. Sometimes I observed 
that the longer spell stated a higher average daily wage. This is caused by the fact, 
that the Christmas bonus is often only paid to workers that are employed at the 
end of the year and/or for at least a certain time of the year. However, even these 
inconsistencies are observed very rarely compared to the huge amount of spells 
that are observed every year.
In the following I will describe some of the corrections I used to overcome the 
inconsistencies and to obtain the dataset that I used to identify job entrants: 
1. If I observed two or more identical spells I only kept one of these spells. 
2. If I observed spells that were identical except for one variable I used, e.g., the 
following rules to decide which spell to keep: 
(a) spell a with wage ≠ 0 and spell b with wage A = 0 Y keep spell a
(b) wage of spell a > wage of spell b Y keep spell a
(c) spell a ends after spell b Y keep spell a 
3. If I observed spells that were identical except for two variables I used, e.g., the 
following rule to decide which spell to keep: 
(a) wage of spell a ≠ wage of spell b & spell a ends after spell b Y keep spell a
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D.2  Data Selection Using the Selection Criteria of Martins et al.
(2012b)
In addition to the sample selection criteria described in Section 5.2.1 – keeping 
only particular jobs that are observed in at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period 
– I also apply sample selection criteria according to Martins et al. (2012b). These 
“further selection criteria” (FSC) are very restrictive.
For the FSC dataset I consider only newly hired workers of firms which employed 
at least 50 full time workers at 30th of June in at least five years of the 1977 to 
2009 period. Additionally, I only include a particular job in the sample of entry 
jobs if for at least half the years that the firm is in the dataset the two following 
requirements are met: 
1. the job accounted for at least three new hires of full-time workers in that year, 
and 
2. the particular job accounted for at least 10 percent of the firm’s new hires of 
full-time workers in that year. 
Due to the FSC only jobs are included in the sample which are observed for at 
least three years1. Martins et al. (2012b) apply the FSC because they are focusing 
on so called “port-of-entry” jobs (see, e.g., Kerr, 1954; Doeringer and Piore, 1970). 
Martins et al. (2012b, p. 41) “[…] do not mean, however, to subscribe to [… the] stark 
description in which firms hire into only a limited number of such jobs, with other 
jobs filled almost exclusively by internal promotions and reassignments. [..  The] 
focus on jobs that recurrently show new hires […] is driven mainly by a pragmatic 
concern – to identify cyclical variation in hiring wages by job, we need those wages 
to be observed in multiple years spanning different business cycle conditions.”
Due to the very restrictive FSC not only a lot of jobs but also a lot of firms are 
dropped from the original dataset. Table D.1 provides summary statistics and shows 
the effects of the FSC on sample sizes.
1 Strictly speaking, two and a half years would be sufficient – the firm has to exist for at least five years and the job 
must be observed in at least half the years the firm is in the dataset.
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Table D.1:  Number of entry jobs per year using the “typical” real entry-wage as endogenous 
variable
 
Real mean wage Real modal wage
Dataset Dataset 
with FSC w/o FSC with FSC w/o FSC
Mean  54,205  1,122,075  11,137  631.226 
Min  42,020  749,063  9,080  448,963 
Max  62,340  1,377,595  13,470  775,498 
Sum  1,788,777  37,029,491  367,529  20,830,454 
Alternatively, I use the daily real wage wijt paid in period t to worker i newly hired 
into job j. Table D.2 again provides summary statistics and shows the effects of the 
FSC on sample sizes.
Table D.2:  Number of job entrants per year using the individual daily real wage as endogenous 
variable
Daily real wage
Dataset 
with FSC w/o FSC 
Mean 932,513 3,702,449 
Min 578,294 2,400,124 
Max 1,270,840 4,745,060 
Sum 30,772,919 122,180,828
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D.3 Data Description and Data Selection – Further Tables
Table D.3:  Number of entry jobs and job entrants by year for the dataset with individual real 
wages without FSC and the drawn sub-sample of this dataset
Year  Individual real wages, dataset without FSC
 Number of job entrants  Number of entry jobs
 Sub-sample  Original dataset  Sub-sample  Original dataset
1977  1,822,918  3,577,107  217,583  962,528 
1978  1,843,047  3,644,717  228,657 1,019,450 
1979  2,154,174  4,180,031  245,901 1,112,191 
1980  2,046,373  4,012,189  252,777 1,134,087 
1981  1,752,155  3,470,701 246,583 1,075,261
1982  1,390,748 2,832,966  232,736  976,068 
1983  1,348,089  2,710,091  230,645  949,209 
1984  1,560,836  3,026,232  241,060  994,372 
1985  1,631,436  3,091,450  245,109  998,811 
1986  1,767,417  3,430,838  261,615 1,106,821 
1987  1,689,074  3,246,381  258,972 1,066,650 
1988  1,807,335  3,441,390  267,887  1,108,947 
1989  2,100,055  3,956,568  283,842 1,198,174 
1990  2,391,281  4,484,235  297,592 1,284,954 
1991  2,246,769  4,304,481  295,368  1,277,104 
1992  1,927,238  3,848,049  288,015  1,234,042 
1993  2,056,169  4,355,962  301,181  1,343,865 
1994  2,132,882  4,393,695  300,874  1,333,431 
1995  2,249,038  4,543,150  309,126  1,377,595 
1996  2,026,732  4,125,827  292,528  1,282,525 
1997  2,041,771  4,077,069  289,933  1,267,135 
1998  2,215,217  4,354,929  297,880  1,329,964 
1999  2,286,129  4,573,666  302,989  1,374,377 
2000  2,480,050  4,745,060  298,422  1,345,393 
2001  2,195,164  4,330,871  285,258  1,286,034 
2002  1,857,721  3,692,327  258,271  1,149,262 
2003  1,685,672  3,343,330  237,497  1,045,761 
2004  1,562,565  3,069,068  219,533  958,107 
2005  1,516,168  2,962,827  208,030  916,005 
2006  1,765,947  3,323,631  210,366  938,147 
2007  1,880,255  3,509,777  210,413  946,274 
2008  1,650,361  3,122,089  199,284  886,884 
2009  1,236,791  2,400,124  171,952  749,063 
Mean  1,888,411  3,702,449  257,208  1,122,075 
Min  1,236,791  2,400,124  171,952  749,063 
Max  2,480,050  4,745,060  309,126  1,377,595 
Sum  62,317,577  122,180,828 8,487,899  37,028,491 
Notes:  FSC: “further selection criteria” (see Appendix D.2). Jobs in the sample without FSC are observed at least 
3  years of the 1977 to 2009 period.
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Table D.4: Number of entry jobs and job entrants by year for different samples
Year  Individual real wages and real mean wages  Real modal wages
 Number of job entrants  Number of entry jobs  Number of job entrants  Number of entry jobs
 Dataset  Dataset  Dataset  Dataset 
 with  w/o  with  w/o  with  w/o  with  w/o 
 FSC  FSC  FSC  FSC
1977  886,019  3,577,107  47,837  962,528  268,919  1,008,539  9,495  496,456 
1978  894,609  3,644,717  49,114  1,019,450  272,156  1,038,035  9,575  529,977 
1979  1,050,035  4,180,031  50,885  1,112,191  310,233  1,157,801  9,615  571,497 
1980  1,012,511  4,012,189  52,031  1,134,087  293,375  1,122,416  9,445  594,675 
1981  849,939  3,470,701  52,101  1,075,261  240,001  1,019,112  9,428  588,001 
1982  662,769  2,832,966  50,775  976,068  180,329  875,739  9,912  559,749 
1983  656,650  2,710,091  50,501  949,209  182,691  867,544  10,278  553,494 
1984  756,423  3,026,232  51,426  994,372  221,216  961,644  10,212  573,108 
1985  807,117  3,091,450  51,558  998,811  244,079  982,977  10,176  574,241 
1986  860,956  3,430,838  52,647  1,106,821  251,062  1,057,838  9,584  625,188 
1987  837,028  3,246,381  52,426  1,066,650  245,511  1,010,076  9,705  608,137 
1988  904,067  3,441,390  53,124  1,108,947  270,533  1,066,980  9,668  628,335 
1989  1,062,304  3,956,568  54,101  1,198,174  313,286  1,166,709  9,413  658,651 
1990  1,214,943  4,484,235  54,897  1,284,954  372,947  1,308,744  9,538  690,343 
1991  1,145,106  4,304,481  54,754  1,277,104  342,143  1,245,828  9,541  689,361 
1992  953,085  3,848,049  54,199  1,234,042  259,790  1,123,255  9,080  679,246 
1993  962,162  4,355,962  60,322  1,343,865  299,912  1,386,618  12,010  744,743 
1994  1,001,916  4,393,695  61,010  1,333,431  321,871  1,410,525  12,176  740,015 
1995  1,090,876  4,543,150  62,239  1,377,595  344,831  1,459,045  12,105  769,578 
1996  976,505  4,125,827  60,993  1,282,525  316,160  1,370,161  12,700  733,884 
1997  1,002,769  4,077,069  61,063  1,267,135  327,990  1,360,383  12,889  728,320 
1998  1,139,079  4,354,929  62,140  1,329,964  392,045  1,458,422  12,723  761,967 
1999  1,164,435  4,573,666  62,340  1,374,377  396,646  1,500,633  12,760  775,498 
2000  1,270,840  4,745,060  62,238  1,345,393  410,450  1,528,862  12,557  753,306 
2001  1,132,311  4,330,871  60,495  1,286,034  363,109  1,400,595  12,426  727,715 
2002  960,419  3,692,327  57,439  1,149,262  313,366  1,261,486  12,654  669,674 
2003  877,450  3,343,330  55,124  1,045,761  311,703  1,199,956  13,207  621,412 
2004  811,292  3,069,068  52,909  958,107  292,498  1,134,828  13,470  577,913 
2005  778,837  2,962,827  50,401  916,005  283,220  1,091,694  12,985  551,627 
2006  844,207  3,323,631  49,739  938,147  328,840  1,230,806  12,987  550,745 
2007  859,158  3,509,777  48,929  946,274  307,725  1,232,283  12,029  543,152 
2008  768,808  3,122,089  47,000  886,884  267,849  1,082,093  11,576  511,483 
2009  578,294  2,400,124  42,020  749,063  204,047  876,051  11,610  448,963 
Mean  932,513  3,702,449  54,205  1,122,075  295,471  1,181,748  11,137  631,226 
Min  578,294  2,400,124  42,020  749,063  180,329  867,544  9,080  448,963 
Max  1,270,840  4,745,060  62,340  1,377,595  410,450  1,528,862  13,470  775,498 
Sum  30,772,919  122,180,828  1,788,777  37,028,491  9,750,533 38,997,678  367,529 20,830,454 
Notes:  FSC: “further selection criteria” (see Appendix D.2). Jobs in the sample without FSC are observed at least  
3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period.
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Table D.5:  Contribution assessment ceiling for Germany, lower earnings limit, inflation, and  
unemployment rate
Year Contribution assessment ceiling for Germany  
(€ per month)a 
German CPIb U ratec  
(in %) 
Compulsory pension 
insurance scheme 
Lower earnings limit  
(§  8, Social Code IV) 
Index Change to 
previous 
year (in %) West  East  West  East 
 Germany  Germany 
1975  1,431.62   178.95   47.47  6.03  4.7 
1976  1,585.01   198.13   49.48  4.22  4.6 
1977  1,738.39   217.30d   51.31  3.70  4.5 
1978  1,891.78   199.40   52.70  2.72  4.3 
1979  2,045.17   199.40   54.88  4.13  3.8 
1980  2,147.43   199.40   57.84  5.40  3.8 
1981  2,249.68   199.40   61.50  6.33  5.5 
1982  2,403.07   199.40   64.72  5.24  7.5 
1983  2,556.46   199.40   66.81  3.23  9.1 
1984  2,658.72   199.40   68.47  2.48  9.1 
1985  2,760.98   204.52   69.86  2.04  9.3 
1986  2,863.23   209.63   69.77  –0.12  9.0 
1987  2,914.36   219.86   69.95  0.25  8.9 
1988  3,067.75   224.97   70.82  1.25  8.7 
1989  3,118.88   230.08   72.82  2.83  7.9 
1990  3,221.14   240.31   74.74  2.63  7.2 
1991  3,323.40   245.42   77.53  3.73  7.3 
1992  3,476.79   255.65   80.57  3.93  8.5 
1993  3,681.30  2709.85  270.98  199.40  83.45  3.57  9.8 
1994  3,885.82  3016.62  286.32  224.97  85.71  2.71  10.6 
1995  3,988.08  3272.27  296.55  240.31  87.11  1.63  10.4 
1996  4,090.34  3476.78  301.66  255.65  88.31  1.38  11.5 
1997  4,192.59  3630.17  311.89  265.87  90.01  1.93  12.7 
1998  4,294.85  3579.04  317.00  265.87  90.91  1.00  12.3 
1999  4,345.98  3681.30  322.11  322.11  91.41  0.55  11.7 
2000  4,397.11  3630.17  322.11  322.11  92.71  1.42  10.7 
2001  4,448.24  3732.43  322.11  322.11  94.51  1.94  10.3 
2002  4,500.00  3750.00  325.00  325.00  95.91  1.48  10.8 
2003  5,100.00  4250.00  325.00  400.00  96.91  1.04  11.6 
2004  5,150.00  4350.00  400.00  400.00  98.51  1.65  11.7 
2005  5,200.00  4400.00  400.00  400.00  100.01  1.52  13.0 
2006  5,250.00  4400.00  400.00  400.00  101.61  1.60  12.0 
2007  5,250.00  4550.00  400.00  400.00  103.91  2.26  10.1 
2008  5,300.00  4500.00  400.00  400.00  106.61  2.60  8.7 
2009  5,400.00  4550.00  400.00  400.00  107.01  0.38  9.1 
a  Values from 1975 until 2001 converted from DM into Euro. Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung Knappschaft-
Bahn-See; Hauptverwaltung Bochum. 
b  Consumer price index (CPI) for Germany (1995–2009) interlinked with the cost-of-living index of all private 
households for West Germany (1974–1994). Source: German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). 
c  Unemployment rate in relation to dependent civilian labor force (abhängige zivile Erwerbspersonen) for West 
Germany (1976–1990) and Germany (1991–2009). Source: Statistic of the German Federal Employment Agency 
(Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit). 
d After July 1st, 1977: € 2,270.16. 
143IAB-Bibliothek 340
Appendix of Chapter 5
D.4 Robustness Checks
To assure the robustness of the results from Section 5.3, I run several additional 
regressions. Tables D.6 and D.7 show estimated coefficients of the unemployment 
rate using the FSC dataset (see Appendix D.2). Tables D.8 and D.9 show estimated 
coefficients of the unemployment rate in slightly altered versions of the baseline 
models (presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6), and Table D.8 shows estimated coefficients 
of the lagged unemployment rate.
Table D.6:  Model 1 – estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate (δ^   ) using “typical” real 
entry-wages
 
Modal wage Mean wage 
Dataset Dataset 
with FSC w/o FSC with FSC w/o FSC
(1.0) 1st and 2nd stage unweighted OLS 
–0.84**
(0.38)
–1.03***
(0.35)
–0.88**
(0.33)
–0.94***
(0.34)
(1.1) 1st stage unweighted OLS, 2nd stage 
OLS weighted by number of entry jobs 
–0.84***
(0.37)
–1.00***
(0.34)
–0.88**
(0.32)
–0.92***
(0.33)
Note: *** Significant at 1 % level; ** 5 % level. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. FSC: “further selection criteria” (see Appendix  D.2). Jobs in the sample without 
FSC are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period. Further controls used: secular time trend controls 
(t  and t 
2) and a dummy for years ≥ 1984.
Table D.7:  Model 2 – estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate (δ^   ) using individual real 
wages
Dataset 
with FSC w/o FSC 
(2.0) 1st stage unweighted OLS, 2nd stage 
OLS unweighted 
–0.84***
(0.27)
–0.83***
(0.27)
(2.1) 1st stage unweighted OLS, 2nd stage 
OLS weighted by number job entrants 
–0.92***
(0.29)
–0.90***
(0.28)
Note: *** Significant at 1 % level.
Robust standard errors in brackets. FSC: “further selection criteria” (see Appendix  D.2). Jobs in the sample without 
FSC are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period. Further controls used: secular time trend controls 
(t  and t 
2) and a dummy for years ≥ 1984. Individual controls used in the 1st stage regression: education, sex, 
nationality, age, age2, and length of the employment spell. 
To control for possible differences in the wage setting between West Germany and 
East Germany, I run some regressions in which I introduce a dummy variable for 
East Germany (East ). The Dummy is equal to one if the place of work is located 
in East Germany (base category: West Germany). Hence the first stage regressions 
(equations 5.1 and 5.3) change to:
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ln(wjt ) = αj   + βt  + Eastjt  + εjt  and  (D.1)
ln(wijt ) = αj   + βt  + γ ′xit  + Eastjt  + εjt  , respectively. (D.2)
However, introducing the East Dummy hardly affects the coefficients of the 
unemployment rate. Also, all other robustness checks show coefficients of the 
unemployment rate which are in the vicinity of the estimated coefficients of the 
baseline models. As expected, the coefficients of the lagged unemployment rate are 
higher than the coefficients of the unemployment rate and are therefore somewhat 
more procyclical.
 
Table D.8:  Robustness checks for model 1 – estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate (δ^   ) 
using “typical” real entry-wages
 Estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate 
Modal wage Mean wage 
Dataset Dataset 
with FSC w/o FSC with FSC w/o FSC
Like (1.1) but 2nd reg. weighted by 
number of job entrants 
 –0.72**  –0.93***  –0.78**  –0.85** 
 (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
Like (1.1) but with a dummy for East 
Germany in the 1st reg 
 –0.84**  –1.00***  –0.88**  –0.92*** 
 (0.37)  (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.33) 
Like (1.1) but 2nd reg. weighted by 
number of job entrants and with a 
dummy for East Germany in the  
1st reg. 
 –0.72**  –0.93***  –0.78**  –0.85** 
 (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
Like (1.1) but 2nd reg. unweighted 
and with a dummy for East Germany 
in the 1st reg. 
 –0.84**  –1.03***  –0.88**  –0.94** 
 (0.38)  (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.34) 
Notes:  OLS regression. Robust standard errors in brackets. FSC: “further selection criteria” (see Appendix D.2). 
Jobs in the sample without FSC are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period. Further controls 
used: secular time trend controls (t  and t 
2) and a dummy for years ≥ 1984. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Estimates for regressions (1.1) and (1.2) see Table 5.5.
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Table D.9:  Robustness checks for model 1 – estimated coefficients of the lagged unemployment 
rate (δ^   ) using “typical” real entry-wages
 Estimated coefficients of the lagged unemployment rate 
Modal wage Mean wage 
Dataset Dataset 
with FSC w/o FSC with FSC w/o FSC
Like (1.0)  –0.89**  –0.89**  –0.84**  –0.82** 
 (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
Like (1.1)  –0.89**  –0.87**  –0.84***  –0.80** 
 (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.30)  (0.04) 
Like (1.1) but 2nd reg. weighted by 
number job entrants 
 –0.80**  –0.82**  –0.77**  –0.75** 
 (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.28)  (0.30) 
Like (1.1) but with a dummy for East 
Germany in the 1st reg. 
 –0.89**  –0.87**  –0.84***  –0.80** 
 (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.30)  (0.31) 
Like (1.1) but 2nd reg. weighted by  
number job entrants and with a 
dummy for East Germany in the  
1st reg. 
 –0.80**  –0.82**  –0.77**  –0.75** 
 (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.28)  (0.30) 
Like (1.1) but 2nd reg. unweighted 
and with a dummy for East Germany 
in the 1st reg. 
 –0.89**  –0.89**  –0.84**  –0.82** 
 (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
Notes:  OLS regression. Robust standard errors in brackets. FSC: “further selection criteria” (see Appendix D.2). 
Jobs in the sample without FSC are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period. Further controls 
used: secular time trend controls (t  and t 
2) and a dummy for years ≥ 1984. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Estimates for regressions (1.1) and (1.2) see Table 5.5.
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Table D.10:  Robustness checks for model 2 – estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate (δ^   ) 
using individual real wages
Estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate 
Dataset 
with FSC w/o FSC
Like (2.0) but with a dummy for East 
Germany in the 1st reg. 
–0.84***  –0.83*** 
 (0.27)  (0.27)
Like (2.0) but without individual 
controls in the 1st reg. 
 –0.84***  –0.83*** 
 (0.27)  (0.27)
Like (2.0) but without individual 
controls in the 1st reg. and with a 
dummy for East Germany in the 1st 
reg. 
 –0.78**  –0.76** 
(0.32)  (0.31)
Like (2.1) but with a dummy for East 
Germany in the 1st reg. 
 –0.92***  –0.90*** 
 (0.29)  (0.28)
Like (2.1) but without individual 
controls in the 1st reg. 
 –0.92***  –0.90***
 (0.29)  (0.28)
Like (2.1) but without individual 
controls in the 1st reg. and with a 
dummy for East Germany in the  
1st reg. 
–0.88**  –0.85** 
(0.34)  (0.33)
Notes:  OLS regression. Robust standard errors in brackets. FSC: “further selection criteria” (see Appendix D.2). 
Jobs in the sample without FSC are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 2009 period. Further controls 
used: secular time trend controls (t  and t 
2) and a dummy for years ≥ 1984. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Estimates for regressions (1.1) and (1.2) see Table 5.6. 
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D.5  Evaluation of the Regression Models – Further Tables
Table D.11:  Summary statistics for the differences between individual worker’s log real wage and 
“typical” real wage in job/year
 
Dataset w/o FSC Dataset with FSC
Mean job wage Modal job wage Mean job wage Modal job wage 
Observations 122,180,828 38,997,678 30,772,919 9,750,533 
Mean  0.000  0.010  0.000  0.025 
Std. Dev.  0.202  0.227  0.241  0.343 
Variance  0.0409  0.052  0.058  0.118 
Skewness  –1.111  0.871  –1.271  0.514 
Kurtosis  11.382  21.176  9.634  9.538 
Note: *** Significant at 1 % level; ** 5 % level.
FSC:  “further selection criteria” (see Appendix D.2). Jobs in the sample without FSC are observed at least 3 years 
of the 1977 to 2009 period. 
Figure D.1:  Distribution of differences between individual worker's log real wage and “typical”  
log real wage
Note:  Distribution of differences between individual worker's log real wage and “typical” log real wage in job/
year for the dataset w/o FSC (left Panel) and for the dataset with FSC (right Panel). FSC: “further selection 
criteria” (see Appendix D.2). Jobs in the sample without FSC are observed at least 3 years of the 1977 to 
2009 period.
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Abstract
This book contributes to two current issues of discussion on wage rigidity: 
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) and real wage rigidity of newly hired 
workers over the business cycle. 
The first and major part of the book focuses on DNWR. Chapter  1 provides an 
overview on causes, extent, and implications of DNWR with a focus on Germany. 
The second chapter deals with the macroeconomic consequences of DNWR. I show 
that wage cuts as well as wage increases are compressed in the presence of DNWR. 
Because of the compression of wage increases, the macroeconomic effects on 
aggregate real wages are weak. I find that a decrease in inflation of one percentage 
point only causes an average increase of real wage growth between 0.013 and 
0.060 percent. The results indicate that DNWR does not provide a strong argument 
against low inflation targets. The third chapter analyzes whether or not DNWR 
affects workers differently, conditional on their characteristics, their position in the 
wage change distribution, and their employers’ characteristics. The results confirm 
previous results, e.g., that women resist nominal wage cuts less than men (see, e.g., 
Anspal and Järve, 2011), and new insights are gained, e.g., that blue-collar workers 
in particular are affected by the compression of wage increases.
The second part of the book focuses on real wage rigidity of newly hired workers 
over the business cycle. One way of generating realistically cyclical fluctuations 
in the unemployment rate in the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides model is the 
introduction of rigid wages into the model. This part of the book contributes 
to the current discussion on whether or not this assumption can be confirmed 
empirically. The fourth chapter provides a brief overview on previous research and 
recent developments concerning the real wage rigidity of newly hired workers 
over the business cycle. The fifth chapter presents the first empirical evidence 
for a large economy, namely for Germany, on the cyclicality of real entry-wages 
while controlling for “cyclical upgrading” and “cyclical downgrading” in employee/
employer matches, by introducing firm-job fixed effects in the regressions. The 
results show that entry-wages in Germany are not rigid, but considerably respond 
to business cycle conditions. An increase in the unemployment rate of one 
percentage point leads to about 0.92 to 1.27 percent lower real entry-wages. The 
results strengthen Pissarides’ (2009) dismissal of theories based on cyclically rigid 
hiring wages. 
The third part of the book summarizes the results and offers an outlook for 
future research.
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Kurzfassung
Dieses Buch leistet einen Beitrag zu zwei Themenbereichen der Lohnrigidität, die 
aktuell in der Wissenschaft diskutiert werden: Abwärtsnominallohnrigidität und 
Real lohnrigidität neu eingestellter Arbeitnehmer über den Konjunkturzyklus. 
Der erste Teil des Buches beschäftigt sich mit Abwärtsnominallohnrigidität. 
Kapitel 1 bietet einen Überblick über Ursachen, Ausmaß und Implikationen von 
Abwärtsnominallohnstarrheit. Im zweiten Kapitel werden die makroökonomischen 
Konsequenzen von Abwärtsnominallohnstarrheit betrachtet. Ich zeige, dass Ab-
wärtsnominallohnrigidität kein starkes Argument gegen die Niedriginflationspolitik 
der Zentralbanken bietet. Ein Rückgang der Inflation um einen Prozentpunkt be-
wirkt lediglich eine durchschnittliche Zunahme der Reallöhne zwischen 0,013 und 
0,060 Prozent. Das dritte Kapitel untersucht, ob die Wirkung von Abwärtsnominal-
lohnstarrheit auf die Löhne der Arbeitnehmer von Charakteristiken des Arbeit-
nehmers, ihrer Position in der Lohnänderungsverteilung, und/oder von Charak-
teristiken des Arbeitgebers abhängt. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen frühere Erkenntnisse, 
z. B. dass Frauen stärkere nominale Lohnkürzungen hinnehmen (müssen) als Männer 
(vgl. Anspal and Järve, 2011), und neue Erkenntnis können gewonnen werden, z. B. 
dass Arbeiter stärker als Angestellte von der Kompression von Lohnerhöhungen be-
troffen sind.
Der zweite Teil des Buches beschäftigt sich mit Reallohnrigidität neu einge-
stellter Arbeitnehmer über den Konjunkturzyklus. Eine Möglichkeit, im kanonischen 
Mortensen-Pissarides Search and Matching Modell realistisch starke zyklische 
Schwankungen in der Arbeitslosigkeit zu generieren, ist die Implementierung von 
rigiden Löhnen. Dieser Buchteil ist ein Beitrag zur aktuellen Diskussion, ob die Imple-
mentierung rigider Löhne empirisch gestützt werden kann. Das vierte Kapitel bietet 
einen Überblick bisheriger empirischer Untersuchungen und neuester Entwicklun-
gen. Das fünfte Kapitel stellt die erste empirische Evidenz zur Zyklizität von Ein-
stiegslöhnen, unter Kontrolle der Arbeitnehmer-Arbeitgeber-Partie, für Deutschland 
bereit. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass reale Einstiegslöhne in Deutschland nicht starr 
sind, sondern wesentlichen konjunkturellen Schwankungen unterliegen. Ein Anstieg 
der Arbeitslosenquote um einen Prozentpunkt führt zu 0,92 bis 1,27  Prozent nie dri-
geren realen Einstiegslöhnen. Die Ergebnisse stärken Pissarides’ (2009) Ablehnung 
von Theorien, die auf zyklisch rigiden Löhnen auf bauen. 
Abschließend fasst der dritte Teil des Buches die Ergebnisse der ersten beiden 
Teile zusammen und bietet einen Ausblick für zukünftige Forschung.
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